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A	   new	   wave	   of	   transnational	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions	   (LSLAs)	   in	   developing	   countries	   has	  
erupted	   since	   the	   mid-­‐2000s.	   Foreign	   and	   domestic	   investors,	   private,	   governmental	   or	  
public/private	   joint	   ventures,	   are	   acquiring	   long-­‐term	   leases	   or	   ownership	   rights	   of	   extensive	  
portions	  of	  land	  in	  countries	  among	  the	  least	  developed.	  LSLAs	  tap	  into	  a	  large	  pool	  of	  meanings	  and	  
are	  placed	  at	   the	   intersection	  of	  development	  economics,	   governance	  and	   law,	   land	  use	  and	   land	  
cover	   change,	   the	   memory	   of	   colonial	   practices,	   peasants	   resistance,	   and	   human	   rights.	   Thus,	  
scholars,	   civil	   society	   and	   international	   organizations	   have	   developed	   high	   interest	   for	   these	   land	  
deals,	  with	  high	  controversy	  between	  some	  who	  see	  in	  this	  phenomenon	  the	  opportunity	  for	  long-­‐
awaited	   investments	   into	   ‘poor’	   countries	   agricultural	   sector,	   and	   others	   who	   associate	   LSLAs	   to	  
dispossession,	   human-­‐rights	   violations	   and	   increasing	   poverty	   for	   local	   populations.	   Despite	   a	  
growing	  body	  of	  research	  and	  knowledge	  on	  the	  topic,	  various	  gaps	  exist,	  among	  others:	  the	  missing	  
link	  between	   the	  evidence	  emerging	   from	  numerous	  and	  often	  anecdotal	   case	   studies	  on	   the	  one	  
hand	  and	  the	  studies	  and	  observations	  performed	  at	  macro	   level	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (Borras	  Jr	  and	  
Franco	  2010;	  Cotula	  2012;	  Messerli	  et	  al.	  2013);	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  empirical	  material	  analysing	  how	  
land	   deals	   are	   implemented	   on	   the	   ground	   (Edelman	   and	   al.,	   2013)	   and	   their	   mid-­‐term	  
consequences	  on	  livelihoods	  (Oya,	  2013);	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  perspective	  to	  analyse	  
the	  phenomenon	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  local	  populations	  (De	  Schutter	  2011;	  Golay	  and	  Biglino,	  2013).	  	  
This	  report	  presents	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  two-­‐years	  long	  research	  project	  funded	  by	  the	  Swiss	  Network	  
for	  International	  Studies.	  Based	  on	  comprehensive	  case	  studies	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia,	  the	  research	  
was	   structured	   around	   three	   core	   questions.	   What	   are	   the	   development	   contexts	   and	   processes	  
among	  various	  actors	  and	  institutions	  across	  different	  administrative	  scales	  that	  are	  determining	  the	  
negotiation	  and	  implementation	  of	  LSLAs?	  What	  are	  the	  impacts	  of	  land	  deals	  on	  local	  populations	  in	  
terms	   of	   livelihood	   system,	   resilience	   and	   adaptation?	   What	   role	   do	   human	   rights	   law	   and	  
monitoring	  and	  judicial	  mechanisms	  play	  (and	  what	  role	  could	  they	  play)	   in	  mitigating	  the	  tensions	  
related	   to	   land	   investments	   and	   protecting	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   local	   populations?	   The	   research	  
draws	  on	  land	  change	  science	  as	  a	  strand	  of	  geography	  and	  sustainability	  science,	  a	  perspective	  that	  
is	  grounded	  in	  political	  economy	  with	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  agrarian	  transformation,	  and	  legal	  and	  
human	   rights	   studies	   with	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   right	   to	   food.	   Beyond	   its	   contribution	   to	  
academic	  debates,	  the	  research	  aims	  at	  providing	  material	   for	  policy	  dialogue	  with	  authorities,	  UN	  
agencies,	  international	  financial	  institutions	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  in	  their	  effort	  and	  
programs	   to	   accompany	   the	   implementation	   of	   LSLAs	   and	   to	   mitigate	   their	   possible	   negative	  
impacts.	  
The	   first	   chapter	   of	   the	   paper	   describes	   and	   analyses	   the	   recurrent	   linkages	   between	   LSLAs	  
implementation	  processes	  and	  different	  contexts	  of	  agrarian	  transitions	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia.	  The	  
second	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   implementation	   of	   land	   acquisitions	   and	   the	   consequent	  
transformation	   of	   rural	   livelihoods	   in	   the	   mid-­‐term.	   The	   third	   chapter	   identifies	   human	   rights	  
violations	  associated	  with	  LSLAs	  and	  evaluates	   the	   role	   that	  human	  rights	   law	  and	  monitoring	  and	  
judicial	  mechanism	  play	  (or	  could	  play)	  in	  mitigating	  the	  tensions	  related	  to	  LSLAs	  and	  protecting	  the	  





1.	  MARGINAL	  LAND	  OR	  MARGINAL	  PEOPLE?	  LINKING	  PROCESSES	  OF	  LARGE-­‐
SCALE	  LAND	  ACQUISITIONS	  TO	  CONTEXTS	  OF	  AGRARIAN	  TRANSITION1	  
Past	   and	   present	   agrarian	   transitions	   in	   Southeast	   Asia	   have	   affected	   land	   use	   and	   livelihoods	   in	  
many	   different	   ways,	   producing	   diverse	   and	   often	   fragmented	   socio-­‐ecological	   contexts.	   The	  
implementation	  of	  LSLAs	  hence	  leads	  to	  highly	  dissimilar	  outcomes	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another.	  This	  
raises	   problems	   in	   generalising	   case	   studies	   and	   locally	   obtained	   empirical	   results	   for	   policy	  
formulation	   at	   the	   regional	   or	   national	   level.	   Guided	   by	   the	   intention	   of	   producing	   evidence	   for	  
informed	  policies	  and	  following	  the	  emerging	  call	  for	  typologies	  of	  LSLAs	  (Borras	  Jr	  and	  Franco	  2012)	  
this	  chapter	  aims	  at	  describing	  and	  understanding	  recurrent	  linkages	  between	  LSLA	  implementation	  
processes	  and	  different	  geographical	  contexts	  of	  agrarian	   transitions.	  More	  precisely	  we	  will	   focus	  
on	  (i)	  analysing	  in	  what	  socio-­‐ecological	  contexts	  LSLAs	  occur	  and	  if	  such	  contexts	  relate	  to	  specific	  
types	  of	  LSLAs	  (crops,	  investors,	  etc.);	  (ii)	  studying	  the	  decision-­‐making	  and	  implementation	  of	  LSLAs	  
involving	   different	   actors	   across	  multiple	   scales	   and	   analysing	   if	   and	   how	   the	   specific	   contexts	   of	  
agrarian	   transition	   influence	   these	   processes.	   Finally	   we	   will	   (iii)	   discuss	   recurrent	   interactions	  
between	  the	  processes-­‐based	  insights	  on	  LSLAs	  and	  the	  place-­‐based	  attributes	  of	  contexts	  in	  which	  
LSLAs	  occur	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   how	  our	   results	   can	  be	   generalised	   and	  out-­‐scaled.	  Our	  underlying	  
assumption	  is	  that	  similar	  interactions	  between	  LSLA	  processes	  and	  contexts	  of	  agrarian	  change	  can	  
inform	  cases	  that	  occur	  in	  different	  places	  and	  at	  different	  times.	  This	  learning	  process	  can	  facilitate	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  times	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  
1.1.	  Regional	  dynamics	  and	  agrarian	  transitions	  in	  mainland	  Southeast	  Asia	  	  
In	   the	   past	   decades	   mainland	   Southeast	   Asia	   has	   seen	   an	   extremely	   high	   pace	   of	   parallel	  
transformations	   of	   societies	   and	   agriculture	   moving	   from	   rural	   subsistence	   oriented	   agriculture	  
towards	   more	   urbanized	   societies	   and	   industrialized	   and	   market-­‐based	   forms	   of	   land	   use.	   These	  
changes	  also	  termed	  as	  ‘agrarian	  transition’	  (De	  Koninck	  2004;	  Rigg	  2006)	  comprise	  processes	  such	  
as	   agricultural	   intensification	   and	   territorial	   expansion,	   integration	   into	   market-­‐based	   economy,	  
migrations,	  new	  forms	  of	  regulations	  governing	  agricultural	  production,	  urbanisation,	  etc.	  (ibid.).	  Yet	  
these	   processes	   do	   not	   happen	   in	   a	   linear	  manner	   and	   they	   occur	   at	   different	   paces	   in	   different	  
places.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  contexts	  of	  agrarian	  transition	  vary	  considerably	  across	  the	  region	  and	  across	  
different	   scales.	   This	   heterogeneity	   leads	   to	   high	   dependencies	   between	   places,	   regions	   and	  
countries	  in	  terms	  of	  resource	  and	  capital	  flows,	  migration,	  value	  chains,	  knowledge,	  economic	  and	  
political	  power.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  beginning	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  cannot	  be	  
so	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   2008-­‐2009	   food	   and	   financial	   crisis,	   which	   are	   commonly	   considered	   as	  
triggers	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   at	   global	   level.	   Evidence	   from	   the	   land	   matrix	   global	   observatory	  
(Anseeuw	  et	  al.	  2012)	  points	  to	  the	  mostly	  regional	  and	  transboundary	  dynamics	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  
rather	   than	   to	  global	  driving	   forces	   related	   to	   the	   ‘land	   rush’2.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	   the	  detailed	  
inventory	  of	   land	  concessions	  in	  Lao	  PDR	  manifesting	  a	  take-­‐off	  of	  transboundary	  land	  concessions	  
as	  early	  as	  2000	  as	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  1.1	  (Schönweger	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   This	   chapter	   has	   been	   prepared	   by	   Peter	   Messerli,	   Amaury	   Peeters	   and	   Oliver	   Schönweger,	   with	   the	  
contribution	  of	  Vong	  Nanhthavong	  
2	  Macro-­‐economic	   factors	   such	  as	   the	  oil-­‐price	  yet	  played	  a	  key	   role.	  Not	  only	  does	   it	   link	   to	   the	   interest	   in	  
biofuels	  but	   it	   is	   also	   closely	   correlated	   to	   the	  price	  of	   natural	   rubber	   and	  hence	   contributed	   to	   the	   rubber	  




At	   the	   level	   of	   the	   four	   countries,	   Laos,	   Cambodia,	   Vietnam	   .and	   Thailand,	   the	   following	   key	  
indicators	   illustrate	   the	   heterogeneity	   and	   the	   related	   differentials	   in	   terms	   of	   agricultural	   and	  
societal	  development	  (see	  table	  1.1).	  	  
	  
	  
Selected	  indicators	  of	  agrarian	  contexts	   Indicator	   Lao	  PDR	   Cambodia	   Vietnam	   Thailand	  
Agricultural	  land1	  (2011)	   %	  of	  land	  area	   10.3	   32.0	   35.0	   41.2	  
Rural	  population	  per	  agricultural	  land1	  (2012)	   Persons	  per	  sq.	  km	   181	   210	   559	   208	  
Employment	  in	  agriculture2	  	  (2011)	   %	  of	  total	  population	   72.0	   55.8	   48.4	   38.7	  
Agriculture,	  value	  added	  2	  (2011)	   (%	  of	  GDP)	   30.8	   36.7	   22.0	   12.4	  
Agricultural	  machinery2	  (2000)	   Tractors	   per	   100	   sq.	   km	  
of	  arable	  land	  
8.5	   5.8	   262.0	   280.0	  
Agriculture,	  value	  added	  annual	  growth2	  	  (2012)	   %	  annual	  growth	   10.4	   3.1	   3.4	   4.1	  
Rice	  paddy	  productivity1	  (2012)	   Tons	  per	  hectare	   3.7	   3.0	   5.6	   3.0	  
Estimated	  share	  of	  shifting	  cultivation3	  (2011)	   %	  of	  land	  area	   28	   2.0	   n.a.	   2.0	  
GDP	  per	  capita2	  (2012)	   Current	  US$	   1399	   946	   1596	   5480	  
Poverty	  headcount	  ratio	  at	  $1.25	  a	  day	  (PPP)	  2	  
(C.:	  2009,	  L.:	  2008;	  T.:	  2011,	  V.:	  2008)	  
%	  of	  total	  population	   33.8	   18.6	   16.85	   0.38	  
Foreign	   direct	   investment,	   net	   inflows2	  
(C.:	  2011,	  L.:	  2011;	  T.:	  2012,	  V.:	  2002)	  
BoP,	  current	  Mio	  US$	   301	  	   901	   7'430	  	   8'616	  
Net	  ODA	  received2	  (2011)	   %	  of	  central	  government	  
expenses	  
42.5	   57.4	   n.a.	   -­‐0.2	  
Mobile	  cellular	  subscriptions	  2	  (2012)	   Per	  hundred	  people	   101.9	   132.0	   149.4	   120.3	  
	  
Table	   1.1:	   Selected	   indicators	   of	   agrarian	   transitions	   at	   national	   level.	   Source:	   1	   FAOSTAT	   (http://faostat.fao.org/)	   ,	   FAO;	   2World	  
Development	  Indicators	  (data	  covering	  2009-­‐2012);	  The	  World	  Bank.	  3	  (Messerli,	  Heinimann,	  and	  Epprecht	  2009;	  Schmidt-­‐Vogt	  et	  al.	  2009)	  
We	  observe	  a	  decreasing	  importance	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  with	  regard	  to	  employment	  and	  GDP	  
ranging	  from	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  to	  Vietnam	  and	  Thailand.	  This	  is	  paralleled	  by	  increasing	  population	  
densities	   per	   agricultural	   land	   with	   extremely	   high	   values	   in	   Vietnam,	   agricultural	  machinery	   and	  
decreasing	  poverty	  rates.	  Laos	  represents	  the	  country	  with	  the	  highest	  share	  of	  shifting	  cultivation	  
and	  the	  highest	  poverty	  headcount	  ratio.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  high	  value	  added	  in	  agricultural	  growth,	  
in	   rice	   paddy	   productivity	   and	   mobile	   cellular	   subscriptions	   indicate	   rapid	   transformations.	  
Governments	   in	   Laos	   and	   Cambodia	   depending	   on	   strong	   support	   from	   official	   development	  
assistance	   (ODA)	   will	   be	   challenged	   to	   provide	   the	   institutional	   guidance	   for	   such	   rapid	  
transformations.	  
High	   heterogeneity	   of	   development	   contexts	   and	   the	   related	   dependencies	   manifest	   themselves	  
also	  at	  sub-­‐national	  levels.	  They	  have	  emerged	  from	  rapid	  and	  geographically	  uneven	  transformation	  
processes,	  and	  conceptualisations	  thereof	  have	  struggled	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  sheer	  pace	  of	  change	  
in	  the	  Asian	  countryside	  (Rigg	  2005).	  Early	  theories	  of	  intensification	  in	  the	  Malthus/Boserup	  sense	  
were	  soon	  expanded	  to	  account	  for	  off-­‐farm	  activities,	  rural	  livelihood	  needs	  and	  aspirations	  related	  
to	   accessibility	   of	   and	   access	   to	   markets,	   education,	   health	   services	   and	   technical	   information	  
(Castella,	   Lestrelin,	   and	   Buchheit	   2012).	   When	   analysing	   the	   systemic	   interactions	   between	  
agricultural	  activities	  and	  livelihoods,	  Rigg	  (2005)	  highlights	  the	  de-­‐linking	  of	  poverty	  and	  livelihoods	  
in	   rural	  areas	   from	   farming	  and	  agricultural	   resources	  occurring	  nowadays	   in	   rural	   Southeast	  Asia.	  
Land,	  he	  stipulates,	   remains	  an	   important	   factor	  but	   is	  not	  ultimately	  decisive	   for	   rural	  poverty	  or	  
prosperity.	  He	  refers	  to	  emerging	  patterns	  of	  change	  in	  the	  Southeast	  Asian	  countryside	  to	  construct	  
a	  generalised	  framework	  for	  agrarian	  transition	  where	  the	  current	  trend	  from	  subsistence	  to	  semi-­‐




farming.	   The	   first	   three	   agrarian	   types	   of	   the	   following	   generalised	   typology	   shall	   guide	   the	  




	   Type	   Agrarian	  type	   Characteristics	   Possible	   indicators	   for	   spatial	   delineation	  of	  context	  
Past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  !
	  	  Present	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  !
	  Future	  
1	   Subsistence	   Shifting	  cultivation,	  farming,	  hunting,	  
collecting	   and	   fishing,	   village	  
focused;	   some	   barter	   and	   sale	   of	  
surplus	  
Land	  use	  mosaics,	   forests	   as	   share	   of	   land	  
cover,	   share	   of	   shifting	   cultivation,	  
ethnicity,	   accessibility	   in	   terms	   of	   travel	  
time,	  poverty	  incidence.	  	  
2	   Semi-­‐subsistence	   Combination	   of	   subsistence	   with	  
market	   oriented	   agriculture;	  
livelihoods	   remain	   farming	   and	  
village	  focused.	  	  
More	   intensive	   cropping	   mosaics,	  
population	  densities,	  agricultural	  practices,	  
accessibility	  to	  markets,	  agricultural	  inputs.	  
3	   Pluri-­‐active	   I	  
(postpeasant)	  
Combination	   of	   semi-­‐subsistence	  
with	   various	   non-­‐farm	   activities,	  
both	   on-­‐farm	   and	   off-­‐farm.	  
Migration	  and	  delocalisation	  of	  work	  
increasing	  significant.	  
Land	  holding	  per	  household,	  diversification	  
of	   activities	   (off-­‐farm)	   and	   income,	  
migration	   and	   unbalanced	   sex	   ratios,	  
dependency	   ratios,	  accessibility	   to	  centres,	  
infrastructure,	   economic	   activities	   at	  
household	  levels.	  	  
4	   Professional	   Professionalization	   of	   farming	   and	  
the	   emergence	   of	   agrarian	  
entrepreneurs.	   Larger	   scale,	  
commercial	   enterprises	   utilising	  
inputs,	   integration	   into	   national	   and	  
international	   markets,	   and	  
technology	  intensive.	  	  
Land	   concessions	   and	   leases,	   farm	   size,	  
large-­‐scale	   irrigated	   fields	   and	   other	  
plantations,	   agricultural	   inputs,	   access	   to	  
processing,	   trade	   points,	   land	   tenure,	  
reduction	   of	   poverty	   incidence,	  
environmental	  decline	  and	  social	  malaise.	  	  	  	  
5	   Pluri-­‐active	   II	  
(post-­‐professional)	  
Return	  or	  adaptation	  of	  pluri-­‐activity	  
as	  part-­‐time	  farmers	  make	  a	  lifestyle	  
choice	   and	   combine	   farming	   with	  
other	  occupations.	  	  
Economic	   activities,	   farm	   size	   per	  
household,	  income,	  accessibility.	  	  	  
6	   Remnant	  
smallholder	  
Rural	  households	  who	  remain	  tied	  to	  
the	   land	   and	   to	   traditional	  
production	  systems.	  
Land	  use	  mosaics,	  forests,	  share	  of	  shifting	  
cultivation,	  ethnicity,	  remoteness,	  poverty.	  	  
Table	  1.2	  Generalised	  typology	  of	  agrarian	  transitions	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  based	  on	  Rigg	  (2005),	  adapted	  by	  the	  authors.	  	  
	  
1.2.	  The	  geography	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia3	  
Materials	  and	  Methods	  
In	  both	  countries,	  national	  databases	  on	  LSLAs	  were	  built	  up	  from	  different	  sources	  of	   information	  
and	  were	  checked	  through	  data	  triangulation.	  Based	  on	  these	  unique	  data	  sets,	  a	  descriptive	  analysis	  
of	  different	  LSLAs	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  investment’s	  country	  of	  origin,	  the	  purpose	  and	  the	  
date	   when	   the	   deals	   were	   granted.	   Based	   on	   the	   geo-­‐references	   of	   the	   LSLAs	   and	   using	   spatial	  
datasets	  at	  national	   levels,	   the	  agrarian	  context	  of	   LSLAs	  was	   investigated	  using	  GIS	   software.	  The	  
following	   attributes	   were	   covered	   by	   the	   analysis:	   poverty	   incidence,	   accessibility	   to	   populated	  
centres,	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  minorities,	  land	  cover,	  forest	  changes	  and	  topographical	  features.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Research	  results	  in	  relation	  to	  Laos	  in	  this	  chapter	  largely	  draw	  on	  previously	  published	  results	  (Schönweger	  




Key	  results	  for	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  
The	   opening	   to	   private	   investments	   in	   the	   form	   of	   land	   concessions	   has	   been	   present	   in	   the	  
economic	  development	  policies	  of	  both	  countries	   for	  many	  years.	  Correspondingly	  and	  following	  a	  
previous	  experience	  on	  a	  concessions	  system	  in	  Cambodia,	  a	  new	  legal	  framework	  has	  been	  adopted	  
(land	  laws)	  for	  this	  type	  of	  investment	  in	  Cambodia	  (since	  2001)	  and	  in	  Laos	  (since	  2003).	  A	  series	  of	  
further	   laws	   and	   decrees	   have	   been	   released	   in	   both	   countries	   reinforcing	   and	   concretising	   this	  
inclination	  (RGC,	  2005;	  GOL	  2004,	  2008)	  together	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  institutional	  mechanism	  
for	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  new	  laws	  and	  policies.	   	  The	  response	  from	  investors	  has	  not	  been	  
slow	   to	  materialize	  with	  what	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  a	   ‘land	   rush’	   in	  both	   countries.	  Governments	  
have	  made	  these	  private	  investments	  in	  land	  explicitly	  an	  important	  part	  of	  their	  rural	  development	  
policy	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  poverty.	  	  
Despite	   several	   moratoriums	   on	   granting	   land	   concessions	   in	   Laos	   (2007,	   2009	   and	   2012)	   and	   in	  
2012	  in	  Cambodia,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  with	  currently	  about	  
2,642	  land	  deals	  encompassing	  1.1	  million	  hectares	  in	  Laos	  (Schönweger	  et	  al.	  2012),	  and	  486	  deals	  
comprising	  4.5	  million	  hectares	  in	  Cambodia.	  These	  granted	  lands	  constitute	  around	  5%	  and	  25%	  of	  
the	  total	  national	  territory	  of	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  respectively.	  The	  number	  of	  concessions	  granted	  in	  
Laos	  increased	  fifty	  fold	  from	  2000	  to	  2009	  with	  a	  steep	  increase	  since	  2005	  (Figure	  1.1).	  	  The	  trend	  
in	  Cambodia4	  also	  shows	  a	  sharp	  increase	  of	  land	  deals	  since	  2005.	  The	  most	  impressive	  observation	  
however	   remains	   that	   since	   2000,	   it	   has	   taken	   only	   eight	   years	   to	   double	   the	   area	   granted	   to	  
investors,	  going	  from	  0.5	  million	  to	  over	  a	  million	  hectares	  and	  it	  took	  only	  4	  years	  to	  double	  it	  again,	  
reaching	  over	  2	  million	  hectares	  in	  2012.	  	  	  
Figure	  1.1:	  Trends	  of	  land	  concessions	  granted	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos.	  Source:	  LSLAs	  national	  data	  sets.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   The	   figures	   about	   Cambodia’s	   trends	   only	   concerned	   economic	   land	   concessions	   (ELCs)	   as	   no	   information	  




Land	  deals	  in	  Laos	  are	  spread	  throughout	  the	  
country	  with	   highest	   shares	   in	   terms	   of	   land	  
in	   the	   North.	   Cambodian	   land	   projects	   are	  
clearly	   concentrated	   in	   three	   clusters:	   in	   the	  
North,	   in	   the	   North-­‐East	   and	   in	   the	   South-­‐
West	  regions.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  private	  
investments	   in	   land,	   domestic	   deals	   play	   an	  
important	   role	   in	   terms	   of	   number.	   But	   as	  
their	  average	  size	  in	  Laos	  is	  much	  smaller,	  the	  
overall	   area	   is	   less	   relevant	   as	   compared	   to	  
foreign	   investment.	   Foreign	   investments	   in	  
Laos	   and	   Cambodia	   are	   dominated	   by	  
neighbouring	   China	   and	   Vietnam	   (Map	   1.1).	  
Thai	   investors	   are	   more	   present	   in	   Laos,	  
whereas	   Cambodia	   has	   more	   investors	   from	  
Malaysia.	  
	  
Map	  1.1:	  Investment	  project	  locations	  and	  investor’s	  countries	  of	  origin	  for	  Cambodia	  (bottom)	  and	  Laos	  (above).	  
Proximity	   can	   partly	   explain	   the	   distribution	   of	   investors,	   as	   Vietnamese	   companies	   are	   more	  
present	  in	  the	  Southern	  region	  of	  Laos	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  Northern	  cluster	   in	  Cambodia.	  Chinese	  are	  
more	  present	   in	   the	  Northern	  part	  of	   Laos	  but	   they	  are	  also	   located	   in	   the	   three	  main	   clusters	   in	  
Cambodia.	  Domestic	   investors	  are	  evenly	  distributed	  following	  the	  global	  distribution	  of	   land	  deals	  
across	  their	  respective	  country.	  	  




#	  Deals	   Total	  Area	  (ha)	   #	  Deals	   Total	  Area	  (ha)	  
Rubber	  with	  and	  without	  other	  plant	   248	  (68%)	   144,453	  (47%)	   113	  (79%)	   784,446	  (52%)	  
Timber	  wood	  (Trincomalee,	  Agarwood,	  Pinus	  
Merkusii,	  Teak,	  Bamboo)	  
25	  (7%)	   5,026	  (2%)	   8	  (6%)	   173,087	  (11%)	  	  
Pulp	  wood	  (Eucalyptus,	  Acacia)	   54	  (15%)	   135,949	  (44%)	   11	  (8%)	   71,570	  (5%)	  
Oil	  Palm	  with	  and	  without	  other	  plant	   n.a.	   n.a.	   6	  (4%)	   104,155	  (7%)	  
Other	  tree	  plantations	   40	  (11%)	   20,807	  (7%)	   4	  (3%)	   382,424	  (25%)	  
TOTAL	   367	  (100%)	   306,234	  (100%)	   142	  (100%)	   1,515,682	  (100%)	  
Main	  purposes	  in	  the	  agriculture	  subsector	  
Lao	  PDR	   Cambodia	  
#	  Deals	   Total	  Area	  (ha)	   #	  Deals	   Total	  Area	  (ha)	  
Sugarcane	  with	  or	  without	  other	  plant	   10	  (3%)	   34,969	  (25%)	   10	  (23%)	   65,596	  (23%)	  
Jatropha	   49	  (14%)	   25,179	  (18%)	   n.a.	   n.a.	  
Coffee	   59	  (16%)	   19,105	  (14%)	   n.a.	   n.a.	  
Cassava	  with	  or	  without	  other	  plant	   34	  (9%)	   14,747	  (11%)	   6	  (14%)	   38,492	  (14%)	  
Other	  (Corn,	  Cashew	  nut,	  Livestock,…)	   208	  (58%)	   46,015	  (33%)	   27	  (63%)	   177,183	  (63%)	  
TOTAL	   360	  (100%)	   140,015	  (100%)	   43	  (100%)	   281,271	  (100%)	  
Table	  1.3	  Main	  purposes	  of	  land	  deals	  among	  the	  forestry	  and	  the	  agricultural	  subsectors	  in	  Laos	  and	  in	  Cambodia.	  Source:	  
LSLAs	  national	  datasets.	  
In	  terms	  of	  production,	  the	  focus	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  is	  on	  very	  few	  export-­‐oriented	  cash	  crops.	  In	  
the	  forestry	  subsector,	  which	  in	  both	  countries	  exceeds	  the	  agricultural	  subsector,	  rubber	  is	  ranked	  
by	  far	  the	  most	  important	  investment	  followed	  by	  other	  tree	  plantations	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  pulp	  wood	  
(eucalyptus	  and	  acacia)	  in	  Laos	  and	  timber	  wood	  (trincomalee,	  teak	  and	  pinus	  merkusi)	  in	  Cambodia.	  
Regarding	  the	  agricultural	  subsector,	  investors	  have	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  sugarcane	  and	  cassava	  in	  
both	  countries,	  with	  a	  specific	  emphasis	  in	  Jatropha	  and	  coffee	  in	  Laos,	  and	  corn	  and	  cashew	  nut	  in	  
Cambodia	  (Table	  1.3).	  
The	  spatial	  overlay	  of	  LSLAs	  with	  key	  features	  of	  the	  agrarian	  context	  concerned	  reveals	   important	  
spatial	  patterns.	   It	  can	  be	  shown	  that	   in	  Laos	  concessions	  have	  been	  granted	  to	  a	   large	  proportion	  
within	  so-­‐called	  un-­‐stocked	  forest	  areas	  (45%	  of	  the	  total	  land	  granted),	  a	  land	  cover	  category	  often	  
attributed	  to	  fallow	  land	  in	  shifting	  cultivation	  areas	  and	  hence	  representing	  upland	  and	  small	  scale	  
agriculture.	   In	   Cambodia,	   the	   land	   area	   granted	   consists	   mainly	   of	   forests	   (77%),	   and	   includes	  
farmers’	   upland	   fallow	   fields	   as	   well.	   Moreover	   the	   analysis	   reveals	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  
investments	   are	   located	   in	   relatively	   easily	   accessible	   areas.	   Almost	   half	   of	   the	   concessions	   are	  
within	  an	  hour	   from	  the	  closest	  district	   capital	   in	   Laos	  and	  about	  37%	  of	   them	  are	  within	  2	  hours	  
from	   the	   closest	   provincial	   capital	   in	   Cambodia.	   Yet	   the	   main	   investors	   (Domestic,	   Chinese	   and	  
Vietnamese)	  also	  hold	  projects	   in	  some	  of	  the	  most	  remote	  regions	  of	  both	  countries	  which	   is	  not	  
completely	   surprising	   considering	   that	   they	   are	   mainly	   investing	   in	   the	   forestry	   subsector	   which	  




When	   analysing	   the	   incidence	   of	  
poverty	  of	  the	  contexts	  affected	  by	  
LSLAs	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  in	  Laos	  the	  
poverty	  incidence	  is	  generally	  lower	  
than	  the	  national	  average,	  whereas	  
the	   opposite	   situation	   is	   observed	  
in	   Cambodia	   (Table	   1.4).	   We	   must	  
however	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   these	  
numbers	   refer	   to	   national	   poverty	  
lines,	   which	   are	   not	   comparable	  
across	   the	   two	   countries.	   As	   the	  
poverty	   indicator	   of	   1.25$	   in	   table	  
(XX)	   shows,	   the	   prevalence	   of	  
absolute	   poverty	   in	   Laos	   is	  
generally	   higher	   than	   in	  Cambodia.	  
Accordingly,	   people	   concerned	   by	  
LSLAs	  in	  Laos	  and	  considered	  as	  not	  
so	   poor	   relative	   to	   the	   national	  
poverty	  line	  may	  hence	  have	  similar	  
incomes	   as	   Cambodian	   households	  
considered	   poor	   by	   their	   national	  
standard.	   	   We	   hence	   focus	   our	  
analysis	   on	   the	   relative	   poverty	  
incidence	  of	  areas	  affected	  by	  different	  types	  of	  LSLAs	  and	  investors.	  




accessibility	  of	  investment	  projects	  
National	  Poverty	  Lines	  &	  LSLAs	  
Lao	  PDR	   Cambodia	  
National	  
Population	  




Population	   around	  
ELCs	  
Poverty	  Incidence	  (PI)	   34.7%1	   27%	   28.3%2	   32.6%	  
%	   of	   villages	   with	   PI	   higher	   (poorer)	   than	  
National	  average	  
62%	   52%	   50.1%	   63.4%	  
#	   of	   villages	   with	   PI	   higher	   (poorer)	   than	  
National	  average	  
10,0353	   1,927	   6,699	   1,097	  
Details	  of	  Poverty	  Incidence	  in	  areas	  under	  
investment	  
Lao	  PDR	   Cambodia	  
Poverty	  
Incidence	  (PI)	  
%	  of	  Villages	  with	  PI	  




%	  of	  Villages	  with	  PI	  
Higher	   (Poorer)	  
than	  National	  Avg	  





	  	  	  	  	  38%	  
	  	  	  	  	  34%	  
59%	  
	  	  	  	  	  69%	  
	  	  	  	  	  61%	  
37%	  
	  	  	  	  	  54%	  
	  	  	  	  	  40%	  
76%	  
	  	  	  	  	  87%	  
	  	  	  	  	  70%	  




	  	  	  	  39%	  
62%	  
	  	  	  	  n.a.	  
32%	  
	  	  	  	  	  31%	  
58%	  
	  	  	  	  	  46%	  
Secondary	  Sector	   21%	   31%	   19%	   20%	  
Tertiary	  Sector	   21%	   21%	   28%	   64%	  
Table	   1.4:	   National	   Poverty	   Incidence,	   National	   Poverty	   Incidence	   in	   areas	   under	   investment	   in	   Laos	   and	   in	   Cambodia.	  
Source:	  1	  calculation	  based	  on	  Epprecht	  et	  al	  (2008)	  	  ²	  calculation	  based	  on	  ID	  Poor	  dataset	  and	  Commune	  database	  book	  
(NCCD)	  2008-­‐2010	  Note:	  The	  capital,	  Phnom	  Pen	  was	   	  not	  taken	   into	  account	   in	  the	  calculation	  as	  no	  data	  over	  poverty	  
incidence	  was	  available	  there,	  3	  based	  on	  most	  current	  village	  location	  data	  for	  the	  Lao	  PDR	  (MPI,	  NGD,	  2008),	  4	  based	  on	  
village	  location	  data	  for	  Cambodia	  (RGC,	  2009)	  
In	  both	  countries,	  domestic	  investments	  clearly	  target	  less	  poor	  areas	  than	  foreign	  investments.	  It	  is	  
also	   worth	   noting	   that	   poverty	   incidence	   in	   areas	   with	   Vietnamese	   and	   Chinese	   investments	   is	  
higher	  than	  the	  national	  average	  of	  investments.	  	  
Taking	   into	   account	   the	   geographical	   distribution	   of	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   groups,	   spatial	   analysis	   has	  
shown	   that	   the	  dominant	  group	   in	   Laos,	   Lao-­‐Tai,	   are	  more	  affected	  by	   land	  deals	   as	   compared	   to	  
their	   national	   representation	   (72%	   vs.	   64%).	   Nevertheless,	   the	  Mon-­‐Khmer	  make	   up	   a	   significant	  
portion	   of	   the	   population	   of	   areas	  with	   land	   concessions	   (25%).	   The	   situation	   is	   a	   bit	   different	   in	  
Cambodia	  where	   the	   second	  dominant	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  group	  after	   the	  Khmer	   ,	   i.e.	   the	  Chaam,	  as	  
well	  as	  several	  smaller	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Phnom,	  Charaay,	  Tampoun	  and	  Kuoy	  are	  
those	  who	   are	   comparatively	  more	   affected.	   This	   last	   observation	   for	   Cambodia	   has	   to	   be	   linked	  
with	   the	   clustering	   of	   investment	   projects	   in	   the	   North	   and	   North-­‐East	   regions	   where	   smaller	  
communities	  are	  mainly	  present.	  The	  affected	  share	  of	  the	  total	  population	  can	  vary	  from	  one	  group	  
to	   another	   one	  with	  more	   than	   70%	  of	   the	   total	   population	   concerned	   by	   land	   projects	   for	   eight	  
Cambodian	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  groups	  or	  more	  than	  55%	  of	  their	  population	  affected	  for	  12	  groups.	  This	  
can	  raise	  concerns	  about	  the	  sustainability	  of	  their	  customs	  and	  traditional	  livelihood	  systems.	  
Emerging	  patterns	  of	  LSLAs	  related	  to	  contexts	  of	  agrarian	  transition	  
In	  Laos	  and	   in	  Cambodia	  we	  have	  seen	  a	  steep	   increase	   in	  LSLAs	   in	   the	  past	  decade	  manifesting	  a	  
more	  than	  50-­‐fold	  multiplication	  of	  land	  deals	  for	  Laos	  and	  a	  fourfold	  increase	  of	  areas	  granted	  for	  
Cambodia.	  Whereas	   in	   Laos	   deals	   are	   smaller	   in	   size	   but	  more	   numerous	   in	   number,	   Cambodian	  




differences	  but	  also	  some	  important	  commonalities.	  Being	  aware	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  oversimplification	  we	  
nevertheless	   undertake	   to	   present	   a	   very	   coarse	   generalisation	   in	   terms	   of	   emerging	   patterns	   of	  
LSLAs	  and	  their	  related	  context	  of	  agrarian	  transition.	  	  
First	  we	   identified	   investments	   in	  the	  forestry	  sector	  and	  specifically	   for	  rubber	  that	  represent	  the	  
single	   most	   important	   type	   of	   LSLA.	   For	   these	   deals,	   Vietnamese	   and	   Chinese	   investors	   play,	  
together,	   a	   predominant	   role	   as	   compared	   to	   domestic	   investors.	   They	   search	   for	   large	   and	  
connected	  plots	  of	  land	  if	  possible	  not	  too	  far	  from	  their	  riparian	  border.	  In	  most	  cases	  these	  plots	  
are	   found	   in	   land	  areas	  categorized	  as	   ‘forests’.	   In	  Cambodia	   this	  category	  actually	  corresponds	   to	  
forests,	   which	   include	   partly	   upland	   farming	   systems,	   whereas	   in	   Laos	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘un-­‐stocked	  
forests’	  represent	  follow	  land	  in	  shifting	  cultivation	  areas.	  In	  both	  countries	  these	  deals	  manifest	  the	  
highest	  poverty	  incidence	  of	  all	  LSLA-­‐affected	  areas	  being	  mostly	  ethnic	  minorities	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  
both	  ethnic	  majority	   as	  well	   as	  ethnic	  minorities	   in	   Laos.	   The	  agrarian	   systems	  affected	  are	  partly	  
subsistence	  farming	  systems	  but	  due	  to	  the	  considerably	  good	  accessibility	  mainly	  semi-­‐subsistence	  
systems	  where	   farmers	   diversify	   to	   commercial	   crops	   (including	   rubber)	   and	   partly	   even	   off-­‐farm	  
income	  (type	  1	  and	  2).	  	  	   
Second	   we	   observe	   LSLAs	   in	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   where	   domestic	   investors	   as	   well	   as	   other	  
nationalities	  (Thai,	  Malaysia,	  Indian,	  Western,	  etc.)	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  These	  deals	  are	  normally	  
smaller	   in	   size,	   located	   in	   slightly	   better	   accessibility	   to	   centres	   and	   in	   Laos	   represent	   areas	  with	  
lower	  poverty	  incidence.	  Even	  though	  they	  still	  target	  areas	  classified	  as	  forests	  they	  interfere	  more	  
often	   with	   pre-­‐existing	   agriculture	   in	   cropping	   mosaics	   and	   hence	   an	   agricultural	   context	  
characterized	  by	  semi-­‐subsistence,	  commercial	  agriculture	  and	  off-­‐farm	  activities	   (type	  2,3	   in	  table	  
1.2).	   In	   Cambodia,	   these	  moderately	   populated	   areas	   also	   experience	   strong	   in-­‐migrations	   due	   to	  
new	  opportunities	  offered	  partly	  by	  new	  land	  concessions	  over	  there.	   In	  other	  words	  the	  LSLAs	  do	  
not	   only	   interfere	   with	   the	   local	   agrarian	   system	   (type	   2	   and	   3	   in	   table	   1.2)	   but	   also	   implant	   a	  
professional	  agrarian	  type	  (type	  4)	  and	  attract	  immigrants	  of	  the	  post-­‐peasant	  type	  (type	  3).	  	  
1.3.	  Decision	  making	  and	  implementation	  of	  LSLAs	  	  
Materials	  and	  methods	  
This	   part	   of	   the	   research	   focusing	   on	   decision	   making	   and	   implementation	   of	   LSLAs	   aimed	   at	   i)	  
improving	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  overall	  decision-­‐making	  process	  on	  LSLAs,	  and	  ii)	  identifying	  the	  
main	   involved	  actors	  at	  different	   levels,	  and	   iii)	   identifying	  the	  key	   factors	   influencing	  the	  granting	  
and	   the	   land	   allocation	   process.	   In	   order	   to	   address	   these	   issues	   one	   PhD	   student,	   three	   Swiss	  
Master	  Students,	   two	   international	   researchers	  and	   four	  national	   researchers	  conducted	   fieldwork	  
between	  October	  2012	  and	  June	  2013	  in	  both	  countries.	  The	  study	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  7	  provinces	  in	  
Laos,	   and	   in	  2	  provinces	   in	  Cambodia	   focusing	  on	  altogether	  33	   LSLAs.	   Semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  
with	  government	  officials	  from	  various	  sectors	  and	  administrational	  levels,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  company	  
representatives	  were	  conducted.	  Approximately	  60	  villages	  were	  visited	  and	  questionnaire	  surveys	  
were	  carried	  out	  with	  village	  authorities	  and	  households.	  	  
Political	  Drivers	  and	  Rational	  for	  granting	  land	  concessions	  
In	   Laos	   and	   Cambodia	   the	   rational	   of	   both	   governments	   to	   grant	   large	   areas	   to	   foreign	   but	   also	  
domestic	   companies	   must	   be	   understood	   within	   the	   context	   of	   economic	   growth	   strategies	   and	  
related	  global	  but	  also	  regional	  political	  and	  economic	  integration	  processes.	  To	  mention	  only	  a	  few:	  
the	   integration	   into	   ASEAN,	   the	   foreseen	   Asian	   Economic	   Community	   (AEC),	   the	  memberships	   to	  




bigger	   and	   economically	   much	   more	   powerful	   neighbouring	   states.	   At	   a	   national	   level,	   these	  
processes	  are	  reflected	  through	  a	  multitude	  of	  policies	  and	  strategies,	  along	  with	  self-­‐set	  and	  highly	  
ambitious	  development	  and	  economic	  growth	  targets	  (e.g.	  eradicating	  shifting	  cultivation	  (Laos)	  and	  
opium	  growing	  fields,	  poverty	  reduction,	  ethnic	  integration,	  etc.).	  They	  are	  providing	  the	  ground	  for	  
both	  governments	  to	  promote	  and	  justify	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  in	  the	  forestry,	  agricultural	  
and	   extractive	   sector.	   Lacking	   the	   means	   to	   valorise	   the	   rich	   natural	   resource	   base	   in	   these	  
countries,	  governments	  pursue	  a	  strategy	  of	  ‘turning	  land	  into	  capital’:	  attracting	  foreign	  investors,	  
through	   leasing	   out	   large	   areas	   of	   land	   under	   very	   favourable	   contractual	   terms,	   has	   become	   the	  
preferred	  development	  avenue	  to	  un-­‐tap	  the	  massive	  natural	  potentials.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  expected	  
raise	   of	   national	   incomes	   and	   fiscal	   revenues,	   land	   concessions	   hold	   the	   promise	   to	   bring	   along	  
modernization	   of	   the	   agricultural	   sector,	   job	   creation	   and	   infrastructure	   development.	   Land	  
speculation,	   rent-­‐seeking	   and	   logging	   may	   be	   in	   many	   cases	   important	   drivers,	   but	   fall	   short	   of	  
providing	  a	  comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  the	  current	  pace	  and	  scale	  of	  the	  LSLAS	  phenomenon.	  	  
Main	  LSLA-­‐typologies	  and	  differences	  between	  land	  granting	  and	  allocation	  processes	  
Main	   types	   of	   implementation	   processes	   of	   land	   concessions	   have	   been	   identified	   based	   on	   the	  
combination	  of	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  investor	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  product	  promoted.	  The	  research	  
has	   provided	   evidence	   that	   the	   granting	   process,	   the	   land	   allocation	   itself,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   final	  
outcome	  on	  the	  ground	  differs	  significantly.	  Especially	   in	  Laos	  an	  area	  granted	  on	  paper,	  does	  not	  
automatically	  lead	  to	  the	  immediate	  land	  allocation	  and	  project	  implementation.	  	  
Financially	  strong	  Vietnamese	  investors	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  rubber	  sector.	  They	  have	  been	  granted	  
and	   allocated	   very	   large	   plots	   of	   land	   in	   both	   countries	   in	   a	   very	   short	   time.	   The	   clearing	   and	  
implementation	  of	  the	  plantations	  happened	  rather	  smoothly	  compared	  to	  other	  concession	  types.	  
This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  political	  backup	  from	  the	  investors’	  and	  host	  countries’	  governments,	  
as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  very	  strong	  and	  influential	  role	  the	  powerful	  Vietnamese	  Rubber	  Group	  (especially	  
in	  Cambodia)	  plays	   in	   lobbing	  for	  rubber	   investments.	   In	  addition	  most	  of	  these	  “big	  players”	  have	  
very	   good	   business	   and	   private	   connections	   across	   different	   government	   administration	   levels	   -­‐	  
often	  up	  to	  the	  very	  top.	  Granting	  land	  concessions,	  and	  control	  over	  land	  is	  in	  both	  countries	  highly	  
political.	  The	  strong	  relationship	  between	  the	  Lao	  PDR	  and	  Vietnam	  established	  during	  and	  after	  the	  
Second	   Indochina	   War	   has	   influenced	   political	   and	   economic	   collaboration	   between	   the	   two	  
countries,	  and	  shapes	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  around	  land	  concessions	  in	  favor	  of	  Vietnamese	  
investors	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  South.	  	  
In	   Laos	   almost	   all	   large	   Vietnamese	   rubber	   investment,	   as	   well	   as	   Japanese	   or	   Indian	   pulp-­‐tree	  
investment	  followed	  a	  process	  driven	  by	  a	  very	  top–	  down	  approach.	  In	  Cambodia	  this	  is	  the	  case	  for	  
actually	   all	   crops	   and	   investor-­‐origins.	   Sub-­‐national	   levels	   in	   Cambodia	   are	   playing	   a	   much	   less	  
significant	   role	   during	   the	   overall	   process.	   Cambodia’s	   hierarchical	   structure	   of	   the	   government	  
concentrates	   the	   power	   on	   the	   national	   level,	   whereas	   the	   power	   of	   local	   authorities	   diminishes	  
with	  each	  level.	  	  
In	   Laos,	   depending	  on	   the	   concession	   locations	   and	  according	   to	  provinces,	   the	   specific	  processes	  
may	  differ	   significantly	  due	   to	   the	  varying	  power	  differentials	   in	  policy-­‐making	  between	  provincial	  
and	   district	   governments.	   Chinese	   Rubber	   investors	   in	   the	   north	   of	   Laos	   have	   been	   granted	   land	  
mostly	  in	  a	  very	  opaque	  way,	  pushed	  and	  facilitated	  by	  provincial	  authorities,	  rather	  than	  the	  central	  
government.	   Furthermore	   the	   mountainous	   landscape	   in	   the	   North	   has	   also	   contributed	   to	   a	  
fragmentation	  of	  plot	  size	  in	  most	  of	  the	  concessions	  compared	  to	  the	  few	  but	  larger	  plots	  in	  given	  
to	  Vietnamese	  investors	  the	  South.	  The	  farther	  away	  from	  the	  Lao-­‐China	  border,	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  




granted	  on	  the	  paper.	  In	  Cambodia	  where	  the	  topography	  is	  much	  smoother,	  concessions	  of	  single	  
companies	  are	  often	  much	  less	  fragmented	  into	  several	  plots.	  However,	  there	  are	  numerous	  records	  
of	   companies	   that	   circumvent	   legal	   restricted	   size	   of	   10,000	   ha	   by	   spinning-­‐off	   into	   subsidiary	  
companies	  and	  numerous	  plots	  below	  this	  size.	  
Other	  investors	  in	  Laos	  planting	  eucalyptus	  and	  acacia	  had	  a	  very	  smooth	  start	  by	  either	  taking	  over	  
existing	   concession	   agreements	   or	   by	   high	   level	   diplomatic	   ties.	   Despite	   the	   promising	   start,	   the	  
same	   companies	   struggle	   until	   today,	   several	   years	   later,	   to	   actually	   get	   the	   land	   on	   the	   ground	  
allocated.	   Support	   from	   provincial	   and	   district	   authorities	   is	   lacking	   and	   often	   land	   is	   simply	   not	  
available	   (anymore).	   In	   some	   cases	   land	   finally	   allocated	   is	   not	   suitable	   for	   the	   product	   or	   of	   low	  
quality.	   This	   has	   led	   to	   a	  more	   pro-­‐active	   approach	   by	   the	   companies.	   They	   are	   approaching	   the	  
villagers	   by	   themselves	   first	   to	   find	   and	   negotiate	   for	   suitable	   and	   available	   land,	   and	   only	   then	  
requesting	  local	  governments’	  support.	  
Key	  factors	  influencing	  decision	  making	  processes	  	  
In	  summary	   it	   can	  be	  said	   that	   the	  country	  of	  origin	  of	   the	   investor,	   the	   related	  political	  backup	  a	  
company	  receives,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  crop	  and	  the	  corresponding	  land	  needs	  are	  the	  most	   influential	  
key	   factors	   within	   the	   overall	   decision	   making	   process.	   In	   Laos	   the	   sub-­‐national	   backup	   is	   often	  
crucial	  and	  local	  authorities	  make	  their	  support	  dependent	  on	  some	  types	  of	  crops,	  which	  they	  seem	  
to	  trust	  more	  than	  others.	  Some	  investor-­‐countries	  are	  preferred	  over	  others.	  Both	  factors	   lead	  to	  
different	   levels	   of	   motivation	   and	   support	   systems,	   resulting	   in	   different	   paces	   of	   project	  
implementation.	   Additional	   factors	   are	   also	   the	   point	   of	   time	   a	   company	   has	   entered	   the	   stage.	  
Companies	   arriving	   at	   an	   early	   stage	  have	  often	   received	  better	   land,	   closer	   to	   infrastructure	   and	  
larger	  connected	  plots	  compared	  to	   late-­‐comers.	  Conversely,	  villagers	  note	  that	   they	  have	   learned	  
from	  past	  experiences	  with	  LSLAs	  and	  were	  able	  to	  negotiate	  better	  conditions	   for	   land	  deals	   that	  
came	  later.	  	  
Both	  governments	  justify	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  land	  to	  investors	  by	  underlining	  the	  various	  potential	  
positive	  benefits	  for	  poor	  and	  rural	  population.	  Yet,	  this	  seems	  to	  remain	  a	  justification	  at	  national	  
policy	   level	   rather	   than	   translating	   into	   appropriate	   action.	   Investors’	   objectives	   to	   invest	   in	   areas	  
with	  the	  highest	  probability	  for	  returns	  of	  investment	  proofs	  to	  be	  a	  more	  influential	  factor	  defining	  
and	   identifying	   areas	   for	   concessions.	   This	  means,	   that	   the	   agrarian	   context	   (as	   defined	   above)	   is	  
playing	  a	   rather	  secondary	  role	   in	   influencing	  decision	  makers	   in	   the	  government.	  The	  mainly	   top-­‐
down	  process	  ignores	  most	  of	  the	  context	  attributes	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  few,	  such	  as	  land	  type,	  
accessibility	  and	  soil	  suitability.	  It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  in	  cases	  where	  these	  factors	  are	  only	  of	  little	  
importance,	   forests	   for	   logging	  or	  ensuring	  merely	  access	   to	   connected	  plots	  of	   land	   (speculation)	  
are	   the	   only	   attributes	   of	   the	   development	   contexts	   taken	   into	   account.	   In	   other	   words,	   an	  
intentional	  targeting	  of	   land	  in	  terms	  of	  promoting	   local	  agricultural	  development	  where	   it	   is	  most	  
needed	  could	  not	  be	  observed.	  In	  at	  least	  two	  cases	  in	  Cambodia	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  timber	  was	  
extracted	  by	  a	  collusion	  of	  concessionaires,	  local	  authorities	  and	  domestic	  companies.	  The	  ties	  of	  the	  
investors	  to	  wood	  processing	  companies	  substantiate	  such	  hypothesis.	  The	  influence	  of	  accessibility	  
to	   the	   concession	   area	   must	   be	   considered	   in	   such	   cases	   in	   relative	   terms.	   In	   order	   to	   extract	  
valuable	   timber,	   the	   government	   committed	   the	   construction	   of	   roads	   to	   concessionaires.	   An	  
improved	   accessibility	   then	   led	   to	   a	   further	   concentration	   of	   concession	   companies	   within	   that	  
specific	  area.	  	  
Local	  population	   tenure	   insecurity	   is	  another	   important	   factor.	  The	   lack	  of	   legal	  documentation	  of	  
smallholders’	   land,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   “criminalization”	   of	   whole	   land	   use	   practices	   such	   as	   shifting	  




or	  private	  state	  land”	  provides	  superficial	  legitimacies	  to	  target	  such	  land.	  In	  Cambodia	  some	  forest	  
areas	  have	  been	  systematically	  degraded	  prior	  to	  the	  contract	  conclusion	  in	  order	  to	  legitimize	  the	  
granting	  of	   forested	  areas.	  The	  general	   lack	  of	  reliable	  data	  and	   local	   land-­‐use	  maps	  facilitates	  the	  
arbitrary	   use	   of	   rather	   vague	   land	   concepts,	   such	   as	   “empty”,	   “unused”	   or	   “underutilized”	   land	  
providing	   additional	   justifications.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   site-­‐specific	   decisions	   are	   generally	   biased	   in	  
favour	   of	   investors	   (or	   the	   local	   elite	   in	   Cambodia),	   and	   often	   not	   comprehensible	   from	   a	   local	  
livelihood	  perspective.	  In	  more	  than	  one	  case	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  has	  argued	  that	  villagers	  
were	   not	   the	   legal	   landholders	   and	   therefore	   not	   protected	   from	   eviction	   after	   concessions	   have	  
been	  granted.	  	  
Although	   more	   relevant	   in	   Laos	   than	   in	   Cambodia,	   the	   specific	   village	   characteristics	   may	  
significantly	   alter	   the	   decision	   process	   and	   final	   outcomes.	   The	   local	   and	   historical	   context	   of	   a	  
village	   (e.g.	   during	   the	  war),	   the	   village’s	   political	   endowment	   and	   the	   connection	   to	   the	   outside,	  
especially	   to	   influential	   people	   within	   government	   can	   be	   crucial	   in	   either	   minimizing	   or	   totally	  
preventing	   the	   land	   transfer	   of	   village	   land	   to	   an	   investor	   (Dwyer	   2013).	   Village	   authorities’	  
capability	  to	  resist	  financial	  allurement	  and	  threats,	  and	  to	  negotiate	  effectively	  with	  companies	  and	  
district	   officials,	   may	   considerably	   influence	   the	   contractual	   modalities	   (contract	   farming	   or	  
concession	  type)	  and	  the	  overall	  terms	  of	  investment	  (area	  size,	  compensation	  payment,	  etc.).	  	  
1.4.	  Synthesis	  and	  conclusion:	  marginal	  land	  or	  marginal	  people?	  
Figure	   1.2	   summarizes	   the	   key	   factors	   of	   LSLAs	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   according	   to	   the	   three	  
domains	   i)	   agrarian	   context,	   ii)	   land	  governance,	   and	   iii)	   land-­‐based	   investments.	  We	  differentiate	  
more	  direct	   influences	  on	   land	  allocation	  (inner	  circle)	  from	  more	   indirect	   influences	  (outer	  circle).	  
Finally,	  key	  factors	  shaded	  in	  grey	  represent	  those	  factors	  for	  which	  spatio-­‐temporal	  data	  allows	  to	  
analyse	  patterns	  at	  a	  regional	   level.	   Ideally	  we	  could	  describe	  different	  types	  of	  processes	  of	  LSLAs	  
implementation	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   recurrent	   linkages	   between	   these	   key	   factors.	   Furthermore,	  
such	   types	   could	   then	  be	  ascribed	   to	   specific	   configurations	  of	   spatio-­‐temporal	   indicators	   (shaded	  
key	  factors).	  This	  would	  ultimately	  allow	  out-­‐scaling	  the	  evidence	  obtained	  from	  case	  study	  research	  





Figure	  1.2:	   	   Key	   factors	  within	   three	  main	   sectors	  determining	   the	   implementation	  processes	  of	  
LSLAs	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  differentiating	  direct	  (inner	  circle)	  and	  more	  indirect	  influence	  (outer	  
circle).	  	  Key	  factors	  allowing	  spatio-­‐temporal	  patterns	  based	  on	  regional	  data	  are	  shaded.	  	  
Yet,	   the	   preceding	   chapters	   have	   shown	   two	   important	   limitations	   to	   this	   endeavour.	   First,	   the	  
complexity	  of	  different	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  is	  considerable	  and	  makes	  the	  clear	  distinction	  of	  
separate	   types	  quite	  difficult.	   Second,	   the	  number	  of	   key	   factors	   that	   can	  actually	  be	   represented	  
through	  spatio-­‐temporal	  data	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  decision-­‐making	  is	  very	  
limited	  compared	  to	  many	  other	  very	  influential	  key	  factors.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  limitations	  we	  propose	  
to	   synthesize	  our	   findings	   into	   three	   idealized	   types,	  each	   combining	   important	   recurrent	   linkages	  
between	  key	  factors	  and	  manifesting	  a	  certain	  spatial	  signature	  (see	  table	  1.5	  below).	  	  
In	   an	   ideal	  world	   and	   relating	   to	   the	   clockwise	   arrows	   in	   figure	   1.2,	   land	   governance	   guides	   land	  
investments,	   land	   investments	   increase	   land	   based	   revenues	   and	   prosperity	   in	   agrarian	   contexts,	  
and	  agrarian	  contexts	  inform	  land	  governance.	  The	  synthesis	  of	  our	  research	  results	  show	  however,	  
that	  only	  type	  (c)	  entitled	  ‘marginal	   land’	  (see	  table	  1.5)	  actually	  pursues	  such	  a	  logic	  and	  this	  type	  
only	  starting	  to	  emerge	   in	  Laos:	   	  as	  companies	  which	  were	  formally	  granted	  concessions	  but	  don’t	  
have	   the	  political	  backup	   to	  overrule	  existing	   claims	  on	   land	  are	  unable	   to	   find	   land,	   they	   identify	  
jointly	   with	   villagers	   plots	   of	   un-­‐used	   or	   under-­‐used	   land	   that	   is	   truly	   available	   and	   we	   label	  
‘marginal	   land’.	  Land	  governance	  support	   is	  then	  sought	  from	  higher	  authorities	   in	  order	  to	  realize	  
this	  investment	  opportunity.	  Given	  the	  quite	  blurry	  spatial	  signature	  of	  type	  (c)	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  
assess	   to	   what	   degree	   the	   few	   case	   studies	   can	   be	   extrapolated	   across	   the	   region.	   Relevant	  
indicators	  may	  comprise	  small	  LSLA	  plots	  in	  semi-­‐subsistence	  and	  pluri-­‐active	  agrarian	  contexts	  (see	  
table	  1.2)	  with	  populations	  that	  have	  a	  voice,	  are	  inclined	  to	  and	  have	  opportunities	  for	  commercial	  
agriculture	   (ethnic	   majority,	   accessibility	   to	   markets,	   know	   how,	   etc.)	   However,	   the	   current	  
dominant	   type	   of	   interaction	   between	   LSLA	   processes	   and	   agrarian	   context	   we	   could	   observe	   is	  











Widespread	   type	   in	   Cambodia	   and	  
Laos	   representing	   largely	   the	   first	  
wave	  of	  large-­‐scale	  investments	  in	  the	  
tree	   plantation	   sector	   by	   powerful	  
neighbouring	   investors	   (Vietnam,	  
China).	  	  
LSLAs	   initiated	   and	   granted	   at	  
province	   level	   in	   Laos	   under	   current	  
national	   policies	   but	   manifesting	  
problems	   in	   effective	   allocation.	   It	  
does	   not	   exist	   anymore	   in	   Cambodia	  
after	  centralisation	  of	  power	  in	  2008.	  	  
This	   more	   bottom-­‐up	   approach	  
emerges	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   failures	   in	  
type	   (a)	   and	   (b)	   and	   directs	   LSLAs	   to	  
land	   where	   different	   stakeholders	  
agree	   that	   it	   is	   available	   for	  















• Close	   linkages	   between	   investors,	  
political	  elites,	  and	  patronage	  under	  
the	   umbrella	   of	   economic	   growth	  
strategies	  
• Top-­‐down	   granting	   processes	  
ignoring	   contextual	   factors	   leading	  
to	  allocation	  of	  large	  plots	  
• ‘Availability’	   of	   land	   is	   defined	  
through	   land	   laws	   and	   policies,	   i.e.	  
weak	   tenure	   rights,	   unclear	  
demarcation	   of	   land	   categories,	  
demand	   to	   abolish	   unwanted	   land	  
use	   (shifting	   cultivation),	   and	   land-­‐
cover	  based	  benefits	  (e.g.	  logging	  of	  
forests)	  
• Provinces	   benefitting	   from	  
decentralized	   decision-­‐making	   and	  
favourable	   national	   laws	   and	  
policies	   to	   boost	   economic	   growth	  
and	  income	  
• Depending	   on	   support	   of	   the	   local	  
government,	  the	  intended	  crop	  and	  
villagers’	   social	   capital,	   land	  
allocation	   becomes	   difficult	   and	  
may	  lead	  to	  failure	  
• Land	   availability	   defined	   by	   land	  
use	   and	   to	   a	   certain	   degree	   by	  
villagers	   leading	   to	   granting	   of	  
smaller	  and	  more	  dispersed	  plots	  
• Based	  on	  previous	  experiences	  with	  
LSLAs	   and	   other	   sources	   of	   social	  
capital,	   villagers	   have	   a	   say	   in	  
defining	   available	   land	   based	   on	  
land	  suitability,	  use,	  accessibility	  	  
• Villagers’	   interest	   for	   commercial	  
agriculture	   and	   willingness	   to	   sell	  
plots	   converge	   with	   domestic	   and	  
international	   investors’	   intentions	  
(crops	  and	  plot	  sizes)	  
• Based	  on	  agreed	  prospects	  for	  land	  
allocation	  the	  support	  of	  authorities	  
is	   requested	   either	   within	   already	  











• Large-­‐connected	   plots	   of	   powerful	  
investors	   mostly	   in	   forestry	   sector	  
(rubber,	  pulp	  trees)	  
• Targeted	   context	   is	   mostly	  
subsistence	   or	   semi-­‐subsistence	  
agriculture	   with	   cropping	   mosaics,	  
shifting	   cultivation,	   forests,	  
relatively	   higher	   poverty	   rates	   and	  
medium	  accessibility	  
• In	   terms	   of	   investor’s	   origin	   and	  
crop	  the	  spatial	  signature	  is	  blurred	  
but	  different	  from	  type	  (a)	  
• Widespread	   across	   different	  
agrarian	  contexts	  but	  less	  in	  forests	  
or	  intensive	  agricultural	  lands.	  
• Plots	  small	  and	  fragmented	  
• Gap	   between	   granted,	   allocated	  
and	   operational	   surfaces	   and	   time	  
of	  contract	  and	  implementation	  
• Blurred	   picture	   in	   terms	   of	  
investors	   but	   generally	   less	  
powerful	   than	   (a),	   often	   domestic,	  
and	   	   interested	   in	   the	   agricultural	  
and	  tree	  plantation	  sector	  
• Plots	  small	  and	  often	  fragmented	  as	  
left-­‐overs	  in	  rather	  intensively	  used	  
areas	  with	  LSLAs	  and	  local	  land	  use	  
• Geographical	   distribution	   however	  
quite	  unclear	  as	   this	   type	  may	  also	  
expand	  to	  remote	  areas	  
Table	  1.5:	  Three	  idealized	  types	  of	  interactions	  between	  the	  agrarian	  context	  and	  governance	  of	  LSLA.	  	  
For	  this	  non-­‐ideal	  world,	  the	  arrows	  in	  figure	  1.2	  would	  be	  directed	  counter-­‐clockwise	  as	  the	  primacy	  
of	  economic	  development	  determines	  and	  shapes	  the	  governance	  of	  LSLAs.	  LSLAs	  in	  turn	  ignore	  the	  
specificity	   of	   agrarian	   contexts	   or	   even	   adapt	   them	   to	   their	   needs.	   Concretely	   ‘available	   land’	   is	  
constructed	   through	   land	   laws	   and	   policies	   weakening	   the	   traditional	   tenure,	   by	   requesting	   the	  
abolishment	  of	  unwanted	   land	  uses	   (such	  as	   shifting	  cultivation),	  and	  by	   targeting	  common	  goods	  
for	  their	  expected	  revenues	  (such	  as	   logging	  of	   forests),	  which	   in	  some	  cases	  shall	  cover	  the	   initial	  
investment	   cost	   of	   LSLAs	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   rubber.	   Given	   the	   absence	   of	   influence	   the	   agrarian	  
context	  exerts	  on	  such	  processes,	  it	  seems	  logically	  impossible	  to	  determine	  spatial	  patterns	  of	  their	  
interaction.	   Yet,	   we	   may	   find	   important	   indicators	   not	   only	   in	   the	   characteristic	   of	   such	   LSLAs	  




target	   regions:	   marginal	   people	   (accessibility,	   ethnicity,	   poverty)	   in	   subsistence-­‐	   and	   semi-­‐
subsistence	   based	   agrarian	   contexts	   (shifting	   cultivation,	   forest	   landscapes,	   etc.).	   Finally	   type	   (b)	  
evolved	  in	  parallel	  to	  type	  (a)	  and	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  standstill	  where	  a	  top-­‐down	  allocation	  of	  
land	   is	  not	  accepted	  anymore.	  Strong	   land	  claims	  within	   the	  agrarian	  context	  cannot	  be	  overruled	  
and	  the	  support	  of	  provincial	  or	  district	  authorities	  fades	  away.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  
land	   investments	   through	   lengthy	   allocation	   processes	   and	   eventually	   leads	   to	   the	   failure	   of	  
concessions	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  investors.	  Compared	  to	  type	  (a)	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  exclusion	  or	  
eviction	  of	  farmers	  this	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  success.	  But	  compared	  to	  type	  (c)	  it	  may	  also	  represent	  a	  
lose-­‐lose-­‐lose	   solution	   to	   farmers,	   the	   government	   and	   the	   investors.	   This	   type	   of	   interaction	  
between	   LSLAs	   and	   agrarian	   contexts	   has	   a	   rather	   blurred	   spatial	   signature	   but	   may	   well	   be	  
extrapolated	  by	  geo-­‐referencing	  the	  history	  of	  failed	  deals.	  
We	   conclude	   by	   pointing	   to	   the	   remaining	   research	   tasks,	   which	   consist	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	  
extrapolations	  across	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  reach	  and	  validity	  of	  these	  findings	  
and	   to	   derive	   evidence	   for	   policy	   and	   decision-­‐making.	   Furthermore	   we	   would	   like	   to	   draw	   the	  
attention	  to	  key	  opportunities	  for	  future	  research	  with	  regard	  to	  more	  sustainable	  land	  investments.	  
It	  needs	  to	  address	  the	  potentials	  of	  transforming	  and	  improving	  the	  interfaces	  between	  i)	  agrarian	  
contexts	   and	   their	   representation	   in	   land	   governance	   through	   institutional	   innovations,	  
empowerment,	  and	  information;	  ii)	   land	  governance	  and	  LSLAs	  through	  the	  design	  of	  sustainability	  
standards,	  voluntary	  guidelines	  and	  binding	  laws	  and	  their	  implementation,	  and	  iii)	  land	  investments	  
and	  agrarian	  context	  through	  negotiation	  and	   learning	  tool	  allowing	  to	  develop	   innovative	  farming	  
practices	   such	   as	   out-­‐grower	   schemes	   and	   cooperatives.	   The	   transformative	   potential	   of	   these	  
interfaces	   will	   be	   decisive	   for	   the	   future	   of	   agrarian	   transitions	   in	   Laos	   and	   Cambodia	   currently	  
standing	  at	  crossroads	  between	  new	  forms	  of	  rural	  poverty	  and	  more	  sustainable	  development.	  	  
2.	  LARGE-­‐SCALE	  LAND	  ACQUISITIONS	  AND	  LIVELIHOODS	  TRANSFORMATION5	  
This	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   implementation	   on	   the	   ground	   of	   LSLAs	   and	   the	   consequent	  
transformation	   of	   rural	   livelihoods.	   Local	   populations	   impacted	   by	   land	   deals	   are	   mostly	  
smallholders	  who	  until	  the	  acceleration	  of	  LSLAs	  had	  relied	  primarily	  on	  family	  farming.	  Their	  ability	  
to	  use	   land	  and	  other	  natural	   resources	  has	  since	  then	  been	  profoundly	  transformed.	  The	  analysis	  
relates	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   whether	   LSLAs	   and	   the	   process	   of	   agrarian	   transformation	   they	   impel	  
provide	  opportunities	  for	  smallholders	  to	  improve	  their	  farming	  systems	  and	  diversify	  their	  activities	  
-­‐	   trade,	  services	  and	  salary	   jobs	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  fast	  developing	  rubber	  sector	  -­‐	  or	   if	   they	   lead	  to	  
dispossession	   and	   do	   not	   offer	   alternative	   livelihoods	   (ADB,	   2004;	   OCM,	   2008;	   Bourdier,	   2009a;	  
Ironside,	   2009;	   Barney,	   2007;	   Manivong	   and	   Cramb,	   2008;	   Thongmanivong,	   Fujita	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  
Ducourtieux,	  2009;	  Baird,	  2011;	  Kenney-­‐Lazar,	  2012;	  Luangmany	  and	  Kaneko,	  2013).	  	  	  
Numerous	   Southeast	   Asian	   experiences	   show	   that	   smallholders	   can	   grow	   rubber	   successfully	  
(Delarue,	  2011;	  Sikor,	  2012	  and	  Sturgeon,	  2012).	  In	  line	  with	  the	  wide	  consensus	  that	  public	  support	  
to	   farmers	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	  diffusion	  of	   technology	   (Pingali	  and	  Heisey,	  2001),	   the	  key	   lesson	   from	  
those	   experiences	   is	   that	   smallholder	   farmers’	   performances	   depend	   greatly	   on	   the	   support	   they	  
receive	  (Fox	  and	  Castella,	  2013;	  Gouyon,	  2005).	  Another	  important	  factor	  in	  farmers’	  performance	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   This	   chapter	  was	   prepared	   by	   Christophe	  Gironde,	  with	   extensive	   contributions	   from	  Cecilie	   Friis,	   Patricia	  
Paramita	   and	   Gilda	   Senties	   Portilla	   on	   Luang	   Prabang,	   Kampong	   Thom	   and	   Champasak,	   respectively.	  
Information	   on	   Ratanakiri	   comes	   from	   field	   research	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   SNIS	   team	   including	   Christophe	  
Gironde,	   Amaury	   Peeters,	   Suon	   Seng	   and	   Chay	   Keartha.	   Additional	   information	   was	   provided	   by	   Vong	  




the	   learning	   process,	   as	   illustrated	   by	   the	   case	   of	   farmers	   in	   Northern	   Thailand	   who	   could	   learn	  
tapping	   in	   plantations	   in	   the	   South	   before	   developing	   their	   own	   farm.	   Similarly,	   Northern	   Lao	  
farmers	  benefited	  from	  ‘sharecropping	  arrangements	  with	  relatives’	  from	  China	  who	  ‘extended	  their	  
rubber	   holdings	   across	   the	   border’	   (Sturgeon,	   2013).	   Against	   deterministic	   theories	   around	   the	  
presumptions	  of	   small-­‐size	  agriculture	  backwardness,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  smallholdings	  can	  reach	   the	  
stage	   of	   ‘early	   advanced	   economy’	   with	  more	   capital-­‐intensive	   and	   quality	   improving	   technology	  
(Barlow,	   1997).	   For	   Cambodian	   farmers,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   ‘the	   conversion	   from	   crop	   production	  
(maize,	   soybean,	   cassava,	   and	   cashew)	   to	   smallholder	   rubber	   plantations	   provides	   the	   largest	  
benefit	   to	   farmers’	   (Hansen	   and	   Top,	   2006).	   Yet,	   Yem	   and	   al.	   (2011)	   recall	   that	   farmers	   need	  
assistance,	   as	   rubber	   plantations	   ‘requires	   huge	   investment	   in	   both	   financial	   and	   technical	  
resources’.	   For	   Northern	   Laos,	   research	   has	   suggested	   that	   farmers’	   investments	   in	   smallholder	  
rubber	   production	   are	   financially	   profitable	   under	   current	   market	   circumstances	   (Manivong	   and	  
Cramb,	   2008;	   and	   Fu	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   However,	   despite	   economic	   gains,	   including	   incentives	   (e.g.	  
contract	   farming	   schemes)	   and	   policies	   by	   the	   Lao	   government,	   Luangmany	   and	   Kaneko	   (2013)	  
conclude	   that	   these	   investments	   may	   come	   with	   losses	   in	   food	   security,	   given	   their	   positive	  
correlation	  with	  soil	  degradation	  and	  deforestation.6	  	  
This	  analysis	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  LSLAs	  addresses	  three	  main	  challenges.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  go	  beyond	  
analysis	  based	  on	   figures	  of	   thousands	  hectares	  of	   land	  being	  granted	  as	  on	  paper,	   i.e.	   to	  provide	  
empirical	  material	  on	  how	  land	  acquisitions	  are	  implemented	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  to	  analyse	  in	  what	  
ways	   and	   to	   what	   magnitude	   they	   transform	   local	   populations’	   access	   to	   and	   use	   of	   livelihoods	  
assets.	  The	   second	  challenge	   is	   to	  go	  beyond	   the	  assessment	  of	   immediate	   impact,	   i.e.	   to	  analyse	  
how	  households	   respond	   to	   the	  new	  constraints	  and	  opportunities,	  and	   to	  what	  extent	   they	  have	  
managed	   -­‐	   or	   have	   not	  managed	   -­‐	   to	   adapt	   their	   productive	   activities	   into	   sustainable	   livelihoods	  
over	  a	  5	  to	  7	  years	  period7.	  The	  third	  challenge	  is	  to	  analyse	  the	  process	  of	  differentiation	  among	  the	  
various	   groups	   of	   populations.	   To	   address	   those	   challenges,	   we	   relied	   extensively	   on	   field-­‐site	  
research	  and	  carried	  out	  a	  series	  of	  14	   in-­‐depth	  village-­‐case	  studies8.	  The	  data	  were	  collected	   in	  4	  
main	   sites:	   Luang	   Prabang	   and	   Champasak	   provinces	   for	   Laos;	   Ratanakiri	   and	   Kampong	   Thom	  
provinces	   for	   Cambodia	   (see	   Appendix	   1).	   Data	   collection	   was	   carried	   out	   mostly	   through	   semi-­‐
structured	   interviews	   with	   population	   and	   local	   authority	   representatives	   and	   participant	  
observation	  in	  villages9.	  The	  findings	  from	  the	  in-­‐depth	  case	  studies	  are	  significant	  for	  the	  mid-­‐term	  
(up	   to	   5-­‐7	   years)	   transformation	   of	   rural	   livelihoods	   at	   district-­‐scale.	   The	   analysis	   builds	   on	   the	  
sustainable	   livelihoods	   framework	   (Scoones	   2009;	   Ellis	   2000;	   Chambers	   and	   Conway	   1991)	   and	  
draws	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   “livelihood	   trajectories”	   (de	   Haan	   and	   Zoomers	   2005).	   Accordingly,	   the	  
chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   follow:	   The	   first	   section	   analyses	   populations’	   vulnerability	   and	   capability	  
prior	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  LSLAs	  that	  accelerated	  from	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  The	  second	  section	  analyses	  the	  loss	  
of	  productive	  assets,	  mainly	  large	  areas	  of	  land	  that	  local	  indigenous	  populations	  previously	  used	  or	  
had	  as	  a	  reserve,	  and	  the	  immediate	  opportunities	  for	  populations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  intrusion	  of	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   assess	   smallholder	   profitability	   with	   rubber	   in	   Southern	   Laos	   because	   there	   are	   very	   few	  
households	  who	  have	  invested	  in	  it	  (the	  ones	  with	  land,	  capital	  and	  know-­‐how),	  and	  rubber	  companies	  are	  not	  
involved	  with	  contract	  farming	  in	  the	  South.	  
7	  We	   refer	   as	   ‘mid-­‐term’	   the	   period	   that	   started	   with	   the	   acceleration	   of	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions	   and	  
rubber	  plantation	  in	  2007-­‐08.	  	  
8	   Cambodian	   territory	   is	   administratively	   divided	   in	   provinces,	   districts	   and	   communes;	   communes	   include	  
several	  villages.	  Laos	  is	  similarly	  divided	  into	  provinces,	  districts,	  clusters	  and	  villages.	  
9	  Research	  included	  2	  Master	  students	  in	  Kampong	  Thom	  and	  1	  PhD	  student	  in	  Champasak	  who	  spent	  between	  
3	   and	   5	   months	   in	   the	   field.	   In	   Ratanakiri,	   a	   questionnaire-­‐based	   survey	   (240	   households,	   24%	   of	   the	  




actors	  into	  local	  economies.	  The	  third	  section	  depicts	  the	  transformation	  of	  livelihoods	  over	  the	  last	  
5-­‐7	  years,	  i.e.	  strategies	  of	  resource	  allocation	  and	  achievements	  with	  respect	  to	  income	  and	  assets.	  
The	   fourth	   section	   proposes	   a	   typology	   of	   changing	   livelihood	   systems	   that	   shows	   the	   process	   of	  
differentiation	  among	  the	  various	  groups	  of	  populations.	  	  	  	  
2.1.	  Vulnerability	  prior	  to	  the	  acceleration	  of	  LSLAs	  
This	   section	   assesses	   vulnerability	   prior	   to	   the	   acceleration	   of	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions	   in	   the	  
mid-­‐2000s.	  Most	  of	  areas	  and	  populations	  where	  large-­‐scale	  concessions	  were	  granted	  in	  Cambodia	  
and	   Laos	   are	   commonly	   depicted	   by	   governments	   and	  mainstream	   development	   organizations	   as	  
being	  poor	  or	   lagging	  behind	   in	   terms	  of	  agricultural	  modernisation	  because	  of	   traditional	   shifting	  
cultivation	  and	  remoteness.	  In	  contrast	  to	  such	  depictions	  of	  poverty	  and	  vulnerability	  as	  endemic,	  
some	  authors	  argue	  that	  “Indigenous	  areas	  are	  rich	   in	  nature	  and	  resources”	   (Ironside,	  2009:	  121)	  
and	  that	  “poverty	  in	  rural	  mountain	  zones	  is	  a	  contemporary	  phenomenon”	  (Ducourtieux,	  2006:	  81)	  
and	  not	   intrinsic	   to	   traditional	   cultivation	   system	   (Moiso,	  2008).	   In	   livelihood	  studies,	   vulnerability	  
primarily	   refers	   to	   the	   limitation	  or	   lack	  of	   capital	   (natural	   and	  physical	   capital	   being	   impacted	  by	  
shocks,	   seasonality,	   trends).	   We	   did	   not	   find	   that	   this	   was	   core	   to	   the	   vulnerability	   context;	  
populations	  were	  rather	  made	  vulnerable	  by	  public	  policies	  and	  policies’	  inadequate	  implementation	  
prior	  to	  LSLAs.	  
Public	  policies	  prior	  to	  the	  acceleration	  of	  LSLAs	  pertain	  mainly	  to	  restrictions	  on	  access	  to	  farming	  
land	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Laos,	  and	  to	  displacement	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ratanakiri.	  Vulnerability	  also	  relates	  to	  
the	   lack	  of	   protective	   legal	   framework	   and	   consequent	   insecurity	   of	   land	   tenure	   and	   settlements,	  
such	  as	  in	  Kampong	  Thom	  where	  some	  villages	  were	  illegal	  by	  status	  (Paramita,	  2013:	  36;	  Fonrouge,	  
2013:	   33).	   Once	   the	   lust	   for	   land	   intensified,	   the	   illegality	   made	   populations	   more	   vulnerable	   to	  
displacement	   and	   dispossession.	   In	   Luang	   Prabang	   (Laos),	   Friis	   (2013)	   highlights	   that	   there	   were	  
limitations	  on	  population’s	  access	  and	  use	  of	  upland	  areas	  before	  the	  land	  concession	  was	  granted.	  
First,	  the	  'zoning	  policy'	  within	  the	  Land	  and	  Forest	  Allocation	  Program	  (LFA),	  implemented	  from	  the	  
late	  1990s,	  restricted	  the	  population's	  use	  of	   land,	  which	  should	  follow	  a	  specific	  use	  associated	  to	  
the	   various	   zones	   (Friis:	   2013:	   64).	   Similar	   restrictions	  were	   set	   up	   for	   the	   use	   of	   forest	   products	  
(idem.)	  Second,	  the	  Government	  of	  Laos'	  policy	  to	  eradicate	  shifting	  cultivation,	  carried	  out	  through	  
LFA,	  restricted	  the	  number	  of	  upland	  plots	  per	  household	  before	  the	  granting	  to	  Chilan	  company	  and	  
the	  conversion	  to	  rubber	  (Friis,	  2013:64,	  67).	  Thus,	  in	  some	  cases	  like	  the	  village	  of	  Na	  Nhang	  Neua	  
in	   Luang	   Prabang,	   people	   were	   confronted	   with	   “low	   land	   availability”	   (relative	   to	   population)	  
“already	  before	  the	  concession	  was	  established”	  (Friis,	  2013:	  76).	  Consequently,	   the	  fallow	  lengths	  
and	  rotational	  cycle	  in	  the	  swidden	  land	  system	  had	  been	  reduced	  over	  the	  past	  years.	  
In	  Champasak	  province,	  Senties	  also	  notes	  that	  LFA	  implementation	  restricted	  the	  use	  of	  agricultural	  
and	   forest	   land	   in	   four	   villages	   (see	   Appendix	   1)	   in	   1996-­‐1997.	   However,	   several	   households	   she	  
interviewed	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  program	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  making	   land	  scarcer	  –in	  practice,	  
few	  households	  complied	  with	  it,	  as	  there	  was	  little	  supervision	  from	  relevant	  authorities.	  Villagers,	  
especially	  the	  elderly,	  tell	  a	  story	  in	  which	  land	  had	  already	  become	  limited	  due	  to	  various	  factors,	  
including	   demographic	   increases,	   in-­‐migration	   flows	   and	   policy-­‐induced	   programmes	   prior	   to	   LFA.	  
For	   instance,	   in	  Lak	  Sao	  Paet	  village,	   in	  Paksong	  district,	  village	  authorities	  mentioned	  that	  "by	  the	  
time	  the	  government	  came	  in	  1996	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  land	  use	  registry",	  and	  they	  determined	  each	  
person	  could	  have	  3	  hectares	  for	  farming,	  they	  found	  out	  that	  "there	  was	  not	  enough	  land	  for	  such	  a	  
distribution,	   and	  only	   3	   ha	   could	   be	   allocated	  per	   household	   and	  not	   individually"	   (Senties	   2013).	  




additional	   primary	   forest	   into	   agricultural	   land	   or	   shortening	   the	   fallow	   periods	   of	   swidden	   plots,	  
while	  simultaneously	  creating	  confusion	  with	  regards	  to	  new	  land	  classifications	  (Senties	  2013).	  
In	  Kampong	  Thom	  Province,	  populations	  were	  already	  vulnerable	  because	  they	  had	  been	  displaced	  
during	  or	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Red	  Khmer	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  Vietnamese	  occupation,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  
the	   case	   of	   Bonteay	   Rongeang	   village	   (Paramita,	   2013:	   36).	   The	   formerly	   landless	   families,	   who	  
established	  Bonteay	  Rongeang	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   a	   State	   Forest	   in	   2004,	  were	  brought	   together	   by	  
AHADA,	   an	   association	   of	   handicapped	   veterans.	   Due	   to	   the	   illegal	   establishment	   of	   the	   village,	  
these	   families	   had	   weak	   land	   tenure.	   Kampong	   Thom	   provincial	   government	   contested	   AHADA	  
legitimacy	  and	  dismissed	  AHADA	  as	  an	  association.	  Consequently,	  the	  population	  was	  left	  vulnerable	  
to	   confiscation,	   reclaim	  and	  granting	  process.	  Once	   the	  district	  witnessed	   increasing	   ELC	   granting,	  
populations	  could	  at	  best	  postpone	  their	  eviction	   (Paramita,	  2013:	  36-­‐).	   In	  Ratanakiri,	  new	  villages	  
were	   established	   from	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   when,	   once	   after	   the	   war,	   the	   government	   developed	   its	  
administration	   in	   ‘remote	   areas’	   and	   remote	   villages	   were	   relocated	   closer	   from	   roads	   and	  
communal	  administration	  (Tang,	  2013).	  In	  such	  case,	  displaced	  inhabitants	  were	  assigned	  land	  areas	  
for	  which	  neither	  traditional	  inheritance	  system	  nor	  communal	  management	  had	  legitimized	  access	  
and	  use-­‐rights,	  a	  situation	  that	  favours	  encroachment	  and	  conflicts	  among	  villagers,	  even	  before	  the	  
arrival	   of	   outsiders	   in	   search	   for	   land.	   Khmerization	   policy,	   i.e.	   the	   policy	   to	   settle	   Khmer	   ethnic	  
populations	   in	  ethnic	  minority	  areas	  also	  made	   local	   indigenous	  populations	  vulnerable.	  Khmer	   in-­‐
migrants	  managed	  to	  accumulate	  substantial	  land	  areas	  during	  the	  1990s,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  the	  
point	  where	  indigenous	  populations	  decided	  to	  move	  away	  from	  migrants’	  clusters	  (Tang,	  2013:	  30-­‐
31).	  	  
Thus	  in	  all	  cases,	  public	  policies	  prior	  to	  LSLAs	  had	  shaped	  new	  contexts	  whereby	  local	  populations	  
access	   to	   farming	   land	   and	   other	   natural	   areas	   (forest,	   rivers)	   from	   which	   they	   could	   derive	  
resources	  (herbal	  medication,	  wood,	  meet	  and	  fish)	  was	  	  “dismantled”	  (Ducourtieux	  and	  al.,	  2005)	  or	  
at	   least	   “ambiguous”	   and	   “contested”	   (Bakker	   and	   al.,	   2010).	   The	   rush	   for	   land	   and	   the	   radical	  
change	   in	   land	   tenure	   –	   long-­‐term	   land-­‐use	   rights,	   formal	   private	   property,	   grabbing	   -­‐	   was	   thus	  
facilitated.	  Vulnerability	  related	  mostly	  to	  institutional	  factors	  -­‐	  rather	  than	  to	  productive	  assets.	  	  
2.2.	  The	  politics	  of	  dispossession	  and	  immediate	  impacts	  on	  livelihoods	  	  
This	  section	  analyses	  the	  politics	  of	  dispossession.	  First,	  it	  depicts	  the	  various	  losses	  and	  constraints	  
as	   well	   as	   opportunities	   that	   were	   associated	   with	   LSLAs,	   and	   their	   immediate	   impacts	   on	  
livelihoods.	   Second,	   it	   analyses	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   dispossession,	   in	   particular	   the	   role	   played	   by	  
local	  authorities	  and	  by	  local	  populations	  themselves.	  	  
Dispossession	  	  
The	  magnitude	  of	   losses	  of	   livelihood	  assets	  vary	  greatly	  between	  the	  study	  sites	  reflecting	  among	  
others	  the	  size	  of	  land	  acquisitions	  and	  what	  is	  left	  to	  local	  indigenous	  populations,	  the	  proximity	  of	  
the	  concessions	  to	  areas	  used	  by	  populations,	  and	  the	  pace	  at	  which	  companies	  started	  to	  use	  the	  
land	   they	   acquired.	   The	   magnitude	   also	   relates	   to	   the	   type	   of	   investors	   with	   whom	   populations	  
could	  eventually	  negotiate	  or	  not.	  We	  distinguished	  three	  levels	  of	  dispossession	  -­‐	  extreme,	  severe,	  
and	  partial.	  
Cases	  of	  extreme	  dispossession	  were	  found	  in	  Kampong	  Thom.	  They	  are	  cases	  when	  populations	  lost	  
all	   the	   land	   they	  were	  using,	   often	   as	   they	  were	  displaced,	  with	   the	   consequent	   loss	   of	   perennial	  
plants	   and	   houses	   (Paramita,	   2013;	   Fonrouge,	   2013).	   In	   such	   cases,	   populations	   had	   to	   rebuild	  
livelihoods	  from	  ground	  zero.	  Santuk	  district,	  where	  15%	  of	  the	  surface	  has	  been	  cleared	  or	  planted	  




29),	   provides	   among	   the	  most	   salient	   illustration	  of	   extreme	  dispossession.	   In	   Kraya	   commune,	   in	  
late	  2009,	   the	  entire	  population	  of	  673	   families	   from	  Bonteay	  Rongeang	  village	  were	  displaced	  12	  
km	  away	  to	  Pum	  Thmay	  village.	  As	  8’000	  ha	  were	  granted	  to	  a	  Vietnamese	  rubber	  company,	  those	  
families	   lost	  access	  to	  the	   land	  they	  had	  cultivated	  until	   then,	  but	  also	  their	   fruit	  trees	  and	  houses	  
(Paramita,	   2013:	   40).	   In	   the	   neighbouring	   commune	   of	   Boeng	   Lvea,	   inhabitants	   could	   keep	   their	  
residential	   land	   but	   lost	   access	   to	   their	   cultivated	   land,	   as	   9784	   ha	   of	   land	   was	   granted	   to	   a	  
Vietnamese	  company	  since	  2006	  (Fonrouge,	  2013:	  44).	  For	  some	  of	  the	  families	  in	  Boeng	  Lvea,	  it	  is	  
actually	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  trees	  rather	  than	  the	  land	  that	  mattered,	  as	  they	  used	  to	  make	  a	  living	  from	  
logging	  (Fonrouge,	  2013:	  52).	  Moreover,	  populations	  did	  not	  receive	  compensation	  for	  all	   the	   land	  
they	   lost;	   fallow	   land	   was	   not	   compensated	   (Fonrouge,	   2013:	   48),	   as	   the	   government	   does	   not	  
officially	   recognize	   it	   yet.	  Populations	  who	  suffered	  extreme	  dispossession,	   including	  displacement	  
and	  leaving	  part	  of	  their	  belongings,	  had	  first	  to	  rebuild	  houses	  and	  some	  lived	  in	  tarp	  tents	  for	  a	  few	  
months	   (Paramita,	   2013:	   43).	   Rebuilding	   refers	   to	   a	   period	   of	   time	   during	   which	   displaced	  
populations	   were	   left	   without	   land	   to	   farm	   and	   to	   extra-­‐effort	   and	   cost	   to	   make	   land	   plots	  
productive	  (e.g.	  clearing,	  water	  control).	  The	  transition	  period	  lasted	  for	  years,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  population	  displaced	  to	  Pum	  Thmay	  in	  2009,	  who	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  cultivation	  land	  the	  
government	  had	  promised	  them.	  In	  2011,	  less	  than	  15%	  of	  the	  evicted	  had	  been	  granted	  cultivation	  
land.	  Populations	  displaced	  from	  Bonteay	  Rongeang	  had	  to	  clear	  residential	  land	  plot	  before	  building	  
a	  house	   from	   scratch	  on	   arrival	   in	   Pum	  Thmay.	   Some	  of	   them	   reported	   they	  had	   to	   leave	  part	   of	  
their	  belongings	  behind	  the	  day	  they	  were	  transported	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  military	  troops,	  who	  had	  
been	  brought	  to	  Bonteay	  Rongeang	  to	  dissuade	  resisting	  villagers.	  Hence,	  for	  the	  first	  two	  to	  three	  
months,	  the	  villagers,	  who	  did	  not	  receive	  any	  assistance,	  had	  to	  live	  in	  tarp	  tents	  (Paramita,	  2013:	  
43).	  The	  victims	  of	  Bonteay	  Rongean	  eviction	  received	  compensation	  in	  form	  of	  residential	  land:	  1	  ha	  
per	  household	  counting	  3	  to	  6	  peoples,	  as	  opposed	  to	  residential	  land	  and	  cultivation	  land	  promised	  
by	   the	   government	   prior	   to	   the	   eviction	   (Paramita,	   2013:	   44).	   Rebuilding	   livelihoods	   was	   further	  
hampered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  populations	  were	  allocated	  land	  they	  had	  to	  clear	  or	  land	  
with	   poor	   quality	   soil	   (Paramita,	   2013:	   62-­‐),	   and	   far	   away	   and	   prone	   to	   floods	   and	   droughts	  
(Fonrouge,	  2013).	  Under	  those	  circumstances,	  populations	  needed	  to	  provide	  extra-­‐effort	  in	  labour	  
and	  cash.	  Cases	  were	  reported	  where	  “because	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  the	  necessary	   investment	  to	  
clear	  the	  land,	  they	  were	  left	  with	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  abandon	  it”	  (Paramita,	  2013:	  44).	  Some	  people	  
are	  still	   left	  without	  compensation:	  in	  May	  2013	  when	  the	  field	  research	  ended	  in	  Pum	  Thmay,	  the	  
village	  authority	  had	  just	  received	  a	  letter	  indicating	  a	  location	  for	  the	  cultivation	  land,	  which	  would	  
be	  allocated	  to	   its	  population.	  The	  allocation	  for	  real	  might	  still	  be	  far	  away,	  as	  the	   letter	   instructs	  
“the	  village	  authority	  to	  form	  a	  village	  committee	  to	  conduct	  a	  survey	  on	  the	  new	  land”	  (Paramita,	  
2013:	  50.	  
Compared	  to	  cases	  of	  extreme	  dispossession,	  severe	  dispossession	  did	  not	  entail	  eviction,	  and	  the	  
relative	  share	  of	   land	   loss	   is	  uneven.	   It	   refers	   to	  cases	  where	   the	   land	  and	  access	   to	  other	  natural	  
resources	  left	  to	  local	  populations	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  basic	  needs.	  Severe	  dispossession	  relates	  
to	   the	   type	   of	   agriculture	   that	   was	   practiced	   before	   land	   was	   granted,	   to	   the	   size	   and	   pace	   of	  
plantation	  development,	  and	  to	  the	  incapability	  for	  some	  people	  to	  react	  to	  dispossession.	  The	  type	  
of	  investor	  was	  also	  found	  crucial	  with	  regards	  to	  what	  could	  be	  negotiated	  or	  spared.	  Dispossession	  
is	  severe	   in	  particular	  for	  swidden	  agriculture	   land,	  as	  both	  Lao	  and	  Cambodian	  governments	  have	  
facilitated	   the	   granting	   of	   land	   areas	   left	   in	   fallow	   with	   the	   argument	   that	   those	   areas	   were	  
‘uncultivated’,	   ‘not	   used’	   or	   ‘free’.	   In	   Champasak	   villages	   studied	   by	   Senties,	   concession	   areas	  
account	   from	  47%	   to	   95%	  of	   the	   total	   village	   area,	  with	   an	   average	   of	   89%	   for	   the	   three	   studied	  




rubber	  indicate	  that	  households	  who	  had	  between	  3	  and	  5	  ha	  were	  left	  with	  around	  1	  ha	  of	  farming	  
land	  (usually	  their	  paddy	  fields)	  and	  that	  swidden	  agriculture	  was	  not	  anymore	  possible	  (idem:	  6-­‐8).	  
In	  the	  villages	  in	  Luang	  Prabang	  studied	  by	  Friis,	  the	  average	  household	  lost	  up	  to	  2	  plots	  of	  swidden	  
land	  over	   a	  10	   year	  period,	  mainly	   attributed	  by	   farmers	   to	   the	  arrival	   of	   rubber	   in	   the	   village.	   In	  
both	  Lao	  provinces,	   local	  populations	  have	   reported	  being	   left	  without	  a	   choice	   (Senties,	  2013)	  or	  
felt	  they	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  plant	  rubber	  on	  their	  swidden	  fields	  (Friis,	  2013:	  69-­‐70).	  Moreover,	  the	  
severity	   of	   dispossession	   relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  most	   households	  were	   not	   compensated	   for	   the	  
land	   that	   had	   been	   kept	   in	   fallow.	   In	   Champasak,	   only	   cultivated	   plots	   could	   be	   subjected	   to	  
‘transaction’	  under	   the	   concession	  agreement.	   ‘Unused’	   and	   ‘uncultivated’	   land	   (including	  plots	   in	  
fallow)	  falling	  under	  the	  concession	  agreement	  could	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  company	  without	  an	  obligation	  
to	   pay	   for	   it	   (Senties,	   Key	   Findings	   document,	   2013:	   3).	   In	   Luang	   Prabang,	   populations	   were	   not	  
eligible	   for	   compensation	  with	   the	   argument	   that	   they	  did	  not	   have	   “permanent	   certificates”	   and	  
that	  the	  land	  was	  therefore	  “state	  land”	  as	  found	  by	  Friis	  (2013:	  69).	  The situation was found similar 
in Ratanakiri: plots in fallow were not taken into account during the measurement operation in 2012, 
and peoples could get land title only for the plots that were cultivated at the time of the measurement. 
Dispossession	  is	  severe	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  land	  loss	  on	  other	  activities	  and	  on	  
natural	   resources.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   in	   Luang	   Prabang,	   where	   the	   area	   planted	   with	   rubber	   has	  
reduced	  also	  the	  area	  available	  for	  grazing,	  and	  wandering	  cattle	  has	  become	  a	  risk	  for	  the	  villagers,	  
since	   the	   one	  main	   company	   that	   operates	   in	   the	   district	   set	   up	   fines	   for	   damages	   to	   the	   trees.	  
Keeping	  cattle	  required	  from	  farmers	  to	  build	  fence	  for	  which	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  material	  or	  did	  
not	   find	   profitable	   to	   invest	   in	   materials	   (Friis,	   2013:	   71).	   Friis	   depicts	   an	   “indirect	   enclosure	   of	  
resources”	  by	  the	  concession,	  in	  particular	  of	  forest	  products	  and	  water,	  as	  the	  “(…)	  company’s	  use	  
of	  chemical	  fertilizers	  and	  pesticides	  (…)	  prohibited	  collection	  of	  non-­‐timber	  forest	  products”	  in	  the	  
vicinity	  of	   the	  plantation	  and	  because	   the	   “rubber	   is	   stocking	   the	  water”	   (Friis,	   2013:	  93;	  72),	   and	  
thus	  influencing	  the	  water	  flow	  to	  the	  lowland	  paddy	  lands.	  The severity of dispossession relates also 
in some cases to the combination of large-scale land deals with a wave of small-scale acquisitions by 
in-migrants, as we found in Ratanakiri in Trang village. This	   happened	   at	   the	   early	   stage	   of	   the	  
acceleration	  of	  the	  land	  rush,	  at	  a	  time	  where	  local	  populations	  viewed	  in	  the	  arrival	  of	  in-­‐migrants	  a	  
good	   opportunity	   to	   sell	   part	   of	   their	   land	   plots	   as	   well	   as	   their	   workforce.	   Trang	   villagers	  
acknowledged	   that	   they	   could	   buy	   motorcycles	   (always	   mentioned	   as	   the	   most	   important	  
acquisition)	  and	  other	  consumption	  goods;	   they	  also	  explain	   that	   rapidly	   the	  entire	  village	   faced	  a	  
severe	  lack	  of	  land	  as	  in	  the	  meantime	  large	  tracts	  of	  their	  land	  reserve	  was	  sold	  to	  companies.	  This	  
village	  has	  reached	  the	  ‘post-­‐peasant’	  (pluri-­‐active	  I)	  stage	  of	  agrarian	  transition	  (reference	  to	  Table	  
1.2)	   as	   off-­‐farm	   occupations	   provide	   the	   crucial	   part	   of	   income	   and	   farming	   has	   become	   a	  
complement	   to	   the	   total	   income.	   And	   the	   trends	   seemed	  unstopped:	   in	   2013,	   one	   third	   (31%)	   of	  
Trang	  households	  reported	  having	  sold	  land	  over	  the	  last	  three	  years;	  those	  sales	  reflect	  a	  process	  of	  
deactivation	  of	  farming	  and	  increasing	  share	  of	  salary	  job	  in	  the	  total	   income.	  Last,	  severity	  relates	  
to	  the	  type	  of	   investors,	  their	  rapidness	  in	  planting,	  the	  attitude	  of	  populations	  towards	  them,	  and	  
the	  attitude	  of	   the	  government,	  as	  we	   found	   in	  Ratanakiri.	  Different	   from	  ELCs	   that	   count	   several	  
thousands	   hectares,	   medium-­‐size	   private	   companies	   (several	   hundreds	   hectares)	   were	   far	   more	  
rapid	   in	   preparing	   and	   planting	   trees	   on	   the	   land	   they	   acquired.	   It	   did	   not	   let	   time	   to	   local	  
populations	  to	  continue	  farming	  for	  a	  while	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  ELCs.	  The	  second	  reason	  explained	  by	  
populations	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  fear	  foreign	  ELCs	  as	  they	  do	  fear	  Khmer	  owners,	  whom	  they	  know	  or	  
perceive	  as	  people	  with	  unlimited	  power.	  Populations	  did	  not	  resist	  to	  the	  latter,	  as	  clearly	  indicated	  
by	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  same	  commune	  (Loum	  Choar)	  between	  Pra	  Lai	  -­‐	  where	  villagers	  continued	  




the	  acquisition	  of	   land	  by	  Khmer	  individuals,	  as	   it	  did,	  although	  late,	  to	  the	  acquisitions	  by	  ELCs.	   In	  
May	  2012,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  issued	  the	  Directive	  01,	  which	  stipulated	  that	  populations	  could	  claim	  
back	   the	   land	   plots	   that	   had	   been	   granted	   to	   ELCs	   and	   that	   they	   still	   cultivated.	   A	  measurement	  
operation	  began	  during	  summer	  2012	  and	  populations	  could	  then	  obtain	  land	  title	  for	  some	  of	  their	  
plots.	  Nothing	   similar	  occurred	   for	   the	   land	  acquired	  by	  Khmer	  ordinary	  companies	   (not	  ELC).	  The	  
survey	   carried	  out	   during	   summer	  2013	   confirm	   the	   crucial	   difference	  between	  Trang	   and	  Pra	   Lai	  
village:	  in	  the	  first	  village,	  not	  one	  single	  household	  reported	  claiming	  land,	  as	  it	  was	  sold	  to	  private	  
company	  and	  in-­‐migrants	  but	  not	  to	  ELC.	  In	  contrast,	  they	  are	  56%	  in	  Pra	  Lai	  who	  got	  their	  claimed	  
land	  measured.	  	  
Different	  from	  severe	  dispossession,	  partial	  dispossession	  refers	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  villages	  were	  
left	  with	  enough	  land	  so	  that	  households	  could	  insofar	  satisfy	  their	  basic	  needs	  from	  farming.	  Apart	  
from	   the	   relative	   size	   of	   land	   loss	   in	   the	   total	   area	   previously	   cultivated,	   the	   cases	   of	   partial	  
dispossession	  pertain	  to	  the	  location	  and	  the	  pace	  of	  development	  of	  companies,	  and	  the	  capacity	  
for	   local	   populations	   to	   anticipate,	   respond	   to	   and	  negotiate	   land	  acquisitions.	  We	   found	   cases	   in	  
Luang	   Prabang	  where	   companies	  were	   far	   enough	   from	   the	  main	   agricultural	   land	   of	   the	   village.	  
Houay-­‐Kong	   villagers	   for	   instance	   could	   keep	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   their	   land,	   but	   also	   their	   cattle	  
without	  risking	  damaging	  rubber	  trees	  (Friis,	  2013:	  75).	  In	  contrast,	  in	  other	  villages,	  the	  companies	  
settled	  on	  territories	  that	  were	  close	  to	  cultivated	  land	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  villagers	  felt	  they	  had	  to	  
convert	   their	   upland	   fields	   to	   rubber	   in	   either	   smallholding	   or	   contract	   farming	   because	   the	  
company	  would	  otherwise	  plant	  rubber	  on	  it	  (Friis,	  2013).	  Loum	  Choar	  commune	  presents	  also	  great	  
difference	  among	  villages	   regarding	   the	  magnitude	  of	  dispossession.	  The	  commune	  counts	  among	  
the	  largest	  ELCs	  in	  the	  province	  (15’000	  ha	  grant	  signed	  in	  2002),	  but	  until	  now	  its	  productive	  activity	  
has	  remained	  distant	  from	  the	  land	  used	  by	  Pra	  Lai	  villagers.	  We	  found	  some	  farmers,	  amongst	  the	  
well	  off	  and	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  village	  himself,	  who	  have	  planted	  rubber	  trees	  for	  their	  own	  and	  even	  
built	  houses	  at	  a	  place	  that	  is	  –	  they	  say	  -­‐	  at	  the	  edge	  but	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  company.	  Such	  
risky	   investment	   by	   relatively	   well-­‐informed	   farmers	   is	   somewhat	   surprising.	   They	   explained	   that	  
they	   decided	   to	   clear	   and	   plant	   trees	   before	   the	   company	   started	   to	   do	   the	   same,	   with	   strong	  
confidence	   in	   their	   capacity	   to	   keep	   their	   trees.	   Their	   confidence	   can	   be	   related	   to	   their	   status	  
and/or	  closeness	  to	  the	  local	  elite;	  the	  most	  plausible	  explanation	  is	  that	  this	  area	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  
ELC	  was	  negotiated	  and	   left	   to	  the	  population.	  Partial	  dispossession	  might	  also	  be	   just	  a	  matter	  of	  
time,	  as	   it	   can	   take	  several	  years	   time	   for	  ELCs	   to	  plant	   the	  areas	   they	  were	  granted,	   in	  particular	  
when	   land	   was	   primary	   forest	   or	   years	   old	   fallow	   land	   with	   trees.	   Some	   ELCs	   encountered	  
organizational	   challenges	   and	   delays,	   such	   as	   getting	   adequate	   budget	   and	   machinery	   for	   land	  
clearing	  or	  for	  developing	  rubber	  nurseries.	  We	  also	  found	  the	  case	  of	  a	  company	  whose	  objective	  
was	   logging	   and	   not	   planting	   rubber	   plantation.	   All	   these	   contingencies	   and	   circumstances	   gave	  
populations	  time	  and	  space	  to	  limit	  dispossession.	  Some	  could	  continue	  farming	  granted	  areas	  for	  a	  
while,	  as	  in	  Pra	  Lai.	  In	  Malik,	  some	  farmers	  who	  had	  enough	  workforce,	  the	  tools	  (chainsaws)	  or	  the	  
financial	  capital	  to	  hire	  workers	  and	  tools,	  rushed	  to	  clear	  land	  plots	  at	  the	  edge	  -­‐	  whether	  inside	  or	  
outside	  –	  of	  ELCs	  territory	  with	  the	  aims	  to	  stop	  further	  or	  extra	  occupation	  and	  to	  fix	  these	  areas	  as	  
‘their’	  land.	  Finally,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  dispossession	  also	  relates	  to	  the	  capacity	  for	  local	  populations	  
to	   negotiate	   with	   companies,	   whether	   to	   spare	   some	   land,	   to	   get	   incorporated	   into	   rubber	  
companies	   or	   to	   get	   some	   compensation	   for	   their	   loss.	   In	   Luang	   Prabang	   for	   instance,	   Na	  Nhang	  
Neua	  populations	  and	  authorities	  managed	  “to	  minimise	  the	  plot	  allocated	  to	  the	  Company”,	  using	  a	  
good	  personal	   standing	  with	   the	  district	   authorities	   (Friis,	   2013:	   91).	   In	   the	   south	  of	   Laos,	   Senties	  
found	   partial	   dispossession	   and	   such	  maneuvering	   opportunities	   limited	   to	   very	   few	   households,	  




knowledge	  of	  their	   land	  rights	  -­‐-­‐some	  even	  managed	  to	  keep	  most	  of	  their	   land	  (Senties,	  2013).	   In	  
Ratanakiri,	   in	   application	  of	  Directive	  01	  and	  after	   the	  measurement,	   families	  obtained	  a	   ‘primary	  
certificate	  on	   landholding’	  and	   later,	   land	  titles.	   In	  Luang	  Prabang,	  some	  villagers	  felt	  that	  the	  only	  
option	   to	   keep	   their	   land	   was	   to	   engage	   in	   contract	   farming	   with	   the	   company	  (Friis,	   2013:	   69).	  
Negotiation	  in	  other	  cases	  consisted	  in	  land	  plots	  exchange	  between	  families	  and	  companies	  as	  we	  
found	   in	  Malik	   commune;	   in	   other	   cases,	   families	   received	   cash	   for	   the	   land	   they	   lost.	   However,	  
none	   of	   these	   arrangements	   with	   companies	   compensates	   populations	   for	   their	   loss.	   In	   Luang	  
Prabang,	   contracts	  with	   the	   company	   rapidly	   turned	   to	   failure	   for	   some	  of	   the	   families	   in	  Na	  Mai	  
village,	  where	   farmers	  had	   to	  uproot	   rubber	   trees	  again	   in	  order	   to	  plant	   rice.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   land	  
plots	  exchange	   in	  Ratanakiri,	   families	   received	   land	  plots	   that	  were	  not	  as	  good	  as	   those	   they	   lost	  
with	   respect	   to	   soil	   quality	   and	   distance.	  What	   dispossessed	   peoples	   received	   from	   companies	   in	  
Ratanakiri	   cannot	   be	   called	   ‘compensation’,	   as	   the	   amount	   -­‐	   150	   to	   200	   US$	   per	   hectare	   -­‐	   was	  
calculated	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  price	  of	   labour	   to	  clear	  and	  plant	   the	  plot,	  a	  derisory	  amount	  when	  
compared	   to	   the	   income	   that	   can	   be	   made	   from	   one	   single	   crop	   on	   these	   plots	   they	   have	   lost	  
forever.	   Furthermore,	   not	   all	   populations	   were	   in	   position	   to	   negotiate,	   as	   noted	   by	   Senties	   for	  
Southern	  Laos	  where	  “even	  if	  compensation	  was	  given,	  it	  was	  not	  considered	  sufficient	  to	  make	  up	  
for	   the	   lost	   land,	   the	   lost	   crops	  and	   the	  emotional	   stress	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   subjective	  meanings	  
attached	   to	   land,	   e.g.	   the	   clearing	   of	   sacred	   sites,	   including	   the	   removal	   of	   phi	   (spirit)	   houses”	  
(Senties	  2014).	  
Actors	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  dispossession	  
Beside	   foreign	   and	   national	   companies	  who	  were	   granted	   large	   areas	   of	   land	   through	   concession	  
regimes,	  the	  areas	  we	  studied	  witnessed	  the	  presence	  of	  numerous	  actors	  from	  various	  types	  and	  all	  
size	   with	   respect	   to	   land	   acquisitions:	   local	   companies	   contracted	   to	   clear	   the	   land	   area	   of	   the	  
largest	   ones	   (Fonrouge,	   2013:	   29;	   35-­‐38),	   Military	   Development	   Unit,	   high-­‐rank	   military	   officers	  
holdings	  and	  “powerful	   individuals	  engaged	   in	   land	  business”	   (Paramita,	  2013);	   individuals	  holding	  
high-­‐rank	  position	   in	   the	   governing	   apparatus	   (Friis,	   2013:	   76)	  whether	   at	   central	   or	   local	   level	   or	  
with	  close-­‐connections	   to	   the	   former	   (Senties,	  2013).	  Our	  case	  studies	  show	  not	  only	   the	   increase	  
and	   the	   diversity	   of	   stakeholders,	   but	   also	   their	   duplicity	   and	   the	   intermingling	   of	   actors,	   such	   as	  
local	   authority	   representatives	   owning	   companies	   in	   Champasak,	   former	   governor	   running	   a	  
company	   in	   Luang	   Prabang,	   and	   government	   officers	   receiving	   land	   in	   concession.	   In	   addition,	   all	  
studied	  areas	  have	  witnessed	  significant	   in-­‐migration	   in	   relation	   to	  LSLAs	  and	  cash	  crops	  boom.	   In	  
Ratanakiri,	   our	   survey	   reveals	   that	   in	  2013	  one	  household	  out	  of	   three	   (31,5%)	   is	  not	  native	   from	  
Ratanakiri.	  The	  distribution	  of	   in-­‐migrants	  by	  year	  of	  arrival	   shows	   that	   in-­‐migration	  has	   increased	  
over	  the	  period:	  7%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  in-­‐migrants	  arrived	  between	  1995	  and	  2000;	  29%	  of	  them	  
settled	  between	  2000	  and	  2004;	  39%	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	   (25%	  settled	  over	   the	   last	  3	  years).	  
Laos	   has	   not	   witnessed	   such	   a	   rush	   of	   migrants	   to	   the	   studied	   areas;	   plantation	   workers	   do	  
prominently	  come	  from	  the	  villages	  where	  the	  plantation	  lies.	  However,	  the	  presence	  of	  newcomers	  
in	   Champasak	   studied	   areas,	   from	   within	   and	   outside	   Laos,	   is	   noticeable:	   including	   Vietnamese	  
managers	   in	   the	   foreign-­‐held	   plantations	   and	   some	   Laotian	   workers	   from	   other	   provinces	   in	   the	  
plantations	  that	  are	  held	  by	  nationals	  (Senties,	  2014).	  
Local	   governments,	   at	   district,	   commune	   and	   village	   levels,	   were	   found	   crucial	   in	   the	   politics	   of	  
dispossession,	   as	   they	  mediated	   between	   populations	   and	   investors	   for	   land	   deals,	   and	   between	  
populations	   and	   upper-­‐levels	   of	   administration	   and	   government	   for	   post-­‐acquisitions	   issues	  
(compensation,	  relocation,	  etc.).	  In	  Laos,	  district	  government	  had	  a	  very	  significant	  role	  in	  facilitating	  




development	   plans;	   they	   were	   rather	   the	   medium	   of	   explanation	   and	   negotiation	   between	   the	  
district,	   company	  and	   the	   villagers.	   In	  Cambodia,	   communal	   authorities	  were	  more	  proponents	  of	  
the	   land	   transactions.	   The	   role	   of	   communal	   authority	   has	   been	   even	   more	   crucial	   due	   to	   the	  
absence	  of	   effective	   legal	   framework,	   authority,	   and	  mechanisms	  people	   can	   turn	   to.	  Most	  often,	  
commune	  and	  village-­‐level	  authority	  representatives	  persuaded	  –	  or	  threatened	  -­‐	  their	  populations	  
to	   accept	   land	   acquisitions	   by	   outsiders,	   facilitated	   the	   deals,	   and	   dissuaded	   populations	   to	  
complain.	   In	   most	   of	   the	   cases,	   local	   governments	   have	   taken	   a	   positive	   stance	   towards	   the	  
conversion	   to	   rubber	   in	   their	   talks	  with	  populations.	  More	  persuasive,	   they	  have	  used	   the	   ‘upper-­‐
level	   decision’	   argument	   to	   explain	   to	   the	   population	   that	   there	   was	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   accept	  
government	  decisions.	  Investors	  were	  thus	  made	  legitimate	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  government	  
had	  approved	  ‘investments	  projects’,	  which	   in	  addition,	  would	  bring	  development	  to	  their	  villages.	  
Furthermore,	   land	  acquisitions	  and	  eventually	   the	  absence	  of	   compensation	  were	   legitimized	  with	  
the	   argument	   that	   the	   land	   was	   “formally	   state	   land”	   or	   “village	   reserved	   land	   for	   agricultural	  
expansion”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Luang	  Prabang	  (Friis,	  2013:	  90-­‐91);	  ‘unused	  land’	  that	  reverted	  to	  the	  State	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  fallow	  plots	  in	  Champasak,	  or	  	  ‘private	  State	  land’	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Cambodia.	  Last,	  when	  
some	  populations	  were	  reluctant,	  local	  authorities	  warned	  them	  that	  the	  company	  would	  take	  their	  
land	   in	   any	   case	   without	   providing	   any	   compensation	   (Senties	   2013),	   although	   in	   most	   cases	  
compensation	   was	   not	   even	   promised	   (Friis,	   2013:	   90)10.	   In	   Phum	   Thmay,	   Kampong	   Thom,	   local	  
authority	   advised	   the	   villagers	   to	   avoid	   any	   type	   of	   complaint	   or	   protest	   directed	   towards	   the	  
government:	  populations	  were	  ‘advised’	  to	  draw	  lessons	  from	  cases	  from	  the	  others	  experiences	  of	  
victims	  of	  forced	  eviction	  and	  from	  the	  case	  of	  «	  protesters	  and	  human	  rights	  defenders	  have	  been	  
frequently	  arrested	  and/or	  assaulted	  by	  the	  government	  »	  (Paramita,	  2013:	  46).	  	  
Local	  authorities	  were	  active	  in	  the	  acquisitions	  of	  land	  by	  outsiders	  in	  three	  ways.	  First,	  they	  often	  
provided	  the	  buyers	  with	   information	  about	   ‘good	  places’	  with	  respect	  to	  soil	  quality,	  accessibility,	  
and	   land	   improvement	   work	   to	   be	   done.	   In	   Nambak	   District,	   the	   Natural	   Resources	   and	  
Environments	  Office	  had	   surveyed	   the	  district	   for	   suitable	   land	  and	  provided	   the	  Company	  with	  a	  
map	  (Friis,	  2013:	  57).	  Second,	   local	  authority	  organized	  meetings	  where	   investors	  were	   introduced	  
to	  populations	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  their	  ‘arrival’.	  In	  Kampong	  Thom,	  the	  local	  government	  together	  
with	  central	   government	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   for	   the	   ‘preparation’	  of	  Tan	  Bien	  Rubber	  Company	  
concession,	   i.e.	   the	   eviction	   of	   inhabitants	   (Paramita,	   2013).	   In	   Bong	   Lvea,	   village	   authority	  
participated	  to	  the	  measurement	  of	  land	  that	  was	  taken	  by	  the	  company	  for	  eventual	  compensation,	  
taking	  the	  opportunity	  to	  charge	  populations	  for	  their	  compensation	  claims	  rather	  than	  “defending	  
people’s	   interest”	   (Fonrouge,	  2013:	  46,	  48).	   In	   some	  cases,	   local	   authority	   rather	   took	  profit	   from	  
the	   arrival	   of	  migrants,	   like	   in	   Ratanakiri	  where	   the	   chief	   of	   one	   commune	   collects	   ‘entrance’	   fee	  
from	  every	  newcomer	  who	  must	  request	  permission	  to	  settle	  in	  the	  commune	  (Tang,	  2013:	  38).	  The	  
chief	   of	   the	   same	   commune	   also	   facilitated	   some	   transactions	   and/or	   land	   grabbing	   by	   Khmer	  
buyers,	  without	   the	   full	   knowledge	   of	   the	   villagers	   (idem).	   Third,	   local	   authority	   representatives	   -­‐	  
village	   chief,	   police,	   commune	   clerk,	   commune	   council	   members	   -­‐	   were	   actively	   engaged	   in	   land	  
deals,	   selling	   land	   themselves	   in	   some	   cases,	   whether	   for	   companies	   and	   to	   in-­‐migrants,	   or	   they	  
allowed	   “clearance	   to	   newcomers“	   (Fonrouge,	   2013:	   35).	   Such	   behaviours	   appear	   to	   be	   more	  
common	   in	  areas	  where	   local	  authority	  heads	  are	  not	  native	   from	  the	  commune,	   like	   in	  Kampong	  
Thom	   for	   the	   case	   of	   Cambodia.	   Yet,	   in	   Ratanakiri,	   representatives	   of	   the	   commune,	   who	   are	  
indigenous,	  engaged	  in	  confusing	  arrangements	  with	  some	  peoples,	  as	  in	  Loum	  Choar	  where	  it	  was	  
reported	  that	  the	  commune	  authority	  convinced	  families	  in	  distress,	  or	  who	  	  feared	  to	  lose	  land,	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




sell	   them	   land	  plots,	  with	   the	  argument	   that	   the	   land	  would	   thus	  be	  protected	   from	  grabbing	   risk	  
(Tang,	  2013).	  Some	  interviewees	  reported	  that	  those	  land	  plots	  were	  then	  sold	  to	  companies	  by	  the	  
commune	  authority.	  Although	  difficult	   to	  document,	   this	  new	  kind	  of	  vulnerability	   is	  plausible,	   i.e.	  
engaging	  in	  a	  ‘Faustian	  bargain’	  (Wood,	  2003)	  consisting	  in	  risky	  arrangements	  with	  more	  powerful	  
parties	  against	  which	  no	  recourse	   is	  possible.	  As	   Ironside	  argues	  about	  neighbour	  villages,	  and	  the	  
‘lawless	  environment”,	  the	  story	  of	  these	  peoples	  is	  “the	  story	  of	  powerful	  people	  dominating	  their	  
life”	  (2009:	  121).	  
Overall,	   local	   authority	   discouraged	   populations	   from	   complaining	   against	   land	   deals	   backed	   by	  
governments.	   In	   Luang	   Prabang,	   Friis	   found	   that	   district	   authority	   contributed	   to	   population’s	  
resignation	   that	   “disagreement	   with	   the	   concession	   plan	   would	   not	   have	   resulted	   in	   anything”	  
(2013:	   62).	   In	   Champasak,	   Senties	   found	   that	   most	   villagers	   interviewed	   felt	   intimidated	   and	  
pressured	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   district	   officials	   organised	   village	   collective	   meetings	   to	   announce	   the	  
grants	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   company	   representatives,	  which	   indicated	   decisions	   had	   been	  made.	   In	  
such	  meetings,	   villagers	  were	   also	   instructed	   by	   the	   district	   to	   collaborate	   so	   that	   the	   concession	  
would	   run	   smoothly	   (Senties	   2013).	   Lu	   reports	   cases	   in	   which,	  when	   the	   villages	   were	   first	  
approached,	  they	  were	  told	  that	  the	  government	  had	  already	  given	  the	  land	  to	  the	  company	  and	  the	  
villagers	  had	  no	  right	  to	  refuse	  since	  it	  was	  state	  land11.	  Lu	  further	  argues	  that	  it	  could	  also	  perhaps	  
be	   interpreted	   as	   some	   confusion	   or	   vagueness	   in	   Lao	   over	   technical	   legal	   definitions	   of	   what	   a	  
concession	  is	  and	  what	  land	  belongs	  to	  villagers	  vs.	  the	  state.	  Regardless,	  villagers	  often	  didn't	  feel	  
they	  had	  a	  choice	  in	  whether	  to	  grant	  land	  and	  even	  less,	  how	  to	  (and	  to	  whom)	  initiate	  a	  complaint	  
and	   seek	   remedies.	   Thus,	   the	   role	   of	   local	   authority	   was	   found	   to	   significantly	   aggravate	  
dispossession.	  	  
Populations:	  risky	  gambling	  at	  a	  time	  of	  invasion	  
In	  parallel	   to	  and	  as	  a	   consequence	  of	   LSLAs,	   local	  populations	   contributed	   to	   the	  politics	  of	   their	  
own	  dispossession	  as	  they	  also	  sold	  land.	  	  It	  was	  not	  an	  option	  in	  Laos,	  as	  populations	  had	  no	  right	  to	  
operate	   any	   transaction	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   companies	   with	   what	   is	   considered	   by	   the	   government	   as	  
“State	  land”.	  The	  situation	  is	  greatly	  different	  in	  Cambodia,	  where	  populations	  sold	  part	  of	  their	  land	  
plots,	   whether	   to	   companies	   or	   in-­‐migrants.	   In	   some	   cases,	   inhabitants	   rented	   out	   their	   land	  
(Fonrouge,	   2013;	   Tang,	   2014:	   54),	   or	   exchanged	   their	   land	   against	   labour	   like	   in	   Ratanakiri	  where	  
various	   arrangements	  were	  made	   between	   indigenous	   populations	  who	   had	   land	   and	   in-­‐migrants	  
who	   provided	   labour	   force,	   skills	   (producing	   rubber	   seedlings)	   and	   machinery	   (chain-­‐saw	   for	  
clearing)	   in	   exchange	   of	   land	   plots.	   Selling	   was	   a	   great	   opportunity,	   at	   a	   time	   motorcycles	   and	  
consumer	   goods	   (radios,	   clothes,	  mobile	  phone,	   hygiene	   and	   cosmetics	   products,	   processed	   food,	  
etc.)	  developed	  and	  ‘life	  was	  changing’	  i.e.	  the	  need	  for	  cash	  was	  increasing.	  Land	  sales	  also	  provided	  
a	  few	  families	  with	  the	  financial	  capital	  to	  invest	  into	  rubber.	  In	  Ratanakiri,	  people	  estimated	  rightly	  
that	   they	  had	  access	   to	  enough	   land	  and	  did	  not	   see	  a	   risk	  when	   selling.	   They	  assumed	   that	   they	  
were	   selling	   ‘extra	   land’,	   remaining	   safe	   as	   they	   still	   had	   enough	   to	   grow	   rice	   for	   the	   family,	   and	  
enough	  land	  around	  they	  were	  allowed	  and	  could	  clear,	  as	  it	  had	  ever	  been.	  They	  were	  right,	  but	  just	  
could	  not	  realize	  how	  fast	  and	  large	  land	  acquisitions	  were	  in	  preparation.	  And	  as	  some	  interviewees	  
reported	  (Tang,	  2013),	  because	  in	  their	  traditional	  farming	  system,	  land	  was	  not	  kept	  more	  than	  2-­‐3	  
years	  of	  time	  before	  being	  left	  fallow,	  they	  could	  not	  conceive	  that	  the	  deals	  they	  made	  were	  indeed	  
final	  sales.	  Although	  populations	  may	  have	  been	  naive	  or/and	  lured	  by	  the	  first	  buyers,	  there	  is	  no	  
doubt	   that	   they	   have	   since	   realized	   how	   much	   their	   land	   tenure	   has	   become	   insecure	   and	   how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




severe	  is	  the	  land	  rush	  in	  their	  neighbourhood.	  Though,	  some	  groups	  have	  optimistically	  engaged	  in	  
gambling	  with	  their	  land,	  selling	  more	  than	  their	  ‘extra-­‐land’,	  as	  they	  expected	  they	  could	  clear	  other	  
plots	  in	  compensation.	  Such	  plan	  turned	  to	  failure,	  as	  the	  pace	  of	  land	  acquisitions	  accelerated	  and	  
reduced	   land	   available	   for	   clearing,	   and	   because	   communal	   authority	   restricted	   or	   prohibited	   the	  
clearing	   of	   the	   land	   that	  was	   left.	   For	   others,	   land	   sales	   reflect	   a	   fear	   of	   losing	   their	   land	   and	   an	  
attempt	   to	  make	  a	  deal	   ‘better	   than	  nothing’.	  Driven	  by	  both	  opportunities	   and	   fear,	   populations	  
have	  contributed	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  (their)	  dispossession.	  	  	  	  	  
	  2.3.	  The	  new	  deal:	  economic	  environment	  and	  perceptions	  
The	   acceleration	   of	   land	   acquisitions	   has	   greatly	   changed	   the	   economic	   environment	   in	   which	  
indigenous	   populations	   have	   to	   reorganize	   or	   adapt	   their	   livelihoods.	   Urban-­‐rural	  
interconnectedness	  has	  strengthened	  and	  trade	  has	   increased.	  New	  opportunities	  have	  arisen,	  but	  
they	   are	   not	   systematically	   synonym	   to	   betterment	   for	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   peasants.	   The	   political	  
economy	  of	  rubber	  boom	  has	  boosted	  economic	  growth	  but	  it	  has	  also	  created	  insecurity	  and	  new	  
inequalities.	  	  
A	  more	  dynamic	  but	  competitive	  and	  insecure	  environment	  
Urban-­‐rural	   interconnectedness	   has	   increased	   thanks	   to	   new	   and	   better-­‐maintained	   roads	   and	  
because	   populations	   have	   massively	   bought	   motorcycles.	   Distance	   and	   transport	   duration	   are	  
shorter.	  This	  development	   is	  more	   important	   in	  Cambodia	  than	   in	  Laos.	  Urban	  centres	  and	  market	  
places	  such	  as	  Kampong	  Thmar	  (Kampong	  Thom)	  and	  Bokeo	  (Ratanakiri),	  as	  well	  as	  secondary	  towns	  
such	   as	   Banlung	   (Ratanakiri)	   have	   grown	   rapidly.	   In	   Champasak	   province,	   Paksong	   and	   Bachiang	  
district	  towns	  have	  also	  experienced	  tremendous	  physical	  change,	  including	  the	  expansion	  of	  market	  
places,	  banks	  and	  ATMs	  that	  did	  not	  exist	   three	  years	  ago.	  The	  supply	  of	  agricultural	   inputs,	   tools,	  
construction	  material,	  medicine,	  consumption	  goods,	  etc.,	  has	  increased.	  Retail	  shops	  have	  opened	  
within	  villages;	  peoples	  who	  travel	  back	  and	  forth	  on	  motorcycles	  supply	  them	  regularly;	  the	  range	  
of	  goods	  has	  diversified.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  peddlers	  making	  tours	  in	  the	  villages	  where	  they	  sell	  
meat,	  fish,	  etc.	  Such	  processes	  are	  particularly	  strong	  for	  instance	  in	  Ratanakiri	  with	  massive	  imports	  
from	  Vietnam.	  Rural	  populations	  spend	  more	  time	  outside	  their	  village,	  as	  indicated	  by	  road	  traffic	  
and	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  mini-­‐bus.	  	  
However,	  urban	  development,	  shops	  and	  increasing	  trade	  flows,	  as	  well	  as	  people’s	  movement	  are	  
not	   systematically	   synonym	  with	   betterment	   for	   indigenous	   populations.	   Some	   of	   the	   food	   items	  
that	  peddlers	  sell	  in	  the	  villages,	  e.g.	  meet,	  fish,	  vegetables	  are	  items	  that	  villagers	  used	  to	  produce	  
or	   collect	   by	   themselves,	   and	   that	   they	  must	   now	   pay	   for	   as	   their	   availability	   has	   decreased	   and	  
because	   populations	   are	   busy	  with	   other	   tasks.	   If	   populations	   can	   undeniably	   find	   an	   increasingly	  
diversified	  range	  of	  items	  in	  shops,	  their	  indebtedness	  also	  increases	  in	  parallel	  to	  their	  consumption	  
of	   purchased	   goods.	   	   Indebtedness	   is	   developing,	   as	   households	   expenses	   tend	   to	   increase	   in	  
relation	  to	  social	  norms	  that	  are	  trending	  up.	  Trade	  and	  markets	  have	  developed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
rise	   of	   cash	   crops,	   but	   farmers	   sell	   their	   harvests	  mostly	   ‘at	   home’	   to	   traders;	   they	   do	   not	   go	   to	  
urban	  markets	   located	  a	   few	  dozens	  kilometres	  around	  where	   sales	  prices	  are	  higher.	  Markets	  do	  
develop,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  for	  local	  populations	  who	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  operate	  on	  those	  markets.	  
Indeed,	   it	   is	  wiser	   for	   them	   to	   sell	   at	   home	   than	   to	   try	   to	   sell	   their	   products	   themselves.	   In	   sum,	  
many	  of	   the	  opportunities	  associated	   to	  urban-­‐rural	   interconnectedness	   remain	  out	  of	   reach	   from	  
the	  bulk	  of	  peasants.	  
Another	   major	   feature	   regarding	   the	   economic	   environment	   is	   the	   development	   of	   the	   financial	  




Financial	  services	  are	  physically	  closer	  to	  populations	  who	  can	  easily	  go	  to	  bank	  offices	  outside	  their	  
village	   by	   motorbike,	   and	   because	   staffs	   regularly	   come	   to	   the	   villages	   for	   information	   meeting,	  
loans	   disbursement,	   repayment,	   etc.	   The	   development	   of	   financial	   institutions	   is	   commonly	  
associated	  with	  an	  improvement	  of	  livelihoods.	  Though,	  the	  link	  is	  more	  complex.	  Although	  a	  large	  
range	  of	  populations	  have	  benefited	  from	  access	  to	  credit,	   it	  has	  benefited	  the	  ‘upper-­‐class’	  more,	  
including	   village	   elites	  who	   have	   engaged	   in	   rubber	   and	   developed	   trade	   and	   services	  within	   the	  
villages,	  e.g.	  shops	  and	  transport,	  as	  well	  as	  urban	  actors	  or	   in-­‐migrants	  who	  have	  developed	  non-­‐
farming	   activities,	   i.e.	   trade,	   construction,	   etc.	   Inequality	   has	   also	   increased	   between	   indigenous	  
local	  populations	  and	  in-­‐migrants	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  latter,	  who	  get	  easily	  access	  to	  credit	  they	  use	  to	  
buy	  land	  on	  arrival	  like	  we	  found	  in	  Ratanakiri.	  	  
Moreover,	   bank	   loans	   do	   not	   always	   correspond	   to	   populations’	   needs:	   as	   cash	   transactions	  
intensify,	  peoples	  need	  cash	  more	  often,	  not	  only	  for	  investment	  but	  also	  for	  ordinary	  transactions;	  
their	   financial	   treasury	   needs	   are	   sometimes	   too	   ‘micro’	   even	   for	  micro-­‐finance	   institutions.	   Last,	  
reluctance	   to	   borrow	   from	   formal	   institutions	   is	   serious	   among	   local	   populations:	   as	   the	   range	   of	  
opportunities	  to	  diversify	  activities	  for	  their	  own	  account	  is	  shrinking,	  the	  risk	  of	  over-­‐indebtedness	  
becomes	   greater	   than	   investment	   opportunities.	   For	   all	   those	   reasons,	   informal	   credit	   remains	  
essential	  in	  all	  studied	  areas.	  
Rural	  livelihoods	  are	  indeed	  increasingly	  under	  the	  influence/control	  of	  external	  actors	  who	  control	  
the	  most	  profitable	  economic	  activities	  -­‐	  rubber	  trade	  (Gironde	  and	  Fortunel,	  2014),	  services,	  various	  
types	   of	   brokerages,	   logging	   (Fonrouge,	   2013:	   74)	   –	   and	   are	   in	   strong	   power	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
peasants,	   as	   illustrated	   by	   contract	   farming	   in	   Laos.	   The	   labour	   market	   in	   Cambodia	   provides	  
another	   illustration,	   with	   the	   role	   played	   by	  Mekas	  who	   are	   peoples	   organizing	   and	   controlling	  
access	  to	  job	  into	  companies	  (recruiters	  and	  sub-­‐managers).	  They	  also	  control	  work	  (supervision	  and	  
payment);	  and	  they	  may	  have	  a	  partial	  control	  on	  workers’	  income	  as	  they	  somewhat	  force	  them	  in	  
patron-­‐client	   relationships	   when	   they	   run	   shops	   in	   which	   workers	   are	   obliged	   to	   buy	   (Paramita,	  
2013:	  76-­‐77).	  	  
LSLAs	  and	  associated	  land	  transactions	  have	  not	  only	  dispossessed	  local	  populations;	  they	  have	  also	  
created	  insecurity	  on	  the	  land	  that	  is	  left	  to	  them.	  Insecurity	  relates	  first	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  lust	  
for	  land	  by	  companies	  and	  landowners	  of	  all	  kinds	  who	  intend	  to	  expand	  their	  areas.	  On	  one	  hand,	  
populations	  are	  nowadays	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  further	  acquisitions	  and	  grabbing	  of	  ’what	  is	  left’;	  
they	  might	  not	  gamble	  with	  their	  remaining	  land	  as	  they	  did	  before.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  selling	  land	  
remains	  a	  great	  opportunity	  given	  the	  price	  of	  land	  but	  also	  because	  some	  groups	  of	  populations	  are	  
forced	   to	   desperate	   land	   sales.	   Insecurity	   relates	   secondly	   to	   conflicts	   among	   tenants.	   This	   is	   the	  
case	  of	  populations	  that	  were	  relocated	  on	  land	  that	  was	  already	  contested,	  such	  as	  in	  Phum	  Thmay	  
with	  land	  already	  occupied	  by	  military	  units	  and	  high-­‐ranked	  officers	  (Paramita,	  2013:46-­‐47)	  and	  in	  
Malik	  with	  families	  relocated	  on	  areas	  that	  were	  already	  disputed	  with	  a	  neighbouring	  village	  (Tang,	  
2013).	  Furthermore,	  the	  relocation	  triggered	  conflicts	  among	  Toul	  inhabitants	  themselves	  (idem),	  as	  
relocated	  families	  do	  not	  have	  a	  good	  command	  of	  new	  areas	  delimitations,	  i.e.	  exact	  borders,	  who	  
is	   entitled	   to	  use	   land	  above	   their	   plots,	  who	   could	   contest	   and	   claim,	  who	   could	   try	   to	  encroach	  
their	  area,	  how	  powerful	  are	  the	  potential	  grabbers,	  etc.	  Those	  cases	  show	  that	  LSLAs	  have	  not	  only	  
dispossessed	  populations	  but	  also	  generated	  conflict	  among	  populations,	  as	  some	  try	  to	  make	  profit	  
out	  of	  ‘confusing	  situation’	  (Fonrouge,	  2013:	  45).	  Peoples	  struggle	  for	  land	  that	  could	  be	  spared	  but	  
could	  be	  granted	  soon,	  for	  land	  that	  was	  allocated	  in	  compensation,	  and	  for	  land	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
granted	  or	  sold	  for	  which	  they	  can	  expect	  a	  good	  price	  or	  compensation	  (Tang,	  2013:	  54;	  Fonrouge,	  




if	  any,	  of	  communal	  land,	  notably	  forest	  areas	  because	  of	  restrictions	  and	  bans.	  Although	  legislations	  
are	   poorly	   enforced,	   access	   to	   those	   areas	   is	  made	  more	   complicated	   and	   it	   now	  has	   a	   price	   (for	  
arrangements	  with	  administration)	  that	  excludes	  some	  groups.	  
Perceptions	  and	  responses	  	  
Households’	  perceptions	  of	   the	  on-­‐going	   transition,	   its	  opportunities	  and	  constraints,	  are	  essential	  
to	  understand	  strategies	  of	  resource	  allocation.	  Bourdier	  for	  instance	  argues	  that	  Cambodian	  upland	  
populations	   are	   rapidly	  modifying	   their	   livelihood	   strategies	  with	   “short-­‐term	  vision”	   as	   they	  have	  
just	  the	  “sentiment	  of	  surviving	  in	  a	  new	  insecure	  social	  environment”	  (Bourdier,	  2009).	  One	  of	  the	  
most	  striking	  findings	   is	  populations’	  contrasted	  says	  about	  the	  change	   in	  their	   life.	  Unsurprisingly,	  
local	  elites	  who	  have	  all	  types	  of	  capital	  needed	  to	  engage	  into	  rubber	  for	  their	  own	  account	  have	  a	  
positive	  opinion	  towards	  the	  rubber	  boom	  and	  even	  the	  presence	  of	  large-­‐scale	  actors.	  The	  opinions	  
expressed	   by	   ordinary	   peoples	   are	  more	   surprising.	   On	   one	   hand,	   they	  mostly	   cheerfully	   express	  
satisfaction	   about	   the	   overall	   process	   of	   change,	   new	   life	   style,	   e.g.	   having	   motorcycles	   and	  
consumer	   goods,	   improvement	   like	   better	   roads,	   and	   new	   opportunities	   such	   as	   getting	   easily	  
outside	  their	  village.	  Some,	  particularly	  the	  younger	  generations,	  also	  express	  wishes	  of	  renouncing	  
agriculture	   altogether,	   opening	   a	   small	   convenience	   shop	   or	   finding	   an	   office	   job.	   One	   the	   other	  
hand,	   there	   is	   awareness	   among	   youth	   of	   the	   limitations	   involved	   because	   they	   have	   no	   start-­‐up	  
capital,	  no	  skills,	  no	  experience	  and	  no	  social	  networks	  to	  access	  such	  opportunities.	  	  Although	  most	  
of	   the	   interviewed	   youngsters	   in	   Bachiang	   district	   expressed	   dissatisfaction	   with	   working	   at	   the	  
rubber	   plantations	   and	   with	   their	   so-­‐considered	   “low	   monthly	   salary”,	   they	   see	   their	   lives	   being	  
better-­‐off	  now	  due	  to	  the	  cash	  they	  get,	  which	  allow	  them	  to	  acquire	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services	  
of	   their	   preference,	  which	   satisfy	   short-­‐term	  needs,	   including	   social	   status	   and	   peer	   identification	  
(Senties	  2013).	  The	  latter	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  do	  not	  express	  aspirations	  that	  depict	  what	  they	  
consider	  a	  ‘better’,	  often	  non-­‐farming,	  livelihood:	  "most	  of	  them	  do	  but	  very	  few	  have	  the	  resources	  
and/or	   the	   capabilities	   to	   engage	   into	   concrete	   actions	   to	   make	   that	   happen"	   (Senties	   2014).	   In	  
Ratanakiri,	   the	  optimism	   is	   testified	  not	  only	  by	  peoples’	  views,	  but	  also	  by	   the	  substantial	  efforts	  
they	   have	   deployed	   to	   invest	   in	   rubber.	   Those	   who	   have	   already	   planted	   rubber	   do	   not	   express	  
concern	  about	  their	  capacity	  to	  grow	  their	  trees	  in	  a	  productive	  way,	  nor	  how	  they	  will	  learn	  to	  tap	  
the	  trees,	  neither	  about	  how	  they	  will	  sell	   their	  product	  (Gironde	  et	  Fortunel,	  2014).	  Among	  those	  
who	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  plant	  rubber	  so	  far,	  many	  explain	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  so	  and	  that	  it	  
is	  mainly	  a	  matter	  of	  time,	  i.e.	  the	  time	  needed	  to	  save	  from	  crops	  sales	  (soja,	  cassava,	  cashewnut)	  
to	  gather	  the	  requested	  sum	  for	  the	  initial	  investment	  for	  rubber.	  However,	  one	  can	  think	  that	  time	  
might	  not	  be	  on	  their	  side.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   populations	   also	   express	   fear	   about	   the	  politics	   of	   dispossession,	   their	   incapacity	   to	  
resist	  further	  land	  acquisitions	  by	  outsiders,	  and	  more	  generally	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  their	  capacity	  
to	  engage	  into	  market	  mechanisms.	  In	  Laos,	  it	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  intimidation	  and	  “being	  left	  without	  
any	   choice	   by	   the	   company”	   (Senties,	   2013)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   feeling	   of	   insecurity	   in	   which	   nothing	  
could	  be	  done	  “if	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  make	  another	  project”	  (Friis,	  2013:	  70)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
land	   granted	   to	   foreign	   companies.	   In	   Cambodia,	   fear	   is	   more	   pronounced	   when	   investors	   are	  
Khmer,	  as	  populations	  know	  or	  presume	  that	  rubber	  trees	  are	  the	  property	  of	  high-­‐rank	  officials	  or	  
other	  peoples	  who	  have	  unlimited	  power	  thanks	  to	  their	  connections	  to	  government	  forces.	  A	  lack	  
of	   confidence	   was	   found	   particularly	   strong	   in	   Ratanakiri	   when	   discussing	   with	   indigenous	   local	  
populations	   who	   argue	   that	   “the	   Khmer	   are	   smarter”	   (than	   them),	   for	   instance	   to	   engage	   into	  
rubber,	  as	  they	  have	  better	  knowledge	  on	  rubber	  due	  to	  their	  original	  place	  where	  there	  was	  rubber	  




migrating,	  e.g.	  to	  host	  the	  new	  comers	  on	  arrival,	  to	  help	  them	  to	  get	  jobs	  in	  companies,	  to	  inform	  
them	  about	  indigenous	  local	  families	  who	  could	  be	  willing	  to	  rent	  or	  sell	  land.	  Ratanakiri	  indigenous	  
populations	   also	   take	   the	   example	   of	   all	   shop	   owners	   and	   families	   who	   have	   developed	   service	  
activities,	   explaining	   that	   they	   (Jarai	   or	   Tumpun)	   do	   not	   have	   the	   knowledge	   and	   networks	   to	  
organise	  such	  business,	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  where	  to	  buy	  the	  goods	  to	  resell,	  etc.	  The	  feeling	  of	  
inferiority	   against	   Khmer,	   who	   are	   seen	   as	   “cleverer”	   was	   noticed	   by	   Maffii	   (2009b:	   134)	   in	   her	  
analysis	   of	   Ratanakiri	   indigenous	   women;	   it	   is	   manifest	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   land	   deals.	   Beyond	  
common	  statements	   like	   “they	   cannot	   take	  our	   land”,	   local	  populations	  express	   the	   idea	   that	   it	   is	  
difficult	   to	   resist	   the	  Khmer	  when	  they	  express	   interest	   to	  buy	   land,	   that	   the	  Khmer	  know	  how	  to	  
“trap”	   them,	   whether	   through	   money	   lending	   that	   will	   have	   to	   be	   repaid	   with	   land,	   or	   through	  
progressive	  occupation	  of	  land	  that	  at	  some	  point	  make	  their	  plots	  difficult	  to	  access.	  	  	  
In	  the	  short-­‐term,	  land	  acquisitions	  and	  the	  growing	  presence	  of	  outsiders	  offered	  local	  populations	  
the	   opportunity	   to	   sell	   their	   workforce,	   most	   importantly	   work	   to	   clear	   the	   acquired	   areas.	  
Immediate	   strategies	   included	   also	   selling	   land,	  whether	   for	   equipment	   and	   consumption	   (mostly	  
housing	   and	   motorcycles)	   or	   for	   productive	   investment	   (rubber,	   transportation	   vehicle,	   motor-­‐
cultivator),	  and	  logging	  on	  the	  lands	  that	  were	  lost	  but	  not	  used	  yet	  by	  new	  landholders	  and	  lands	  
that	  were	  going	  to	  be	  lost.	  In	  cases	  of	  partial	  dispossession,	  populations	  also	  reacted	  to	  prevent	  land	  
loss	  by	  clearing	  plots	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  fix	  their	  possession	  or	  right	  to	  use	  it,	  or	  with	  the	  objective	  that	  
they	   would	   have	   better	   chances	   to	   get	   compensation	   by	   companies,	   or	   to	   prevent	   further	  
acquisitions	  of	  land	  that	  they	  would	  now	  occupy.	  The	  substantial	  loss	  of	  farming	  land	  and	  access	  to	  
areas	   for	  natural	   resources	  collection	  combined	  to	  the	   increasing	  need	  for	  cash	   led	  populations	  to	  
transform	  their	  farming	  system	  towards	  (1)	  a	  more	  intense	  use	  of	  land	  plots,	  as	  shifting	  cultivation	  is	  
hampered;	  (2)	  an	  increase	  of	  rapid-­‐return	  cash-­‐crops	  such	  as	  cassava;	  (3)	  a	  reduction	  of	  cattle;	  (4)	  an	  
effort	   to	   invest	   into	   rubber.	   Agricultural	   intensification	   consists	   into	   additional	   consecutive	   crops	  
instead	  of	  fallow;	  in	  some	  cases	  farmers	  have	  re-­‐cultivated	  areas	  they	  had	  stopped	  to	  cultivate,	  like	  
low-­‐wet-­‐land	  (srey)	  in	  Ratanakiri.	  Another	  major	  transition	  is	  the	  reduction	  of	  cattle	  rearing,	  hunting	  
and	   non-­‐timber	   forest	   product	   collection,	   as	   they	   became	   more	   or	   too	   busy	   with	   intensified	  
cultivation	   and	   off-­‐farm	   job.	   They	   deployed	   effort	   to	   jump	   in	   the	   rubber	   bandwagon,	   whether	  
through	  contract	  farming	  like	  in	  Northern	  Laos	  or	  through	  their	  own	  plantation.	  Others	   invested	  in	  
non-­‐farming	  businesses	  that	  developed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  overall	  change	  of	  farming	  system,	  including	  
a	  growing	  demand	   for	  agricultural	   inputs	  and	  machines,	  and	   increasing	  expenses	   for	   consumption	  
and	   social	   status.	   The	   search	   for	   salaried	  work	   has	   become	   the	   core	   strategy	   for	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	  
populations,	  at	  the	  place	  of	  residence	  first	  and	  increasingly	  outside.	  Out-­‐migration	  is	  increasing	  in	  all	  
studied	  areas	  except	  Ratanakiri;	  it	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  need	  for	  income	  as	  well	  as	  aspirations	  to	  get	  
an	  experience	   somewhere	  else,	   in	   cities	  and	  abroad,	   in	  particular	   for	  youth.	  Out-­‐migration	  can	  be	  
seasonal	  but	  migrations	  stays	  are	  getting	  longer.	  It	  is	  not	  an	  option	  yet	  for	  indigenous	  populations	  in	  
Ratanakiri	   because	   they	   lack	   connections	   outside	   their	   place	   of	   residence.	   Only	   3.7%	   of	   surveyed	  
households	   reported	   having	   a	   member	   ‘who	   migrated	   outside	   the	   commune’	   in	   this	   location.	  
However,	  we	   found	  evidence	   that	   out-­‐migration	   is	   going	   to	   develop,	   as	   illustrated	  by	  Vietnamese	  
recruiters	  who	  come	  to	   look	  for	  workers	   in	  Ratanakiri,	  or	   local	  agent	   in	  Kampong	  Thom	  (Paramita,	  
2013:	  79)	  who	  organize	  recruitment,	  licensing	  and	  travel	  documentations.	  The	  out-­‐migration	  of	  the	  
entire	  household	  has	  not	  been	  an	  option	   for	  many	   insofar.	   Populations	   lack	  networks	   to	  envisage	  
and	   organize	   migration	   of	   the	   entire	   household.	   Second,	   at	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   agrarian	   transition,	  
populations	   could	   maintain	   livelihoods	   locally,	   by	   combining:	   farming	   on	   the	   land	   they	   were	   left	  




land	   deals	   and	   the	   rubber	   boom;	   selling	   their	   work	   force	   to	   large-­‐scale	   landholdings;	   and	   the	  
migration	  of	  some	  of	  households	  members.	  	  
2.4.	  Agrarian	  transition	  and	  social	  differentiation	  
This	  section	  proposes	  a	   typology	  of	   livelihoods	  transformation	   found	   in	   the	  various	  case	  studies	   in	  
the	   two	   countries	   along	   the	   agrarian	   transition.	   It	   reflects	   how	   households	  were	   affected	   by	   and	  
could	  respond	  to	  dispossession.	  Households	  who	  have	  in-­‐migrated	  to	  the	  studied	  areas	  are	  included	  
in	   the	   typology.	   We	   could	   not	   include	   households	   who	   out-­‐migrated	   in	   the	   typology.	   The	   main	  
reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   it	   would	   have	   needed	   too	  much	   time	   and	   resource	   to	   find	   them	   in	   other	  
provinces	   or	   abroad.	   Each	   type	   of	   household	   is	   characterized	   by	   (i)	   the	   main	   transformation	   of	  
productive	  activities	  and	  in	  particular	  their	  situation	  regarding	  rubber	  (ii)	  the	  difference	  compared	  to	  
the	  previous	  type,	   (iii)	   the	   factors	  explaining	  how	   livelihoods	  transformation	  was	  made	  possible	  or	  
hampered,	  and	  (iv)	   the	  current	  dynamics	  of	  household	  economy,	   i.e.	   the	  potential	  and	  options	   for	  
progressive12	  development	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limits	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  current	  transformation.	  
Five	  main	  types	  of	  transformed	  livelihoods	  can	  be	  distinguished.	  
Rubber	  farmers	  	  
Households	  in	  this	  group	  have	  managed	  to	  develop	  rubber	  plantations	  of	  their	  own	  on	  areas	  ranging	  
from	  2	  ha	  (Luang	  Prabang)	  to	  10	  ha	  (Ratanakiri).	  This	  group	  pertains	  to	  local	  elites	  –	  e.g.	  commune	  
and	  village	  chiefs	  and	  committee	  members	  -­‐	  and	  their	  nearest,	  i.e.	  relatives	  and	  in-­‐laws.	  This	  group	  
includes	   also	   early	   in-­‐migrants	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Ratanakiri.	   This	   group	   started	   to	   plant	   rubber	  
simultaneously	   to	   large-­‐scale	   land	   deals	   in	   their	   areas.	   Thanks	   to	   their	   status	   and	   power,	   they	  
managed	  to	  avoid	  to	  be	  dispossessed	  by	  external	  actors:	  they	  could	  guide	  them	  to	  areas	  that	  did	  not	  
threaten	  their	   land	  assets	  or	   they	  could	  negotiate	   their	   land	  not	   to	  be	   taken.	   In	  cases	  where	   their	  
land	  was	  located	  in	  the	  granted	  or	  sold	  areas,	  they	  had	  the	  power	  to	  get	  access	  to	  other	  areas	  in	  the	  
vicinity.	  This	  group	  could	  thus	  anticipate,	  negotiate	  or	  compensate	  in	  case	  of	  land	  loss	  by	  large-­‐scale	  
actors.	  Their	  participation	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  dispossession	  gave	  them	  the	  opportunity	  to	  socialize	  with	  
investors	  from	  whom	  they	  benefited	  inputs	  (seedlings)	  and	  technical	  advice	  or	  to	  get	  connected	  to	  
skilled	   persons	   from	   the	   emerging	   rubber	   sector.	   They	   could	   thus	   invest	   into	   rubber	   in	   good	  
technical	   conditions.	   Moreover,	   these	   households	   had	   enough	   capital	   to	   afford	   the	   best	   quality	  
investment	   (for	   land	   preparation,	   planting,	   seedlings,	   use	   of	   inputs)	   and	  monitoring	   of	   their	   trees	  
(hiring	   skilled	   workers).	   Rubber	   will	   become	   their	   main	   source	   of	   income	   and	   they	   are	   likely	   to	  
achieve	  their	  plan	  to	  expand	  rubber	  areas.	  
Rubber	  boom-­‐related	  family	  enterprises	  
This	   group	   includes	   shop-­‐owners,	   traders,	   and	   households	   providing	   services	   such	   as	   transport,	  
restaurant,	   reparation,	   brokers,	   workers’	   recruitment,	   and	   money	   lending.	   They	   have	   thrived	   on	  
rubber	   boom	   and	   the	   induced	   economic	   growth	   and	   diversification.	   Different	   from	   the	   previous	  
group,	  these	  households	  are	  mostly	  outsiders	  to	  the	  places	  where	  they	  have	  settled	  their	  business.	  
This	   is	   particularly	   strong	   in	   Ratanakiri,	   where	   this	   group	   includes	   almost	   exclusively	   Khmer	   in-­‐
migrants,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   Champasak	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Vietnamese	   moneylenders.	   This	   group	   has	   not	  
suffered	  from	  the	  land	  acquisitions.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  their	  non-­‐farm	  activities	  have	  grown	  in	  relation	  
to	   LSLAs	   and	   rubber-­‐related	   economic	   growth	   (section	   4.A.).	   Land	   brokers	   have	   made	   very	   high	  
profit	   from	   buying-­‐reselling	   land	   since	   the	   time	   land	   deals	   have	   accelerated;	   others	   have	  made	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





fortune	  from	  logging.	   In	  both	  countries,	  some	  of	  these	  households	  have	  also	   invested	   in	  rubber	  at	  
the	  time	  when	  land	  was	  still	  affordable,	  and	  they	  nowadays	  hold	  plantations	  similar	  in	  size	  to	  those	  
of	  the	  first	  group.	  Many	  of	  them	  have	  organized	  their	  activities	  around	  several	  places	  (for	  purchase,	  
for	  sales,	  rubber	  landholding	  place).	  For	  the	  most	  developed,	  the	  range	  and	  size	  of	  assets,	  the	  pluri-­‐
locality,	   the	   use	   of	   salaried	   workers,	   the	   regular	   use	   of	   formal	   financial	   institutions	   and	   the	  
engagement	   into	  commodity-­‐chains	   is	  more	  akin	  to	  family	  enterprise	  than	  to	  household	  economy.	  
The	  limit	  to	  their	  prosperity	  comes	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  imitated	  by	  many,	  as	  illustrated	  
by	  series	  of	  shops	  one	  beside	  the	  other	  along	  the	  roads	  around	  main	  market	  places.	  
Farming-­‐based	  livelihoods,	  limited	  engagement	  into	  rubber	  
For	   this	   group,	   the	   transformation	   of	   livelihoods	   is	   marked	   by	   an	   increasing	   share	   of	   their	   land	  
dedicated	  to	  cash	  crops,	  including	  little	  rubber.	  These	  households	  have	  not	  only	  developed	  cassava	  
crop	  but	  also	  other	  trees	  such	  as	  cashew	  nut	  in	  Cambodia,	  fruit	  trees	  in	  Southern	  Laos,	  tung	  oil	  trees	  
in	   Luang	   Prabang.	   Farming	   activities	   have	   remained	   at	   the	   core	   of	   their	   livelihood	   systems.	   The	  
engagement	  into	  rubber	  has	  been	  slow	  or	  came	  later	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  two	  previous	  groups:	  
these	   households	   did	   not	   hold	   the	   capital	   needed	   to	   invest	   into	   rubber.	  With	   time	   and	   thanks	   to	  
savings	  from	  cash	  crops,	  typically	  cassava	  in	  rotation	  with	  soja,	  they	  have	  managed	  to	  replace	  part	  of	  
their	  food	  crops	  with	  trees.	  In	  Luang	  Prabang,	  some	  households	  in	  this	  group	  could	  engage	  in	  rubber	  
cultivation	  on	   their	   own;	  while	   others	   had	   entered	   contracts	  with	   the	   investment	   company,	   since	  
they	   did	   not	   have	   the	   financial	   resources	   for	   start-­‐up	   investments	   (Friis	   2013:	   83).	   The	   pace	   of	  
change	   also	   reflects	   how	   these	   households	   were	   impacted	   by	   the	   politics	   of	   dispossession.	   In	  
Cambodia,	   this	   group	   includes	   households	   who	   lost	   part	   of	   their	   land	   because	   of	   ELCs	   or	   other	  
companies	  (partial	  dispossession),	  but	  who	  managed	  to	  clear	  other	  areas	  to	  compensate	  partly.	  This	  
group	  did	  not	  sell	   land,	  except	  a	  few	  who	  sold	  little	  of	  their	   land	  area	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  land	  
rush,	  when	  they	  still	  could	  easily	  clear	  forest	  areas	  in	  compensation	  for	  their	  land	  sales.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	   Laos,	   this	  group	  was	   rather	   severely	   impacted	  by	  LSLAs,	  but	  households	   in	   the	  North	   turned	   to	  
contract	  farming	  to	  cope.	  They	  lacked	  capital	  for	  initial	  investment	  -­‐	  to	  buy	  seedlings	  and	  fertilizers	  –	  
and	  contract	  farming	  has	  enabled	  them	  to	  hold	  1	  to	  2	  hectares	  of	  rubber.	  	  We	  cannot	  predict	  if	  these	  
households	  will	  manage	   to	   turn	   their	   investment	   into	  profitable	  cropping	   system,	  as	   trees	  are	  not	  
productive	  yet.	  So	  far,	  they	  have	  managed	  to	  engage	  in	  rubber	  and	  do	  not	  have	  to	  work	  for	  others,	  
or	  only	  exceptionally,	  like	  the	  following	  groups.	  
Part-­‐time	  farmers,	  rubber	  out	  of	  reach	  
For	  this	  group,	  an	   increasing	  share	  of	  salaried	  work,	  or	  petty	  commodity	  production	  for	  a	  few,	  has	  
marked	  the	  transformation	  of	   livelihoods.	  This	  was	  needed	  to	  complement	  for	   insufficient	   farming	  
outputs.	  This	  group	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  engage	  into	  rubber;	  those	  among	  the	  few	  who	  tried	  
were	  unsuccessful.	  Like	  the	  previous	  group,	  these	  households	  have	  developed	  cash	  crops.	  This	  was	  
achieved	   partly	   by	   replacing	   food	   crops	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   partly	   through	   agricultural	  
intensification,	   i.e.	   increasing	   the	  use	  of	   the	   same	   land	  plots.	  On	  one	  hand,	   cash	   crops	  have	   for	   a	  
while	  provided	  households	  with	  the	  incomes	  to	  meet	  their	  growing	  needs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  
change	   in	  cropping	  system	   is	  not	  a	  progress,	  as	  cassava	   is	  cultivated	   intensively,	  years	   after	  years,	  
without	  rotation.	  Farmers	  do	  acknowledge	  that	  their	  land	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  exhaustion	  or	  is	  already	  getting	  
degraded.	   This	   intensification	   is	   found	   also	   for	   rice,	   as	   in	   Luang	   Prabang	   and	   Champasak	   where	  
fallow	  duration	  has	  been	  shortened,	  from	  5-­‐7	  to	  maximum	  3	  years.	  Similarly,	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  farmers	  
from	  this	  group	  explain	  that	  they	  cultivate	  rice	  repetitively,	  whereas	  they	  used	  to	  change	  plots	  after	  




At	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  rubber	  boom,	  this	  group	  could	  continue	  to	  farm	  part	  of	  the	  land	  that	  was	  
acquired	  by	   large-­‐size	   landholdings.	  They	  could	  catch	  petty	  opportunities	  such	  as	  growing	  cassava,	  
soya,	  peanuts	  and	  corns	  between	  young	  rubber	  trees	  during	  the	  first	  three	  years.	  This	  period	  is	  over,	  
as	   rubber	   plantations	   have	   expanded	   and	   trees	   have	   grown	   (no	  more	   intercropping	   after	   rubber	  
trees	   are	   3-­‐4	   years	   old).	   These	   households	   could	   not	   afford	   the	   start-­‐up	   investment	   needed	   to	  
engage	   into	   rubber	   on	   their	   own.	   The	   group	   includes	   some	   who	   have	   tried	   to	   engage	   in	   rubber	  
throughout	  contract	  farming	  like	  in	  Northern	  Laos,	  but	  have	  failed,	  whether	  because	  they	  could	  not	  
stand	  the	  years-­‐long	  period	  without	  any	  food	  crop	  harvest	  for	  subsistence;	  or	  because	  they	   lacked	  
financial	  capital	  to	  purchase	  inputs;	  or	  because	  the	  workload	  associated	  with	  their	  contract	  was	  too	  
large	  and	  hampered	  them	  to	  work	  adequately	  their	  own	  fields.	  Despite	  the	  development	  of	  annual	  
cash	   crops,	   these	   households	   cannot	   rely	   on	   family	   farming	   activities	   alone	   anymore	   and	   have	   to	  
turn	   increasingly	   to	   salaried	   work.	   Indeed,	   they	   do	   not	   invest	   anymore	   into	   agriculture	   and	   rely	  
increasingly	   on	   salaried	   work,	   mostly	   locally.	   Significantly,	   loans	   are	   not	   used	   for	   agricultural	  
investment	   but	   rather	   for	   consumption.	   The	   best	   some	   of	   this	   group	   have	   achieved	   is	   accessing	  
semi-­‐skilled	  and	  more	  regular	   jobs	  for	   instance	   in	  construction	  or	  transport.	  Some	  have	  developed	  
petty	   commodity	   production	   like	   charcoal,	   processed	   food	   or	   handicrafts.	   The	   prospects	   for	   this	  
group	  depends	  much	  on,	  first,	  the	  competition	  from	  in-­‐migrant	  workers,	  which	  is	  already	  very	  strong	  
in	   the	  case	  of	  Ratanakiri	  and	   foreseeable	   in	   the	  study	  areas	   in	  Laos.	  Second,	  prospects	  depend	  on	  
networks	  that	  may	  facilitate	  the	  migration	  for	  work	  of	  one	  member	  of	  the	  household	  in	  other	  rural	  
areas	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bong	  Lvea	  in	  Kampong	  Thom,	  urban	  areas	  (case	  of	  Svein	  Serrey	  in	  Kampong	  
Thom)	   or	   even	   abroad	   (case	   of	   Huaytong	   in	   Champasak).	   This	   is	   the	   option	   that	   Ratanakiri	  
indigenous	  population	  lack	  so	  far.	  
Rural	  workers,	  farming	  if	  nothing	  else	  
This	  group	  has	  reached	  one	  stage	  beyond	  the	  previous	  one	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  crucially	  importance	  
of	   salaried	  work,	   including	   in	   some	  cases	   the	  migration	  of	  one	  household	  member.	  Different	   from	  
the	  previous	  group,	  these	  households	  did	  not	  even	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  attempt	  to	  engage	  into	  
rubber.	   Most	   of	   them	   have	   turned	   to	   intensive	   cassava	   cultivation	   as	   it	   provides	   rapidly	   and	  
relatively	   high	   income	   in	   cash,	   but	   their	   area	   is	   limited	   (1.5	   ha	   per	   adult	   maximum)	   and	   are	  
confronted	  with	  the	  same	  limitations	  of	  unsustainable	  intensification.	  	  
The	   stage	   reached	   by	   this	   group	   relates	   to	   the	   severity	   of	   land	   dispossession,	   such	   as	   displaced	  
populations	  who	  were	  provided	  with	  residential	  land	  only	  at	  the	  place	  of	  relocation.	  Households	  in	  
this	  group	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  clear	  areas	  to	  compensate	  for	  lost	  land.	  They	  find	  at	  best	  a	  
few	   opportunities	   like	   renting	   the	   land	   of	   other	   households	  who	  migrate,	   often	   just	   for	   one	   crop	  
cycle,	  as	  migrations	  are	  seasonal.	  Salaried	  jobs	  have	  become	  the	  priority	  and	  households	  from	  this	  
group	  may	  not	  even	  farm	  the	  limited	  land	  they	  have	  kept	  in	  case	  they	  can	  be	  hired	  durably.	  Selling	  
labour	  has	  become	  more	  rational	  than	  farming	  land.	  The	  proletarization	  is	  more	  advanced	  for	  those	  
in	  this	  group	  who	  unwisely	  sold	  part	  of	  their	  land	  or	  who	  were	  landless	  to	  begin	  with.	  The	  group	  also	  
includes	  recent	  in-­‐migrants	  like	  in	  Ratanakiri	  who	  have	  so	  far	  made	  their	  living	  mostly	  from	  salaried	  
work.	  However,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  different	  path,	  as	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  in	  1-­‐2	  years	  of	  time	  to	  rent	  or	  
even	  to	  buy	  a	   first	  hectare	  of	   land	  from	   indigenous	   local	  populations.	  Migrants	  are	   in	  a	  process	  of	  
asset	   accumulation,	   although	   slow,	   whereas	   local	   indigenous	   populations	   are	   in	   a	   process	   of	   de-­‐
capitalization	  when	  they	  sell	  or	  rent-­‐out	  their	  land	  to	  the	  former.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  process	  is	  less	  advanced	  in	  Laos,	  where	  even	  the	  worse-­‐off	  households	  still	  rely	  on	  farming	  and	  salaried	  




Options	   for	   this	   group	   are	   limited	   to	   the	   different	   types	   of	   employers	   they	   can	   apply	   to	   and	   the	  
recruiters	   they	  must	   go	   through.	   Daily	   jobs	   or	   couple	   of	   days-­‐long	   recruitment	   dominate;	   regular	  
jobs	   are	   rare.	   Workers	   are	   constrained	   by	   employer’s	   requirements	   such	   as	   owning	   tools	   or	  
motorbike;	   women	   are	   discriminated	   in	   some	   cases.	   ‘Fortune’	   with	   salary	   work	   relates	   to	   the	  
drudgery	  of	  work,	  conditions	  such	  as	  number	  of	  days	  per	  week	  or	  month	  and	  day-­‐off,	  and	  payment	  
system:	  daily,	  monthly,	  based	  on	  product,	  premium	  payments	  upon	  ‘regularity’	  conditions.	  Workers	  
are	   particularly	   at	   risk	   because	   of	   their	  weak	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   recruiters	  who	   also	   supervise	   their	  
work	   and	   deliver	   salaries.	   Workers	   in	   general	   explain	   that	   they	   do	   not	   like	   to	   work	   for	   rubber	  
companies,	  as	  “companies	  took	  our	  land”,	  and	  because	  companies	  do	  not	  pay	  daily	  or	  also	  because	  
companies	  want	   their	  workers	   to	   stay	   for	   long	   and	   do	   not	   let	   them	   go	   to	   take	   care	   of	   their	   own	  
fields.	   Indeed,	  there	   is	  not	  anymore	  such	  a	  dilemma	  for	  this	  group;	  they	   just	  have	  no	  other	  choice	  
than	  to	  catch	  any	   job	  opportunity.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  salaried	  work,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  opportunities	   like	  
renting	  the	  land	  of	  other	  households	  who	  migrate,	  but	  often	  just	  for	  one	  crop	  cycle,	  as	  migration	  is	  
seasonal.	  Such	  opportunities	  are	  rare;	  the	  trend	   is	  rather	  that	   job	  opportunities	  are	  not	  enough	  at	  
home.	  Consequently,	  households	  have	  to	  go	  further	  away	  from	  their	  place	  of	  residence	  to	  look	  for	  
jobs.	  Many	  cannot	  migrate,	  mainly	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  acquaintances,	  which	  can	  help	  them	  to	  
organize	  their	  migration	  and	  search	  for	  job;	  those	  ones	  are	  left	  with	  no	  choice	  but	  ‘desperate’	  land	  
sales.	  	  
2.5.	  Conclusion	  	  
The	  process	  and	  magnitude	  of	  dispossession	  varies	  significantly	  among	  our	  case	  studies,	  communes	  
and	   villages,	   including	   the	   almost	   total	   loss	   of	   productive	   assets	   and	   belongings	   because	   of	  
displacement	  (extreme	  dispossession),	  situations	  where	  populations	   lost	  the	  essential	  of	  their	   land	  
without	   any	   compensation	   or	   possibility	   to	   negotiate	   or	   compensate	   (severe	   dispossession	   in	  
particular	  of	  swidden	  land),	  whereas	  in	  other	  cases	  populations	  were	  insofar	   left	  with	  enough	  land	  
to	   satisfy	   their	   basic	   needs	   (partial	   dispossession).	   Focusing	   initially	   on	   LSLAs	   in	   the	   frame	   of	  
government	   laws,	   our	   case	   studies	   show	   that	   land	   acquisitions	   of	   all	   sizes	   by	   various	   types	   of	  
external	   actors	  have	  accompanied	  and	   sometimes	  preceded	   them;	   and	   they	   represent	   substantial	  
areas.	   Our	   analysis	   has	   also	   taken	   into	   account	   local	   populations:	   if	   they	   had	   no	   or	   little	   say	   on	  
government-­‐led	  land	  acquisitions,	  they	  were	  active	  in	  other	  cases,	  gambling	  with	  their	  land	  that	  had	  
become	  a	  valuable	  asset.	  However,	  in	  a	  context	  of	  increasing	  need	  for	  cash	  and	  changing	  livelihood	  
strategies	  induced	  by	  the	  overall	  process	  of	  land	  commercialization	  and	  associated	  cash	  crop	  boom,	  
selling	  land	  has	  become	  rather	  a	  necessity	  than	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  peoples.	  
The	  case	  studies	  further	  indicate	  that	  dispossession	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  in	  reference	  to	  contracts	  or	  
other	   documents	   from	   which	   land	   transactions	   are	   measured.	   There	   are	   cases	   where	   land	   and	  
related-­‐assets’	  loss	  is	  larger	  than	  what	  is	  reported	  on	  paper,	  as	  companies	  encroached	  land	  beyond	  
the	  area	  they	  were	  granted,	  because	  large	  landholdings	  hamper	  access	  to	  areas	  located	  beyond	  their	  
border,	   and	   because	   other	   productive	   activities	   such	   as	   cattle	   grazing,	   hunting,	   fishing,	   and	   the	  
collection	  of	  NTFP	  were	  jeopardized	  by	  the	  new	  landholdings	  and	  fine	  systems.	  Overall,	  populations	  
lost	  more	  than	  what	  was	  acquired	  by	  outsiders,	  as	  governments	  have	   implemented	  measures	  that	  
restrict	  peoples’	  access	  to	  natural	  resources,	  typically	  forest	  areas.	  There	  are	  also	  situations	  where	  
land	  loss	  was	  smaller	  than	  granted	  areas,	  as	  people	  could	  continue	  to	  use	  part	  of	  the	  land	  until	  the	  
companies	  started	  to	  plant	  trees.	  In	  some	  cases,	  populations	  managed	  to	  spare	  for	  their	  own	  part	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rubber	  productive	  stages,	  as	  rubber	  companies	  might	  hire	  fewer	  local	  populations	  and	  rather	  recruit	  tappers	  





the	  areas	  that	  were	  granted;	  in	  other	  cases,	  they	  could	  compensate	  the	  loss	  by	  clearing	  other	  plots	  
and	  managed	  to	  establish	  their	  use-­‐rights.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Prior	   to	   the	   acceleration	   of	   LSLAs,	   a	   soft	   agrarian	   transition	   was	   already	   at	   stake.	   The	   transition	  
included	   the	   development	   of	   cash	   crops	   in	   addition	   to	   or	   replacement	   of	   subsistence-­‐oriented	  
production.	   More	   important,	   this	   transition	   was	   marked	   by	   public	   policies	   that	   fragilized	   local	  
livelihoods	  through	  restrictions	  on	  traditional	   farming	  and	  forest	   resources	  collection	  systems,	  and	  
through	   a	   de-­‐legitimization	   of	   customary	   land	   tenure.	   If	   the	   implementation	   of	   those	   policies	  
remained	  soft	  and	  populations	  had	  some	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  to	  resist,	  they	  weakened	  populations’	  
rights	   on	   land	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   State	   and	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   LSLAs	   and	   more	   broadly	   facilitated	   the	  
commercialization	   of	   land	   by	   local	   governments	   and	   populations	   themselves.	   The	   vulnerability	  
context	   was	   one	   of	   public	   policies	   that	   were	   detrimental	   to	   local	   livelihoods,	   which	   otherwise	  
enjoyed	  sufficient	  productive	  resources	  with	  respect	  to	  land	  and	  workforce.	  
The	   wave	   of	   LSLAs	   from	   the	   mid-­‐2000s	   has	   forced	   a	   radical	   transition	   from	   livelihoods	   relying	  
primarily	   on	   family	   farming	   to	   livelihood	   systems	   in	   which	   off-­‐farm	   job	   has	   become	   the	   pillar	   of	  
increasingly	  more	  diversified	  pool	  of	  economic	  activities.	   Job	  creation	   from	   large-­‐size	   landholdings	  
do	  not	  compensate	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  resources	  local	  populations	  derived	  from	  farming	  land.	  The	  socio-­‐
economic	   environment	   in	   which	   people	   have	   to	   reorganize	   their	   livelihoods	   is	   certainly	   more	  
dynamic	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   growth,	   diversification	   and	   urban-­‐rural	   linkages,	   but	   the	   new	  
opportunities	   do	   not	   benefit	   primarily	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   population.	   In	   addition	   to	   land,	   new	  actors	  
have	   taken	   control	   of	   the	   local	   economy	   (non-­‐farming	   sector,	   wage	   labour)	   and	   the	   added	   value	  
created	   by	   crop	   boom.	   The	   increasing	   competition	   they	   create	   over	   land	   and	   jobs	   has	   rather	   put	  
local	  populations	   into	  unfavourable	  power	  relations	  and	  new	  dependency	  patterns.	  Moreover,	   the	  
new	  environment	  is	  also	  one	  that	  generates	  or	  exacerbates	  conflicts	  among	  villagers.	  	  
Differentiation	  is	  also	  pronounced	  at	  household	  level.	  A	  tiny	  village	  elite	  has	  managed	  to	  engage	  into	  
rubber	   on	   its	   own	   thanks	   to	   its	   initial	   political	   capital	   and	   control	   over	   land,	   and	   because	   its	  
implication	   in	   land	   deals	   with	   outsiders	   has	   in	   return	   provided	   them	   connections	   to	   large-­‐scale	  
landholdings	   from	   which	   they	   can	   benefit	   natural	   capital	   (good	   quality	   seedlings)	   and	   technical	  
support	  (advice	  or	  skilled	  workers).	  Another	  group	  emerges,	  sometimes	  better-­‐off	  than	  the	  former,	  
as	   it	   engaged	   into	   cash	   crops-­‐related	   trade	   and	   services;	   this	   group	   does	   not	   include	   many	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   but	   rather	   outsiders	   who	   can	   be	   successful	   in	   their	   business	   thanks	   to	   their	  
connections	   outside	   the	   villages.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   majority	   of	   local	   populations	   have	   witnessed	   a	  
decline	   of	   return	   from	   farming,	   reduced	   farming	   occupations	   and	   have	   become	   increasingly	  
dependent	  on	  salaried	  job.	  	  
3.	  LARGE-­‐SCALE	  LAND	  ACQUISITIONS	  AND	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS14	  
This	  chapter	  analyses	  the	  consequences	  of	  LSLAs	  on	  human	  rights,	   including	  the	  right	  to	  food,	  and	  
seek	  to	  understand	  what	  role	  do	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  monitoring	  and	  judicial	  mechanism	  play	  (and	  
what	  role	  could	  they	  play)	  in	  mitigating	  the	  tensions	  related	  to	  land	  investments	  and	  protecting	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  This	  part	  has	  been	  drafted	  by	  Christophe	  Golay,	  with	  contributions	  from	  Irene	  Biglino	  and	  Ioana	  Cismas.	  Two	  
background	   papers	   have	   been	   used	   as	   reference	   documents	   to	   write	   this	   chapter:	   Patricia	   Paramita	   and	  
Samuel	  Segura	  Cobos,	  “Large	  Scale	  Land	  Acquisitions:	  Vulnerabilities	  and	  Human	  Rights.	  A	  Literature	  Review”,	  
2012;	  Ioana	  Cismas,	  “Legal	  Analysis	  of	  International	  Instruments	  Appicable	  to	  LSLAs	  and	  their	  Transposition	  in	  




human	  rights	  of	  local	  populations	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos?15	  To	  that	  end,	  we	  will:	  (1)	  present	  a	  legal	  
analysis	  of	  international	  instruments	  applicable	  to	  LSLAs	  and	  their	  transposition	  in	  domestic	  law;	  (2)	  
identify	   human	   rights	   violations	   associated	   with	   LSLAs	   in	   the	   two	   countries;	   and	   (3)	   identify	   and	  
analyse	  the	  work	  of	  monitoring	  and	  judicial	  mechanisms	  with	  competence	  to	  address	  these	  human	  
rights	  violations.	  	  
3.1.	  Legal	  framework	  
International	  level	  
Relevant	   instruments	   at	   the	   international	   level	   include	   human	   rights	   treaties	   and	   International	  
Labour	  Organization	  (ILO)	  conventions	  to	  which	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos	  are	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	  soft-­‐law	  
instruments.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  category,	  it	  must	  first	  of	  all	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  ratification	  record	  
of	  both	  countries	   is	  rather	  strong	  as	  far	  as	  the	  key	  human	  rights	  treaties	  are	  concerned.	  The	  latter	  
instruments	  which	  have	  been	  ratified	  by	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos	  include	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  
Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR),	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  
(ICESCR),	   the	   International	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Racial	   Discrimination	  
(ICERD),	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  (CEDAW),	  
the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	   (CRC)	  and	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  
Disabilities	  (CRPD).	  This	  means	  that	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos	  are	  committed	  to	  ensure	  the	  full	  realization	  
of	  all	  human	  rights.	  Among	  others,	  they	  are	  legally	  bound	  to	  respect,	  protect	  and	  fulfil	  the	  right	  to	  
food	  in	  their	  territory,	  without	  any	  discrimination.16	  They	  should	  also	  implement	  policies	  to	  support	  
particularly	  vulnerable	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  
A	   certain	   degree	   of	   reluctance	   can	   be	   detected	   on	   the	   part	   of	   both	   states	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
ratification	   of	   Optional	   Protocols	   allowing	   for	   individual	   or	   collective	   communications	   in	   cases	   of	  
human	   rights	   violations.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   Laos	   has	   not	   ratified	   any	   optional	   instrument.	  
Cambodia,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   has	   ratified	   the	  Optional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   CEDAW.	   This	   entails	   that	  
women	  victims	  of	  discrimination	   in	   the	  enjoyment	  of	   their	  human	   rights	   in	  Cambodia	  may	   submit	  
complaints,	   or	   ‘communications’	   before	   the	   UN	   Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Discrimination	  
against	   Women.	   The	   monitoring	   functions	   of	   the	   treaty	   bodies	   through	   the	   periodic	   review	   of	  
reports	   submitted	   by	   state	   parties,	   and	   how	   this	   relates	   to	   Cambodia	   and	   Laos,	  will	   be	   discussed	  
further	  on.	  
It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  weak	  ratification	  of	  the	  most	  relevant	  ILO	  conventions	  characterizes	  Cambodia	  
and	  Laos,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  investor	  countries	  China	  and	  Vietnam,	  although	  one	  instrument	  in	  particular	  
may	  be	  of	  great	  relevance	  to	  LSLAs.	  This	   is	  the	  ILO	  Convention	  No.	  169	  concerning	  Indigenous	  and	  
Tribal	   Peoples	   (1989)	   which	   incorporates	   provisions	   protecting	   land	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   people,	  
which	   is	   identified	  as	  a	  vulnerable	  group	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  LSLAs.	   In	  particular,	  Article	  16	  contains	  a	  general	  
prohibition	   against	   removal	   of	   indigenous	   people	   from	   their	   lands,	   with	   the	   specification	   that	  
relocation	  is	  permitted	  only	  as	  an	  “exceptional	  measure”	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  compliance	  with	  a	  strict	  
set	  of	  conditions.	  But	  Cambodia,	  Laos,	  China	  and	  Vietnam	  have	  not	  ratified	  this	  instrument.	  None	  of	  
the	  ILO	  conventions	  with	  specific	  focus	  on	  agricultural	  labour	  (C129,	  C010,	  C011,	  C012,	  C025,	  C036,	  
C038,	  C040,	  C099,	  C111,	  C184)	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  the	  four	  states.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  also	  C.	  Golay	  and	   I.	  Biglino,	  “Human	  Rights	  Responses	  to	  Land	  Grabbing:	  a	   right	   to	   food	  perspective”,	  
Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  34,	  No.	  9,	  2013,	  pp.	  1630-­‐1650.	  This	  article	  published	  in	  a	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journal	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  results	  of	  this	  research	  projcet	  financed	  by	  the	  SNIS.	  
16	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  The	  Right	  to	  Adequate	  Food,	  General	  Comment	  12,	  
adopted	  in	  1999	  ;	  J.	  Ziegler,	  C.	  Golay,	  C.	  Mahon	  and	  S-­‐A.	  Way,	  The	  Fight	  for	  the	  Right	  to	  Food.	  Lessons	  Learned,	  




Turning	  to	  the	  soft-­‐law	  remit,	   it	  must	  be	  highlighted	  that	   in	  recent	  years	  a	  number	  of	   instruments	  
have	   been	   developed	   with	   a	   view	   to	   reaffirming	   the	   relevance	   of	   human	   rights	   principles	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   LSLAs,	   in	   particular	   the	   principles	   of	   participation,	   accountability,	   non-­‐discrimination,	  
transparency,	  human	  dignity,	   empowerment	  and	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   (PANTHER).17	  Given	   their	   specific	  
relevance	  to	  the	  subject	  under	  scrutiny,	  a	  brief	  overview	  will	  be	  provided.18	  	  
(i)	   In	  May	   2012	   the	  UN	   Committee	   on	  World	   Food	   Security	   adopted	   Voluntary	  Guidelines	   on	   the	  
Responsible	  Governance	  of	   Tenure	  of	   Land,	   Fisheries	   and	   Forests	   in	   the	  Context	  of	  National	   Food	  
Security	   (Governance	   of	   Tenure	   Guidelines).19	   The	   main	   objective	   of	   the	   Governance	   of	   Tenure	  
Guidelines	   is	   to	  promote	  secure	  tenure	  rights	  and	  equitable	  access	  to	   land,	   fisheries	  and	  forests	   in	  
order	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  and	  realize	  the	  right	  to	  food.	  Two	  central	  elements	  of	  the	  guidelines	  are	  the	  
need	  to	  identify,	  record	  and	  respect	  legitimate	  tenure	  rights,	  whether	  formally	  recorded	  or	  not,	  and	  
to	  protect	   tenure	   rights	  holders	  against	   forced	  evictions.	  Special	  protection	  should	  be	  accorded	   to	  
smallholders	  and	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  other	  communities	  with	  customary	  tenure	  systems.	  The	  
guidelines	   also	   recommend	   that	   states	   provide	   safeguards	   to	   protect	   legitimate	   tenure	   rights,	  
human	  rights,	  livelihoods,	  food	  security	  and	  the	  environment	  from	  risks	  that	  could	  arise	  from	  LSLAs	  
and	  that	  responsible	  investments	  should	  do	  no	  harm,	  safeguard	  against	  dispossession	  of	  legitimate	  
tenure	  right	  holders	  and	  environmental	  damage,	  and	  respect	  human	  rights.	  The	  guidelines	   further	  
underline	  that	  redistributive	  reforms	  can	  facilitate	  broad	  and	  equitable	  access	  to	  land	  and	  inclusive	  
rural	  development.	  	  
(ii)	  In	  March	  2010,	  the	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  food,	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter	  submitted	  a	  
report	  to	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  in	  which	  he	  outlined	  a	  set	  of	  human	  rights	  principles	  applicable	  
to	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions	   and	   leases.20	   These	   principles	   include	   the	   obligation	   to	   conduct	  
negotiations	   leading	   to	   LSLAs	   in	   a	   fully	   transparent	   manner	   and	   with	   the	   participation	   of	   local	  
communities;	   the	   requirement	   of	   free,	   prior	   and	   informed	   consent	   of	   the	   local	   communities	  
concerned;	  the	  general	  prohibition	  of	  forced	  evictions;	  the	  obligation	  to	  recognize	  and	  protect	  land	  
tenure	  rights	  of	  local	  communities;	  the	  importance	  of	  sharing	  of	  revenues	  generated	  by	  LSLAs	  with	  
the	  local	  population;	  the	  necessity	  of	  choosing	  labour-­‐intensive	  farming	  systems	  in	  countries	  facing	  
high	  levels	  of	  rural	  poverty	  and	  few	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  other	  sectors;	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  
the	   environment;	   the	   necessity	   of	   including	   clear	   and	   detailed	   obligations	   for	   investors	   in	   the	  
agreements,	  with	  sanctions	  for	  non-­‐compliance;	  the	  need	  to	  include	  a	  clause	  providing	  that	  a	  certain	  
minimum	  percentage	  of	  the	  crops	  produced	  will	  be	  sold	  in	  local	  markets	  in	  food-­‐importing	  countries,	  
to	  contribute	  to	  local	  food	  security;	  the	  necessity	  to	  undertake	  prior	  impact	  assessments,	  including	  
on	   food	   security,	   environment	   and	   employment;	   the	   obligation	   to	   protect	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
rights;	  and	  those	  of	  respecting	  the	  applicable	  ILO	  instruments.21	  Despite	  their	  soft-­‐law	  character,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  O.	  De	  Schutter,	  Countries	  tackling	  hunger	  with	  a	  right	  to	  food	  approach,	  Briefing	  Note	  1,	  Special	  Rapporteur	  
on	   the	   right	   to	   food,	   2010;	   FAO,	   Right	   to	   Food.	  Making	   it	   Happen.	   Progress	   and	   Lessons	   Learned	   through	  
Implementation,	  Rome:	  FAO,	  2011,	  pp.	  6-­‐7.	  
18	  See	  also	  C.	  Golay	  and	   I.	  Biglino,	  “Human	  Rights	  Responses	  to	  Land	  Grabbing:	  a	  right	   to	   food	  perspective”,	  
Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  34,	  No.	  9,	  2013,	  pp.	  1636-­‐7;	  1642-­‐3.	  
19	  Voluntary	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  responsible	  governance	  of	  tenure	  of	  land,	  fisheries	  and	  forests	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
national	  food	  security,	  adopted	  by	  the	  FAO	  Committee	  on	  World	  Food	  Security	  on	  11	  May	  2012.	  	  
20	  See	  annex	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  food	  Mr.	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter	  on	  large-­‐scale	  
land	  acquisitions	  and	  leases:	  a	  set	  of	  minimum	  principles	  and	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  human	  rights	  challenge,	  
UN	  Doc.	  A/HRC/13/33/Add.2,	  28	  December	  2009.	  
21	  Annex	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  food	  Mr.	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter	  on	  large-­‐scale	  land	  
acquisitions	  and	  leases:	  a	  set	  of	  minimum	  principles	  and	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  human	  rights	  challenge,	  UN	  




Special	   Rapporteur	   stressed	   that	   these	   principles	   “are	   not	   optional;	   [but]	   follow	   from	   existing	  
international	  human	  rights	  norms’.22	  	  
It	  must	  be	  stressed	  that	  both	  international	  treaties	  ratified	  by	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos,	  as	  well	  as	  soft	  law	  
instruments,	   provide	   a	   solid	   basis	   for	   evaluating	   the	   impacts	   of	   LSLAs	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   of	  
affected	  communities	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos.	  The	  research	  conducted	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  present	  
project,	   however,	   has	  not	  disclosed	  a	  particular	  use	  of	   these	   treaties	   and	   soft	   law	   instruments	  by	  
State	  authorities	  or	  private	  actors	  involved	  in	  carrying	  out	  transactions	  associated	  with	  LSLAs.	  As	  far	  
as	  human	  rights	  actors	  are	  concerned,	  international	  treaties	  and	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter’s	  principles	  have	  
been	  used	  by	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Situation	  in	  Cambodia,	  Surya	  Subedi,	   in	  
his	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   land	   concessions	   from	   a	   human	   rights	   standpoint.23	   And	   local	   and	  
international	  human	  rights	  NGOs	  have	  widely	  used	   international	   treaties	  ratified	  by	  Cambodia	  and	  
Laos,	  combined	  sometimes	  with	  soft	  law	  instruments,	  in	  denouncing	  the	  negative	  impacts	  of	  LSLAs.24	  
Regional	  level	  
Unlike	  Africa,	  the	  Americas,	  and	  Europe,	  Asia	  is	  the	  only	  region	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  regional	  human	  
rights	  treaty,	  human	  rights	  court	  or	  commission	  covering	  the	  region	  in	  its	  entirety.	  One	  development	  
in	   this	   sphere	   is	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  ASEAN	   Intergovernmental	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  the	  ASEAN	  Commission	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  and	  Children	  
in	  2009	  and	  201025,	  although	  the	  Commissions’	  added	  value	  in	  the	  area	  of	  LSLAs	  and	  human	  rights	  
remains	  unclear,	  as	  does	  their	  engagement	  with	  the	  topic.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  food	  Mr.	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter	  on	  large-­‐scale	  land	  acquisitions	  
and	   leases:	   a	   set	   of	   minimum	   principles	   and	   measures	   to	   address	   the	   human	   rights	   challenge,	   UN	   Doc.	  
A/HRC/13/33/Add.2,	  28	  December	  2009,	  §	  5.	  
23	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	   Subedi,	   UN	   Doc.	  
A/HRC/21/63/Add.1,	  24	  September	  2012,	  including	  §	  69.	  
24	  See	  for	  example	  the	  parallel	  report	  submitted	  by	  36	  Cambodian	  NGOs	  to	  the	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  
Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   in	   2009	   available	   online	   at	  
http://www.ciddhu.uqam.ca/documents/Parallel_report_Cambodia.pdf	   (last	   accessed	   28	   November	   2013).	  
See	   also	   Centre	   on	   Housing	   Rights	   and	   Evictions	   (COHRE),	  Realising	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   in	  
Cambodia,	  Summary	  of	  Recommendations	   from	  the	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  
Geneva,	  COHRE,	  2009.	  ADHOC,	  The	  Report	  of	  Land	  and	  Housing	  Rights,	  ADHOC,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  2011.	  Amnesty	  
International,	   Rights	   Razed:	   Forced	   Evictions	   in	   Cambodia,	   Amnesty	   International,	   February	   2008.	   Amnesty	  
International,	  Annual	  Report	  2012	  –	  Cambodia,	   2012.	  Amnesty	   International,	  Cambodia:	  Briefing	   for	   the	  UN	  
Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   May	   2009.	   LICADHO,	   Land	   Grabbing	   and	   Poverty	   in	  
Cambodia:	  The	  Myth	  of	  Development,	  Licadho,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  2009.	  Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International,	  State	  
of	  the	  World’s	  Minorities	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  2012	  –	  Cambodia,	  2012.	  Unrepresented	  Nations	  and	  Peoples	  
Organization	   (UNPO),	   Alternative	   Report	   submitted	   to	   the	  UN	   Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Racial	  
Discrimination	  at	  the	  80th	  Session	  during	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  16th	  –	  18th	  Periodic	  Reports	  of	  Laos,	  UNPO,	  
The	  Hague,	  January	  2012,	  pp.	  8-­‐9.	  Alliance	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Laos,	  Report	  of	  the	  Alliance	  for	  democracy	  in	  Laos	  
about	  the	  human-­‐	  rights	  situation	  and	  the	  race	  discrimination	  in	  Laos,	  presented	  to	  the	  UN	  Committee	  on	  the	  
Elimination	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination,	  Hagen	  (Germany),	  30	  January	  2012.	  INDIGENOUS	  (International	  Network	  
for	   Diplomacy	   Indigenous	   Governance	   Engaging	   in	   Nonviolence	   Organizing	   for	   Understanding	   &	   Self-­‐
Determination),	   Shadow	   Report	   Regarding	   the	   Periodic	   Reports	   of	   Laos	   under	   the	   UN	   Convention	   on	   the	  
Elimination	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  (CERD),	  28-­‐29	  February	  2012.	  Gender	  and	  
Development	  Group,	  Lao	  People’s	  Democratic	  Republic	  Implementation	  of	  the	  CEDAW	  Convention.	  List	  of	  key	  
issues	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  CEDAW	  Committee.	  CEDAW	  pre-­‐session	  November	  2008	  (44th	  CEDAW	  session),	  20	  
October	  2008.	  
25	   In	   2009	   and	   2010,	   two	   new	   institutions	   (composed	   of	   states’	   representatives)	   have	   been	   created	   –	   the	  
Intergovernmental	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  the	  
Rights	  of	  Women	  and	  Children	  –	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Southeast	  Asian	  Nations	  (hereafter	  ASEAN)	  to	  monitor	  
existing	   international	   human	   rights	   obligations	   of	   ASEAN	   members,	   in	   agreement	   with	   Article	   14	   of	   the	  





As	  far	  as	  Cambodia	  is	  concerned,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  the	  national	  legal	  framework	  of	  
relevance	   to	   LSLAs	   has	   been	   provided	   in	   the	   report	   of	   the	  UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   Human	  
Rights	  Situation	  in	  Cambodia,	  cited	  above,	  which	  the	  present	  work	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  duplicate.	  One	  
conclusion	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  report,	  and	  which	  has	  consistently	  emerged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  present	  project’s	  fieldwork,	  is	  that	  there	  is	  an	  apparently	  solid	  legal	  framework	  that,	  in	  principle,	  
offers	  numerous	  safeguards	  in	  human	  rights	  terms.	  However,	  it	  may	  equally	  be	  concluded	  that	  there	  
is	   a	   stark	   discrepancy	   between	   what	   constitutes	   ‘law	   on	   paper’	   and	   how	   the	   law	   is	   actually	  
implemented	  and	  applied	  ‘on	  the	  ground’.	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  Cambodia	  (adopted	  in	  1993)	  recognizes	  the	  precedence	  of	  international	  human	  
rights	   instruments	  over	  national	   law.	   It	   states	   that	   the	   “Kingdom	  of	  Cambodia	   shall	   recognize	  and	  
respect	   human	   rights	   as	   stipulated	   in	   the	   United	   Nations	   Charter,	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	  
Human	   rights,	   the	   covenants	   and	   conventions	   related	   to	   human	   rights,	   women’s	   and	   children’s	  
rights”	  (article	  31).	  It	  also	  enshrines	  a	  list	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  
life	  and	  security	   (article	  32),	   the	  right	  of	  participation	  (article	  35),	  and	  freedoms	  of	  expression	  and	  
assembly	  (article	  41).	  Its	  article	  61	  provides	  that	  the	  State	  “shall	  promote	  economic	  development	  in	  
all	   fields,	   especially	   in	   agriculture,	   handicraft,	   industry,	   to	   begin	   with	   the	   remotest	   areas,	   with	  
concern	   for	   water	   policy,	   electricity,	   roads	   and	  means	   of	   transportation,	   modern	   techniques	   and	  
credit	  system”.	  	  
With	   regard	   to	   legislation,	   the	   2001	   Land	   Law	   recognizes	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
collective	   ownership	   of	   their	   lands,	   including	   residential	   and	   agricultural	   land,	   and	   both	   land	  
currently	  cultivated	  and	  land	  reserved	  for	  shifting	  agriculture.	  Moreover,	  specific	  procedures	  aimed	  
at	   the	   recognition	   and	   implementation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples’	   rights	   to	   collective	   land	   title	   are	  
introduced	  by	   the	   law,	  provided	   that	  a	  process	   is	   followed	   to	  obtain	   the	   recognition	  of	   their	   legal	  
status.26	   While	   this	   process	   is	   pending,	   in	   theory	   the	   indigenous	   communities	   can	   continue	   to	  
manage	   their	   communities	   and	   land	   according	   to	   traditional	   customs	  without	   interference.27	   Yet,	  
what	   emerged	   from	   the	   project’s	   fieldwork	   component	   is	   the	   extreme	   intricacy	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
fulfilling	  all	   the	  bureaucratic-­‐administrative	  steps	  required	  to	  obtain	  recognition	  under	  the	  Law	  for	  
the	   purposes	   of	   obtaining	   collective	   titles.	   This	   clearly	   raises	   formidable	   hurdles	   for	   indigenous	  
communities	   wishing	   to	   avail	   themselves	   of	   the	   protection	   introduced	   by	   the	   legislation,	   casting	  
serious	   doubt	   on	   its	   practical	   ramifications	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   protection	   actually	   afforded	   by	   the	  
provisions.28	  
Another	   example	   of	   legislation	   which	   introduces	   a	   number	   of	   ‘formal’	   safeguards	   for	   indigenous	  
peoples	   is	   the	   Protected	   Areas	   Law,29	   which	   guarantees	   secure	   access	   to	   traditional	   uses,	   local	  
customs,	  beliefs	  and	  religions	  of	   local	  communities	  and	   indigenous	  ethnic	  minority	  groups	  residing	  
within	   and	   adjacent	   to	   “protected	   areas”.30	   Yet,	   there	   is	   evidence	   about	   concessions	   that	   were	  
granted	  in	  such	  areas	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  indigenous	  communities,	  notwithstanding	  the	  apparently	  
unequivocal	   content	   of	   the	   legal	   provisions.	   In	   a	   similar	   manner,	   the	   2008	   Protected	   Areas	   Law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	   Subedi,	   UN	   Doc.	  
A/HRC/21/63/Add.1,	  24	  September	  2012.	  
27	  Ibid	  §	  52.	  
28	  See	  also	  J.	  Vize	  and	  M.	  Hornung,	  “Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Land	  Titling	  in	  Cambodia:	  A	  Study	  of	  Six	  Villages”,	  
paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  Annual	  World	  Bank	  Conference	  on	  Land	  and	  Poverty,	  Washington	  DC,	  April	  8-­‐11,	  2013.	  
29	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	   Subedi,	   UN	   Doc.	  





established	   that	   an	   essential	   pre-­‐conditions	   for	   granting	   land	   concessions	   are	  public	   consultations	  
and	  environmental	   and	   social	   impact	   assessments.	  According	   to	   the	   Special	  Rapporteur’s	   analysis,	  
“assessments	  are	   to	  be	  undertaken	  and	   reviewed,	  with	   the	   findings	   shared	  before	   the	  granting	  of	  
concessions”.31	  It	  appears	  that	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  adequate	  public	  consultations	  have	  been	  
conducted	  prior	  to	  the	  granting	  of	  most	  of	  the	  concessions.32	  And	  these	  decisions	  affecting	  the	  land	  
on	  which	  communities	  live	  are	  often	  made	  without	  their	  involvement.33	  The	  latter	  examples	  are	  but	  
three	   illustrations	   of	   the	   dichotomy	   between	   ‘formal	   legality’	   and	   reality	   which	   emerged	   in	   a	  
considerable	   number	   of	   interviews34	   and	   which	   is	   well-­‐summarized	   by	   the	   words	   of	   the	   Special	  
Rapporteur,	  “[t]he	  granting	  and	  management	  of	  economic	  and	  other	  land	  concessions	  in	  Cambodia	  
suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  adherence	  to	  existing	  laws.	  Much	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  on	  
these	  matters	  is	  relatively	  well	  developed	  on	  paper,	  but	  the	  challenge	  is	  with	  its	  implementation	  in	  
practice”.35	  	  
The	  situation	  is	  very	  similar	  in	  Laos,	  were	  good	  laws	  have	  been	  passed,	  but	  are	  poorly	  implemented,	  
or	   implemented	   against	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   the	   population,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	  
most	  vulnerable	  people.	  The	  Constitution	  (adopted	  in	  2003)	  recognizes	  a	  list	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  
including	   the	   right	   to	   education	   (article	   38),	   the	   right	   to	   health	   (article	   39),	   the	   right	   to	   submit	  
complaints	   and	   petitions	   (article	   41),	   the	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   of	   expression,	   assembly,	   and	  
association	  (article	  44).	  It	  also	  provides	  that	  the	  “State,	  society	  and	  families	  attend	  to	  implementing	  
development	  policies	  and	  supporting	  the	  progress	  of	  women	  and	  to	  protecting	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  
benefits	   of	   women	   and	   children”	   (article	   29).	   It	   is	   worth	   mentioning	   however	   that	   many	  
fundamental	  rights	  are	  not	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  life,	  the	  right	  to	  food,	  
and	   the	   right	   to	   housing,	   and	   that	   the	   Constitution	   does	   not	  mention	   international	   human	   rights	  
instruments.	   An	   example	   of	   good	   legislation,	   the	   2003	   Land	   Law	   creates	   eight	   land	   categories:	  
agricultural	  land,	  forestland,	  water	  area	  land,	  industrial	  land,	  communication	  land,	  cultural	  land,	  land	  
for	   national	   defence	   and	   security,	   and	   construction	   land.	  One	   of	   its	  main	   objectives	   is	   to	   support	  
small	  farmers	  to	  better	  use	  agricultural	  land,	  and	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  secure	  legal	  environment.	  
However,	  ten	  years	  after	  its	  adoption,	  many	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas	  in	  Laos	  remain	  untouched	  by	  
or	  relatively	  unaware	  of	  these	   legal	  provisions.	  And	   it	  has	  been	  found	  by	  Senties	  that	  the	   land	   law	  
“paved	  the	  way	   for	   foreign	   investment	   in	   land	  through	  …	   legally	  defining	   the	  circumstances	  under	  
which	   land	   can	   be	   conceded	   to	   investors	   [with]	   enormous	   implications	   to	   the	   typically	   rural	   and	  
subsistence-­‐oriented	   agrarian	   structures	   of	   the	   country,	   which	   …	   largely	   remain	   founded	   on	  
customary	  practices”.36	  Senties	  also	  concluded	  that	  the	  titling	  of	  communal	  lands	  that	  could	  be	  used	  
to	  protect	  villagers	  against	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  corporations,	  for	  example	  in	  accessing	  food	  and	  
water,	   is	  poorly	   implemented	   in	  Laos.37	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  other	  relevant	   laws,	   including	  
the	  2007	  Forestry	  Law	  and	  the	  1990	  Property	  Law.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Ibid	  §	  114	  
32	  Ibid	  §§	  37-­‐39.	  
33	  Ibid	  §	  115.	  
34	  Interviews	  carried	  out	  by	  Dr.	  Irene	  Biglino	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  Cambodia,	  in	  January	  2013.	  
35	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	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3.2.	  Human	  rights	  violations	  associated	  with	  LSLAs	  
A	  second	  segment	  of	  the	  research	  conducted	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  project	  focuses	  on	  the	  identification	  
of	   aspects	   and	   consequences	   of	   LSLAs	   that	  may	   be	   interpreted	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   human	   rights	  
violations.	  As	  a	  first	  overarching	  observation,	  it	  must	  be	  said	  that	  the	  rights	  which	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  
most	  frequently	  threatened	  in	  LSLA	  settings	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos	  are	  the	  right	  to	  food,	  the	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  to	  dispose	  of	  their	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources,	  the	  rights	  to	  housing	  and	  not	  to	  
be	   forcibly	  evicted.	   In	   turn,	  violations	  of	   these	  rights	   tend	  to	   trigger	  a	  wider	  pool	  of	   infringements	  
such	   as	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   education,	   healthcare,	   and	   violations	   of	   cultural	   rights.	   As	   a	   second	  
observation,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  obligations	  to	  respect,	  protect,	  and	  fulfil	  the	  foregoing	  rights	  give	  
rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  procedural	  obligations	  that	  are	  very	  often	  violated	  in	  relation	  to	  LSLAs	  in	  the	  two	  
countries.	   These	   include:	   (a)	   Identification	   of	   vulnerable	   groups,	   as	  well	   as	   an	   assessment	   of	   how	  
their	  human	  rights	  are	   impacted	  upon.	   (b)	  The	  state’s	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  effective	  consultations,	  
participation	   of	   stakeholders,	   and	   prior	   free	   and	   informed	   consent,	   in	   particular	   of	   vulnerable	  
groups.	  (c)	  Access	  to	  effective	  means	  of	  obtaining	  legal	  redress,	  which	  includes	  adequate	  relocation	  
and	  adequate	  compensation,	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  court	  to	  seek	  a	  remedy	  and	  ensure	  accountability.	  	  
Concerns	  raised	  by	  UN	  treaty	  bodies	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  identifying	  violations	  
Part	  of	   the	  research	  concerning	  the	  human	  rights	  component	  was	  devoted	  to	  studying	  the	  human	  
rights	  responses	  to	  LSLA’s	  from	  different	  actors,	  with	  one	  of	  the	  focus	  areas	  being	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
UN	   Treaty	   Bodies	   (see	   part	   3	   below).38	   The	   findings	   of	   this	   segment	   provide	   a	   useful	   conceptual	  
container	  for	  the	  identification	  and	  classification	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  connection	  with	  LSLAs	  
in	  Cambodia	  and	   Laos.	   This	   is	  because,	   in	   their	  Concluding	  Observations	   stemming	   from	   the	   state	  
reporting	  process,	  the	  Treaty	  Bodies	  often	  do	  identify	  violations	  or	  at	  least	  indicate	  areas	  of	  concern.	  
Through	   our	   study	   of	   a	   number	   of	   closely	   interconnected,	   common	   threads	   run	   through	   their	  
concluding	   observations.	   Not	   exhaustive	   but	   a	   rather	   vivid	   backdrop	   against	   which	   to	   place	   the	  
project’s	  findings.	  
The	  first	  overarching	  concern	  relates	  to	  the	  actual	  or	  potential	  human	  rights	  implications	  of	  forced	  
displacement	   and	   evictions	   caused	   by	   LSLAs,	   which	   often	   lead	   to	   drastic	   changes	   in	   livelihood	  
opportunities.	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	  of	   this	  working	  paper,	   a	   connected	   concern	   is	  
that	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  displaced	  individuals	  and	  communities	  are	  not	  resettled	  and	  compensated	  for	  
their	   livelihood	   losses.	   In	   its	   consideration	   of	   Cambodia,	   the	   Committee	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  
Cultural	  Rights	  (CESCR)	  examined	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  impact	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  quite	  some	  
detail,	   explicitly	   reporting	   that	   ‘authorities	   of	   the	   State	   party	   are	   actively	   involved	   in	   land-­‐
grabbing’.39	   The	   CESCR	   expressed	   grave	   concerns	   over	   the	   vast	   concessions	   granted	   to	   private	  
companies	   and	   noted	   the	   increase	   in	   forced	   evictions	   and	   threats	   of	   eviction	   linked	   to	   such	  
concessions40	   and	   expressed	   deep	   concern	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   effective	   consultation	   with	   persons	  
affected	  by	   forced	  evictions.	   It	  also	  called	  attention	  to	   the	   inadequate	  compensation	  or	   relocation	  
provisions	  for	  families	  forcibly	  removed	  from	  their	  properties.41	  	  
The	   second	   common	   thread	   involves	   the	   impact	   of	   LSLAs	   on	   the	   livelihoods	   and	   right	   to	   food	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  specifically.	  Something	  that	  is	  also	  very	  clear	  in	  reading	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	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working	  paper.	  These	  negative	  impacts	  have	  been	  central	  in	  the	  reviews	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  states,	  
and	  have	  been	  tackled	  by	  virtually	  all	  treaty	  bodies.	  Emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  right	  to	  free,	  prior	  and	  
informed	   consent	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   externally	   imposed	   policies	   and	   activities	   that	   directly	  
affect	   their	   livelihoods.	   For	   example,	   as	   noted	   above,	   the	   CESCR	   examined	   the	   impact	   of	   land	  
concessions	   on	   indigenous	   peoples	   during	   its	   assessments	   of	   Cambodia.	   In	   particular,	   in	   its	  
recommendations,	   the	  Committee	  highlighted	   the	  need	   for	   carrying	   out	   environmental	   and	   social	  
impact	  assessments	  and	  consultations	  with	  affected	  communities	  with	  regard	  to	  economic	  activities,	  
including	  mining	  and	  oil	  explorations,	   ‘with	  a	  view	  to	  ensuring	   that	   these	  activities	  do	  not	  deprive	  
the	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   the	   full	   enjoyment	   of	   their	   rights	   to	   their	   ancestral	   lands	   and	   natural	  
resources’.42	   In	   further	   pointing	   out	   that	   legislation	   providing	   for	   the	   titling	   of	   indigenous	  
communities’	  lands	  had	  not	  been	  implemented	  in	  an	  effective	  manner,	  the	  CESCR	  urged	  Cambodia	  
to	  provide	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  provisions	  without	  delay.	  	  
The	  Committee	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  (CERD)	  has	  also	  extensively	  examined	  the	  
need	   to	   better	   protect	   the	   livelihoods	   –	   and	   the	   right	   to	   an	   adequate	   standard	   of	   living	   –	   of	  
indigenous	   populations.	   In	   its	   consideration	   of	   reports	   concerning	   the	   Lao	   People’s	   Democratic	  
Republic,	  the	  Committee	  reiterated	  the	  right	  of	  communities	  to	  free	  prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  and	  
called	  for	  the	  state	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  is	  respected	  in	  the	  planning	  and	  implementation	  of	  large-­‐scale	  
projects	  affecting	  their	   lands	  and	  resources.	  43	  Express	  references	  were	  made	  to	  the	   importance	  of	  
‘the	  cultural	  aspect	  of	   land,	  as	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	   identity	  of	   some	  ethnic	  groups’.44	  CERD	  also	  
scrutinised	   the	   human	   rights	   impact	   of	   land	   concessions	   in	   Cambodia.	   The	   Committee	   noted	   that	  
such	  transactions	  were	   in	  many	  cases	  being	  conducted	   ‘to	  the	  detriment	  of	  particularly	  vulnerable	  
communities	   such	   as	   indigenous	   peoples’.45	   Another	   concern	   related	   to	   reports	   that	   concessions	  
affecting	   land	   traditionally	   occupied	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   were	   being	   granted	   without	   full	  
consideration,	  or	  exhaustion	  of	  procedures	  provided	  for	  by	  national	  legislation46.	  	  
The	   foregoing	   discussion	   unearths	   another	   recurrent	   theme,	   namely	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
disproportionately	  negative	  effect,	   in	  human	  rights	  terms,	  that	  LSLAs	  have	  on	  populations	  that	  are	  
vulnerable	   to	  discrimination	  and	   face	  conditions	  of	  marginalization	  or	  disadvantage.	   In	  addition	   to	  
indigenous	  peoples,	   concerns	  have	  been	   raised	  about	  negative	   impacts	  on	  women,	   children,	   rural	  
communities,	  and	  small-­‐scale	  farmers.	  The	  Committee	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  
Women	   (CEDAW)	   focused	   its	   attention	   on	   female	   heads	   of	   household	   in	   Cambodia	  who	   had	   lost	  
their	   sources	   of	   livelihood	   because	   of	   the	   confiscation	   of	   land	   by	   private	   companies	   and	   were	  
excluded	  from	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  concerning	   land	  distribution.47	  Similarly,	   in	   its	  concluding	  
observations	  on	  Cambodia	  in	  June	  2011,	  the	  Committee	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Child	  (CRC)	  expressed	  deep	  
concern	  that	  thousands	  of	  children	  and	  families,	  especially	  the	  urban	  poor,	  small-­‐scale	  farmers	  and	  
indigenous	  communities,	  were	  continuing	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  their	   land	  ‘as	  a	  result	  of	   land	  grabbing	  
and	  forced	  evictions	  carried	  out	  by	  people	  in	  positions	  of	  power’.48	  	  
As	  an	  overarching	   recommendation	   in	   its	   assessment	  of	  Cambodia,	  CERD	   requested	   that	  a	  proper	  
balance	  be	  struck	  between	  development	  objectives	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens	  and	  that	  the	  former	  are	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not	   enacted	   ‘at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   vulnerable	   persons	   and	   groups	   covered	   by	   the	  
Convention	  [on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination]’.49	  Following	  CEDAW’s	  review	  
of	   Laos,	   it	   was	   recommended	   that	   the	   state	   party	   ensure	   that	   development	   projects	   are	  
implemented	  only	  after	  conducting	  gender	  impact	  assessments	  involving	  rural	  women.50	  
Selected	  fieldwork	  findings	  	  
The	  present	  sections	  seeks	  to	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  key	  insights	  which	  emerged	  during	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  fieldwork	  conducted	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos	  by	  flagging	  selected	  areas	  of	  concern	  from	  a	  human	  
rights	   standpoint.	   It	   is	   by	   no	   means	   to	   be	   considered	   an	   exhaustive	   exposition	   of	   the	   multiple	  
findings	  that	  emerged.	  	  
Forced	  evictions,	  dispossession	  of	   land,	  and	  internal	  displacement,	  highlighted	  above	  as	  a	  key	  area	  
of	  concern	  in	  human	  rights	  terms	  in	  different	  Treaty	  Bodies’	  observations,	  also	  emerged	  as	  a	  finding	  
of	  paramount	   importance	   in	   the	  project’s	   fieldwork.	   In	   the	  majority	  of	  study	  areas	  covered	  by	   the	  
project,	  dispossession	  of	  agricultural	  land	  was	  a	  common	  phenomenon,	  while	  evictions	  from	  homes	  
only	  emerged	   in	  certain	  contexts.	  To	  cite	  but	  one	  example,	  with	   regard	   to	   fieldwork	  conducted	   in	  
Cambodia,	  in	  Sein	  Serrey,	  it	  was	  shown	  how	  LSLAs	  led	  a	  large	  number	  of	  households	  to	  lose	  access	  
to	  productive	  agricultural	  land,	  which	  in	  turn	  caused	  them	  to	  become	  increasingly	  vulnerable	  to	  food	  
insecurity.51In	   the	   latter	   scenario,	   compensation	   following	   agricultural	   land	   dispossession	   was	  
primarily	  awarded	  in	  the	  form	  of	  alternative	  land.	  However,	  in	  many	  reported	  cases,	  such	  land	  was	  
too	  small	  and	  less	  productive	  to	  farm,	  leading	  numerous	  households	  to	  sell	  the	  land	  they	  obtained	  
and	  resort	  to	  migration	  to	  other	  Provinces.52	  	  
The	   latter	   point	   leads	   to	   another	   overarching	   consideration	   which	   emerged	   as	   a	   key	   area	   for	  
concern,	  involving	  the	  negative	  repercussions	  that	  displacement	  following	  evictions	  may	  have	  on	  the	  
rights	   to	   adequate	   housing,	   health,	   education,	   and	   work.	   In	   cases	   of	   migration	   stemming	   from	  
evictions,	   families	  were	  not	  only	   reported	  to	   face	   increased	  hardship,	  but	  encountered	   formidable	  
difficulties	   in	   attaining	   an	   adequate	   standard	   of	   living,	   including	   adequate	   housing,	   ensuring	  
education	  for	  their	  children	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  health	  facilities.	  
As	  revealed	  by	  the	  fieldwork,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  outright	  evictions	  or	  dispossession,	  the	  granting	  
of	   land	   concessions	   often	   entailed	   de	   facto	   interferences	   with	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   a	   wide	   array	   of	  
rights.	   If	  we	   take	   the	   right	   to	  water	  as	  an	  example,	   in	  Ratanakiri	   (Cambodia)	   it	  has	  been	   reported	  
that	  the	  establishment	  of	  concessions	  has	  led	  to	  blocking	  paths	  and	  roads	  used	  by	  villagers	  to	  access	  
waterways,	  or	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  rubber	  plantations	  has	  diverted	  the	  course	  of	  streams,	  or	  that	  
water	   sources	  were	  simply	  used	   for	   the	   irrigation	  of	   the	  plantations.	   53	  The	  same	  violations	  of	   the	  
right	  to	  water	  have	  been	  observed	  in	  several	  cases	  in	  Laos,	  including	  in	  Savannakhet	  Province	  where	  
Chinese	  companies	  are	  active.	  	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  a	  land	  concession	  of	  7’000ha	  granted	  to	  a	  Chinese	  rubber	  company	  (Sino	  
Company)	   in	   2006,	   on	   a	   local	   community	   in	  Nambak	  District,	   Luang	   Prabang	   Province	   (Laos),	   also	  
revealed	   that	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   land	   concession	   led	   to	   a	   large-­‐scale	   enclosure	   of	   upland	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  Observations:	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  1	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  2010,	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  16.	  
50	   CEDAW,	   Concluding	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   People’s	   Democratic	   Republic,	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   Doc.	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51	  See	  P.	  Paramita,	  Between	  Chamkar	  And	  The	  Kitchen:	  A	  Livelihood	  Approach	  To	  The	  Implication	  Of	  Land	  Grabs	  
On	  Food	  Security	  In	  Cambodian	  Rural	  Households,	  Dissertation	  Submitted	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  requirement	  for	  
the	  Master	  in	  Development	  Studies	  (MDev)	  at	  the	  Graduate	  Institute	  in	  Geneva,	  2013,	  p.	  62.	  
52	  Ibid.	  




resources	   that	   these	   villages	   depended	   on.54	   This	   also	   implied	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   strict	   penalty	  
scheme	   for	   damage	   to	   rubber	   by	   roaming	   animals,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   prohibition	   of	   villagers	   from	  
continue	  livestock	  rearing,	  which	  had	  negative	  impacts	  on	  soil	  fertility	  and	  led	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  paddy	  
rice	  yields.	  
What	  surfaced	  with	  particular	  clarity	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  in	  geographical	  areas	  with	  a	  large	  
segment	   of	   the	   population	   composed	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   is	   the	   latter	   communities’	   increased	  
vulnerability.	  Interviews	  conducted	  in	  Ratanakiri	  (Cambodia)	  disclose	  a	  number	  of	  interferences	  with	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  access	  to	  forest	  areas,	  either	  because	  the	  forests	  had	  been	  cleared	  to	  make	  way	  
for	  plantations	  in	  areas	  affected	  by	  land	  concessions,	  or	  because	  access	  was	  physically	  impeded,	  the	  
forest	  area	  being	  engulfed	  by	  a	  concession.55	  This	  entailed	  a	  variety	  of	  consequences,	  including	  the	  
hindrance	  of	  access	  to	  food	  sources	  obtainable	  by	  traditional	  subsistence	  activities	  such	  as	  hunting,	  
fishing,	  and	  gathering	  forest	  products.56	   	  The	  protection	  of	  cultural	   rights	   is	  also	  threatened	   in	  this	  
context,	  in	  that	  access	  to	  the	  forest	  for	  many	  community	  bears	  spiritual	  significance,	  the	  forest	  being	  
sacred	   and	   hosting	   certain	   communities’	   burial	   grounds.57	   Finally,	   another	   concern	   which	   was	  
expressed	  in	  more	  than	  one	  interview,	  including	  by	  representatives	  of	  NGOs	  working	  specifically	  on	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   rights,	   members	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   who	   sought	   work	   on	   the	  
plantations	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  families	  encountered	  difficulties	  in	  securing	  
employment.	   In	   Ratanakiri,	   it	  was	   reported	   that	   it	   is	  more	   difficult	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	   find	  
work	   because	   of	   language	   barriers	   and	   of	   perceptions	   by	   companies	   that	   they	   are	   ‘unskilled’	  
labourers.58	  These	  considerations	  must	  be	  placed	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  monumental	  hurdles	  
facing	  such	  communities	  in	  obtaining	  collective	  land	  titles,	  which	  was	  mentioned	  above.	  
Information	  asymmetry,	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  key	  themes	   identified	  by	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  
the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,59	   also	   emerged	   in	   our	   fieldwork	   findings.	   In	   a	   survey	  
conducted	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  present	  project	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  we	  found	  that	  64	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  
241	  households	   studied	  had	  no	  knowledge	  about	   the	   special	  protection	  of	   land	   rights	  afforded	   to	  
indigenous	  peoples	  under	  existing	  legislation.60	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  36	  per	  cent	  did	  have	  some	  form	  
of	  knowledge	  of	  such	  protection,	  and	  the	  survey	  revealed	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  had	  
an	   impact	   on	   the	   interviewees’	   situation.61	   Our	   survey	   showed	   that	   100%	   of	   those	  who	   received	  
compensation	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  land	  (7	  people	  out	  of	  27	  people	  who	  lost	  their	  land	  in	  total)	  had	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  special	  protection	  of	   land	  rights	  afforded	  to	  indigenous	  people.	  On	  the	  other	  
side,	  39%	  of	  those	  who	  lost	  their	  land	  and	  had	  knowledge	  about	  the	  special	  protection	  of	  land	  rights	  
for	   indigenous	  people	   received	  a	   compensation	   (7	  people	  out	  of	  18	  who	   lost	   their	   land	  and	  knew	  
about	  special	  protection),	  while	  those	  who	  lost	  their	   land	  but	  had	  no	  knowledge	  about	  this	  special	  
protection	  had	  no	  chance	  at	  all	  to	  receive	  a	  compensation	  (see	  Annex	  1	  for	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  
this	  correlation).62	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The	   foregoing	  discussion	  underpins	   the	   right	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   very	   core	  of	   the	  project:	   the	   right	   to	  
food	  related	  impacts	  of	  LSLAs.	   In	  most	  of	  the	  contexts	  described	  above,	   land	  is	  the	  main	  source	  of	  
food	  availability	   and	  accessibility,	   and	   there	  are	  often	   few	  other	   livelihood	  opportunities	   available	  
for	   affected	   households	   and	   communities.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   and	   as	   revealed	   by	   the	   fieldwork,	  
drastic	   changes	   in	   dietary	  habits,	   both	   in	   terms	  of	  quality	   and	  quantity,	   have	  occurred	   for	   certain	  
communities	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   their	   inability	   to	   grow	   their	   own	   food	  or	   obtain	   it	   from	  natural	  
resources	  following	  the	  absorption	  of	  their	  land	  by	  land	  concessions.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  reported	  cases,	  
individuals	  and	  their	  families	  were	  left	  with	  no	  option	  but	  to	  purchase	  food	  on	  the	  market	  although,	  
due	  to	  their	  precarious	  economic	  conditions,	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  a	  rich,	  nutritious	  and	  diverse	  diet	  
as	   they	  had	  when	  they	  had	  agricultural	   land	  on	  which	  to	  grow	  food	  and	  access	   forest	  areas	  which	  
provided	  additional	  food	  sources	  (i.e.	  fish	  and	  wild	  animals).	  	  
To	  analyse	  these	   findings	   in	   terms	  of	  violations	  of	   the	  right	   to	   food,	   it	  can	  be	  recalled	  that	  a	  state	  
would	   be	   acting	   in	   violation	   of	   this	   right	   if,	   by	   granting	   concessions	   or	   selling	   land	   to	   investors	  
(whether	   domestic	   or	   foreign),	   it	   were	   depriving	   local	   populations	   from	   access	   to	   productive	  
resources	   indispensable	   to	   their	   livelihoods,	   unless	   appropriate	   alternatives	   are	   offered.63	   It	  would	  
also	  be	  violating	  the	  right	  to	  food	  if	  it	  negotiated	  such	  agreements	  without	  ensuring	  that	  this	  will	  not	  
result	   in	   food	   insecurity.64	  Finally,	  a	  point	   that	   is	  particularly	  pertinent	   to	   the	  present	  discussion	   is	  
that	   failure	   to	   protect	   individuals	   and	   communities	   from	   similar	   actions	   and	   consequences	  
undertaken	  by	  third	  parties	  can	  also	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  violation.	  We	  have	  found	  that	  these	  violations	  
of	  the	  right	  to	  food	  are	  taking	  place	  in	  both	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos.	  
Another	  key	  thread	  that	  surfaced	   in	  the	  fieldwork	  as	  especially	  problematic	   in	  human	  rights	  terms	  
involves	  compliance	  –	  or	  lack	  thereof	  -­‐	  with	  what	  we	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘procedural	  obligations’	  above.	  
Inadequate	   participation,	   consultation,	   and	   information	   asymmetry	   appeared	   to	   constitute	   a	  
dominant	   trend	   in	   the	   survey	   performed	   in	   Ratanakiri	   (Cambodia),	   as	  well	   as	   in	   Savannakhet	   and	  
Luang	  Prabang	  (Laos).	  According	  to	  the	  survey	  done	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  it	  must	  be	  highlighted,	  specifically,	  
that	  78	  per	  cent	  of	  those	  who	  lost	  land	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  LSLAs	  were	  not	  notified	  in	  advance,	  thus	  
revealing	   that	   in	   most	   of	   the	   cases	   there	   was	   no	   consultation,	   provision	   of	   information,	   or	  
participation.	  65	  	  
3.2.	  Human	  rights	  remedies	  
National	  level	  
As	  far	  as	  Cambodia	  is	  concerned,	  once	  again	  Special	  Rapporteur’s	  report,	  cited	  above,	  provides	  the	  
most	   comprehensive	   overview	   of	   what	   remedies	   exist	   at	   the	   domestic	   level.	   Among	   these,	   the	  
Special	   Rapporteur	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	   land	   dispute	   resolution	   mechanisms,	   including	   the	  
Commune	   Councils,	   the	   Administrative	   Committees,	   the	   Cadastral	   Commission,	   the	   National	  
Authority	   for	   Land	   Conflict	   Resolution	   and	   the	   courts.66	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   to	   what	   extent	   these	  
mechanisms	  have	  contributed	   in	  providing	  a	  viable	  avenue	  for	  affected	  people	  to	  have	  their	  cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  	  See	  annex	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  right	  to	  food	  Mr.	  Olivier	  De	  Schutter	  on	  large-­‐scale	  
land	  acquisitions	  and	  leases:	  a	  set	  of	  minimum	  principles	  and	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  human	  rights	  challenge,	  
UN	  Doc.	  A/HRC/13/33/Add.2,	  28	  December	  2009,	  p	  5.	  
64	  Ibid.	  
65	  Ratanakiri	  survey	  of	  241	  households.	  
66	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	   Subedi,	   UN	   Doc.	  




heard	   and	   resolved.67	   In	   a	   Guide	   to	   defend	   land	   and	   housing	   rights,	   Bridges	   Across	   Borders	  
Cambodia	  (BAB),	  International	  Accountability	  Project	  and	  the	  Center	  on	  Housing	  Rights	  and	  Evictions	  
(COHRE)	  gave	  the	  following	  advice	  to	  potential	  victims	  of	  evictions:	  “The	  Cadastral	  Commission	  has	  a	  
very	   big	   list	   of	   cases	  waiting	   to	   be	   heard,	   and	   sometimes	   it	   is	   not	   effective	   or	   efficient	   in	   solving	  
disputes,	   especially	   if	   they	   involve	   a	   powerful	   person.	   You	  may	   decide	   to	   file	   a	   complaint	   to	   the	  
Cadastral	  Commission,	  but	  at	   the	   same	   time	  you	   should	  also	   consider	  other	  options	   to	   resolve	   the	  
land	  dispute.	  For	  example,	  you	  may	  write	  petitions	  and	  letters,	  and	  arrange	  meetings	  with	  officials,	  
in	  addition	  to	  complaining	  to	  the	  Cadastral	  Commission.”	  
Administrative	   remedies	   are	   even	  weaker	   in	   Laos,	   where	   the	  main	   avenue	   that	   exits	   is	   a	   hotline	  
created	  in	  2012	  to	  call	  the	  national	  assembly.	  According	  to	  many,	  a	  great	  number	  of	  complaints	  are	  
related	  to	  land	  disputes.68	  And	  in	  one	  case	  at	  least,	  it	  led	  a	  member	  of	  the	  national	  assembly	  to	  visit	  
the	  community	  and	  compensation	  was	  given	  to	   its	  members.	  But	  everything	   is	  made	  orally,	  which	  
makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  have	  more	  information	  about	  the	  efficiency	  of	  this	  remedy.	  In	  order	  to	  gauge	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  such	  remedies	   in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos,	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  study	  on	  this	  particular	  aspect	  
would	  be	  warranted,	  although	  such	  an	   investigation	  exceeds	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  present	  project.	  
What	   does	   emerge	   with	   greater	   clarity,	   however,	   is	   that	   individuals	   affected	   by	   LSLAs	   encounter	  
many	   hurdles	   in	   accessing	   justice,	   both	   in	   Laos	   and	   Cambodia.	   In	   a	   2012	   report,	   the	   UN	   Special	  
Rapporteur	  on	  extreme	  poverty	  and	  human	  rights	  developed	  an	  analytical	  structure	  for	  the	  analysis	  
of	   the	   obstacles	   in	   accessing	   justice	   that	   face	   people	   living	   in	   poverty.69	   The	   Special	   Rapporteur’s	  
framework	   identifies	   a	   set	   of	   macro-­‐categories	   whereby	   obstacles	   can	   be	   classified,	   and	   a	   large	  
number	   of	   issues	   identified	   in	   the	   framework	   reflect	   barriers	   that	   have	   emerged	   in	   the	   countries	  
under	   scrutiny.	   To	   select	   but	   two	  examples	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   the	  present	  paper,	   the	   categories	  
‘institutional	  and	  structural	  obstacles’	  and	  ‘social	  and	  cultural	  obstacles’	  can	  be	  briefly	  examined.	  	  
Under	   the	   first	   heading,	   in	   Cambodia	   for	   example	   we	   find	   physical	   accessibility	   issues	   affecting	  
persons	  living	  outside	  of	  urban	  centres	  and,	  therefore,	  not	  within	  easy	  reach	  of	  the	  courts.	  There	  are	  
detectable	  economic	  accessibility	  issues	  as	  well,	  which	  apply	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  are	  no	  fees	  
to	   lodge	   complaint	   but	   are	   rather,	   in	   terms	   of	   transportation	   costs,	   lost	  wages,	   and	   seeking	   legal	  
assistance,	  which	  may	  raise	  additional	  barriers	  for	  individuals.70	  In	  interviews	  with	  NGOs71	  it	  surfaced	  
that,	  in	  order	  to	  help	  overcome	  such	  barriers,	  a	  number	  of	  organizations	  have	  established	  paralegal	  
programs	  and	  ‘access	  to	  justice’	  programs	  throughout	  the	  country72,	  although	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	   According	   to	   a	   report	   by	   Bridges	   Across	   Borders	   Cambodia	   (BABC),	   the	   Center	   on	   Housing	   Rights	   and	  
Evictions	   (COHRE),	   and	   the	   Jesuit	   Refugee	   Service	   (JRS),	   around	   5’000	   cases	   have	   been	   received	   by	   the	  
Cadastral	  Commission	  between	  2002	  (year	  during	  which	  the	  first	  cases	  have	  been	  accepted)	  and	  2009;	  1653	  
have	  been	  resolved,	  1211	  have	  been	  rejected,	  220	  have	  been	  withdrawn,	  and	  1975	  were	  still	  pending	  in	  2010.	  
BABC,	   COHHRE,	   JRS,	  Untitled.	   Tenure	   Insecurity	   and	   Inequality	   in	   the	   Cambodian	   Land	   Sector,	   2009.	  On	   the	  
difficulty	  to	  use	  this	  kind	  of	  information	  and	  judge	  the	  efficiency	  of	  administrative	  mechanism	  to	  resolve	  land	  
disputes,	   see	   more	   generally	   the	   report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   extreme	   poverty	   and	   human	   rights,	  
Magdalena	  Sepulveda	  Carmona,	  UN	  Doc.	  A/67/278,	  9	  August	  2012.	  
68	  Interview	  by	  C.	  Golay	  in	  Laos	  in	  January	  2013.	  See	  also	  I.	  Baird,	  «	  Turning	  Land	  into	  Capital,	  Turning	  People	  
into	   Labour:	   Primitive	   Accumulation	   and	   the	   Arrival	   of	   Large-­‐Scale	   Economic	   Land	   Concessions	   in	   the	   Lao	  
People’s	  Democratic	  Republic	  »,	  New	  Proposals:	  Journal	  of	  Marxism	  and	  Interdisciplinary	  Inquiry,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  1,	  
2011,	  pp.	  10-­‐26.	  
69	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  extreme	  poverty	  and	  human	  rights,	  Magdalena	  Sepulveda	  Carmona,	  UN	  
Doc.	  A/67/278,	  9	  August	  2012.	  
70	  Ibid,	  §	  55.	  
71	  Interviews	  carried	  out	  by	  Dr.	  Irene	  Biglino	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  Cambodia,	  in	  January	  2013.	  





coverage	   and	   impact	   of	   such	   initiatives	   are.	   In	   addition	   to	   inadequate	   capacity	   and	   resources	  
affecting	  courts	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  corruption	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  as	  a	  key	  concern.	  It	  
has	   been	   reported	   that	   corruption	   of	   courts	   from	   companies	   and	   wealthy	   land	   purchasers	   is	   a	  
common	  problem.73	   It	   has	   also	  been	   suggested	   in	   the	   interviews	   that	   the	   independence	  of	   courts	  
may	  also	  be	  compromised	  by	  judges	  live	  in	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  or	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  or	  may	  be	  
threatened	   if	   they	  take	  positions	   in	   favour	  of	  plaintiffs	   to	  the	  detriment	  of	  companies	  or	  what	  are	  
referred	  to	  as	  ‘high	  ranking	  persons’	  in	  cases	  involving	  LSLAs.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  interviews	  it	  emerged	  
that	  courts	   in	  many	   instances	  have	  stated	  that	  they	  have	  no	   jurisdiction	   in	  order	  to	  refuse	  to	  hear	  
cases	  involving	  LSLAs,	  or	  use	  devices	  to	  suspend	  or	  prolong	  the	  proceedings	  indefinitely.	  Under	  what	  
the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  labels	  ‘social	  and	  cultural	  obstacles’,	  the	  Cambodian	  scenario	  there	  appears	  
to	   be	   characterized	   by	   a	   widespread	   mistrust	   of	   the	   justice	   system.	   According	   to	   a	   study	   by	  
Transparency	  International,	  the	  judiciary	  is	  perceived	  by	  Cambodians	  as	  the	  most	  corrupt	  institution	  
in	   the	  country,	   followed	  by	   the	  police	  and	  public	  officials.74	  What	  surfaced	   in	   the	   fieldwork	   is	   that	  
when	   individuals	  know	  that	  courts	  exist	  and	  that	  actions	  may	  be	   initiated	  before	  them	   in	  order	   to	  
claim,	  for	  example	  compensation	  or	  restitution,	  they	  don’t	  trust	  them.	  Others	  fail	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
judicial	  system	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  land	  disputes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  LSLAs	  because	  they	  fear	  reprisals.	  	  
International	  level	  
Against	   this	  backdrop,	   international	  human	  rights	  mechanisms	  have	  demonstrated	  a	  willingness	  to	  
address	  human	  rights	  implications	  of	  LSLAs,	  with	  different	  human	  rights	  actors	  addressing	  different	  
angles	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  
The	  United	  Nations	  treaty	  bodies	  –	  in	  particular	  the	  CESCR,	  CERD,	  CEDAW,	  and	  CRC	  –	  have	  tackled	  
the	  intersection	  between	  LSLAs	  and	  human	  rights,	  and	  issued	  recommendations	  to	  both	  Cambodia	  
and	   Laos.75	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   several	   common	   threads	   can	   be	   extracted	   from	   these	  
recommendations:	  (1)	  The	  actual	  or	  potential	  human	  rights	  implications	  of	  the	  internal	  displacement	  
and	  evictions	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  consequence	  to	  LSLAs,	  which	  often	  threatens	  livelihood	  opportunities.	  
(2)	  And	  the	  way	  in	  which	  LSLAs	  may	  negatively	  influence	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  
populations	   that	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   discrimination	   and	   face	   conditions	   of	   marginalization	   or	  
disadvantage	  have	  been	   identified	  as	  a	  key	   concern.	   (3)	  We	  can	  also	  add	   that	   land	  policy	   reforms	  
financed	  and	  promoted	  through	  development	  assistance	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  treaty	  bodies	  to	  entail	  
negative	   impacts	   on	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   human	   rights,	   i.e.	   when	   they	   focus	   on	   individual	   property	  
rights	  instead	  of	  collective	  or	  communal	  land	  titles.76	  
The	  UN	  Special	  Procedures	  of	   the	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  have	  also	  engaged	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   human	   rights	  
and	  LSLAs	  with	  both	  country	  mandates	  and	  thematic	  mandates.	  The	  best	  country	  mandate	  example	  
is	   the	   2012	   report	   by	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Cambodia,	   Surya	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Interviews	  carried	  out	  by	  Dr.	  Irene	  Biglino	  in	  Ratanakiri,	  Cambodia,	  in	  January	  2013.	  
74	  Transparency	  International,	  Country	  Profile	  Cambodia,	  2012.	  
75	  See	  in	  particular	  CESCR,	  Concluding	  Observations:	  Cambodia,	  UN	  Doc.	  E/C.12/KHM/CO/1,12	  June	  2009,	  §	  16,	  
30;	  CERD,	  Concluding	  Observations:	  Lao	  PDR,	  UN	  Doc.	  CERD/C/LAO/CO/16-­‐18,	  9	  March	  2012,	  	  §	  16-­‐17;	  CERD,	  
Concluding	  Observations:	  Cambodia,	  UN	  Doc.	  CERD/C/KHM/CO/8-­‐13,	  1	  April	  2010,	  §	  16;	  CEDAW,	  Concluding	  
Observations:	  Cambodia,	  UN	  Doc.	  CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/3,	  25	  January	  2006,	  §	  31;	  Committee	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  
the	   Child	   (CRC),	   Concluding	   Observations:	   Cambodia,	   UN	   Doc.	   CRC/C/KHM/CO/2,	   20	   June	   2011,	   §§	   61,	   61;	  
CEDAW,	  Concluding	  Observations:	  Lao	  People’s	  Democratic	  Republic,	  UN	  Doc.	  CEDAW/C/LAO/CO/7,	  14	  August	  
2009,	  §	  44,	  45.	  
76	  See	  in	  particular	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  CESCR	  addressed	  to	  Germany,	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  development	  
cooperation	   in	   Cambodia.	   CESCR,	   Concluding	   Observations:	   Germany,	   UN	   Doc.	   E/C.12/DEU/CO/5,	   20	   May	  




Subedi,	   focusing	   on	   LSLAs	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   human	   rights	   in	   this	   country.77	   Among	   many	  
recommendations,	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  called	  on	  Cambodia	  to	  assess	  the	   impact	  of	  concessions	  
on	   livelihood	   and	   income-­‐generating	   opportunities	   of	   affected	   families	   through	   a	   set	   of	   concrete	  
actions.	   Relevant	   government	   bodies	   and	   business	   enterprises	   were	   urged	   to	   comply	   with	   legal	  
requirements	  for	  public	  consultations.	  Surya	  Subedi	  also	  insisted	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  standards	  of	  free,	  
prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  must	  be	  rigorously	  applied	  when	  consulting	  with	  all	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
As	   we	   have	   also	   seen,	   the	   best	   thematic	   mandate	   example	   is	   the	   presentation	   by	   the	   Special	  
Rapporteur	   on	   the	   right	   to	   food	   of	   a	   set	   of	   human	   rights	   principles	   applicable	   to	   large-­‐scale	   land	  
acquisitions	  and	  leases,	  to	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  in	  March	  2010.78	  
If	  NGOs	  have	  often	  been	  at	   the	  origin	  of	   concrete	   recommendations	  addressed	  by	  UN	  monitoring	  
mechanisms	  to	  the	  governments	  of	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos,	  they	  have	  not	  properly	  used	  the	  possibility	  
to	   send	   communications	   to	   UN	   treaty	   bodies	   and	   Special	   Procedures	   in	   case	   of	   human	   rights	  
violations	  associated	  with	  LSLAs.	  In	  the	  future,	  they	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  use	  this	  possibility,	  and	  
send	  communications	  to	  relevant	  Special	  Rapporteurs	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council,	  including	  those	  
on	   the	   rights	   to	   food,	   water,	   housing,	   education,	   water	   and	   sanitation,	   health,	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples,	   and	   extreme	   poverty	   and	   human	   rights79,	   and	   to	   the	   Committee	   on	   the	  
Elimination	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  Women	  in	  case	  of	  violations	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  
3.4.	  Conclusion	  
To	  respond	  to	  the	  research	  question	  related	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  LSLAs,	  we	  identified	  human	  rights	  
violations	   associated	   with	   LSLAs	   and	   analysed	   the	   role	   that	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   monitoring	  
mechanisms	   play	   (or	   could	   play)	   in	   mitigating	   the	   tensions	   related	   to	   LSLAs	   and	   protecting	   the	  
human	  rights	  of	  local	  populations.	  Our	  findings	  are	  contrasted.	  Human	  rights	  are	  well	  recognized	  in	  
Cambodia	  and	  Laos,	  and	  national	  laws	  are	  adequate,	  which	  represent	  a	  good	  basis	  for	  evaluating	  the	  
impacts	  of	  LSLAs.	  But	  these	  human	  rights	  instruments	  and	  national	  laws	  are	  poorly	  implemented	  in	  
both	   countries.	   And	   despite	   a	   constructive	   role	   played	   by	   international	   monitoring	   mechanisms,	  
human	  rights	  violations	  are	  widespread	  in	  the	  context	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia.	  
It	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  reach	  a	  conclusion	  regarding	  the	  role	  that	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  monitoring	  
and	  judicial	  mechanisms	  play	  in	  mitigating	  the	  tensions	  related	  to	  LSLAs	  and	  protecting	  the	  human	  
rights	  of	  local	  populations.	  International	  mechanisms	  play	  their	  role	  in	  monitoring	  the	  human	  rights	  
situation	   and	   making	   recommendations	   to	   the	   governments	   of	   Cambodia	   and	   Laos,	   and	   they	  
certainly	   offer	   one	   of	   the	   few	   avenues	   that	   exist	   to	   seek	   remedies	   for	   violations	   of	   human	   rights	  
associated	   with	   LSLAs	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   But	   they	   are	   hardly	   heard.	   It	   is	   also	   difficult	   to	  
understand	   how	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   monitoring	   and	   judicial	   mechanisms	   could	   play	   a	   more	  
positive	  and	  efficient	   role,	  without	   looking	  at	  a	  broader	   range	  of	   issues,	  and	   in	  particular	   the	   links	  
between	  democracy,	  development,	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights.80	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We	   have	   created	   or	   identified	   typologies	   in	   the	   three	   parts	   of	   our	   research.	   In	   the	   first	   part,	   we	  
identified	   three	  major	   patterns	   in	   the	   processes	   leading	   to	   LSLAs	   in	   Cambodia	   and	   Laos,	   in	  which	  
national,	   provincial	   and	   local	   authorities	   play	   different	   roles.	   We	   also	   identified	   three	   types	   of	  
recurrent	   linkages	   among	   key	   factors,	   each	  manifesting	   its	   specific	   spatial	   signature:	   the	  marginal	  
people,	   marginal	   investments,	   and	   marginal	   land	   types	   of	   interaction.	   In	   the	   second	   part,	   we	  
identified	   various	   degrees	   of	   dispossession	   affecting	   local	   populations	   in	   relation	   to	   LSLAs,	   and	  
classified	   them	   as	   extreme,	   severe	   and	   partial.	   We	   also	   identified	   five	   types	   of	   livelihoods	  
transformation	   reflecting	   how	   households	   were	   affected	   by	   and	   could	   respond	   to	   the	   politics	   of	  
dispossession,	  the	  main	  transformation	  of	  their	  economic	  activities	  and,	  how/if	  they	  have	  managed	  
or	  not	  to	  engage	  into	  the	  rubber-­‐boom.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  third	  part	  we	  identified	  three	  types	  of	  human	  
rights	  violations	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos:	  human	  rights	  violations	  
associated	  with	  forced	  displacement	  and	  evictions;	  violations	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  rights,	  including	  
their	  right	  to	  an	  adequate	  standard	  of	  living;	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  associated	  with	  land	  policy	  
reforms	   financed	   and	   promoted	   through	   development	   assistance,	   such	   as	   those	   focusing	   on	  
individual	  property	  rights	  instead	  of	  collective	  or	  communal	  land	  titles.	  
The	  analysis	  of	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  shows	  that	  LSLAs	   in	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	  are	   far	   from	  an	  
ideal	  world	   in	  which	   land	   governance	  would	   guide	   land	   investments	   and	   land	   investments	  would	  
increase	  land	  based	  revenues	  and	  prosperity.	  Only	  one	  type	  -­‐	  ‘marginal	  land’	  -­‐	  actually	  pursues	  such	  
logic	   and	   this	   type	   is	   starting	   to	   emerge	   only	   in	   Laos.	   The	   current	   dominant	   type	   of	   interaction	  
between	   LSLA	   processes	   and	   agrarian	   context	   we	   could	   observe	   is	   clearly	   the	   type	   we	   labelled	  
‘marginal	   people’,	   whereby	   the	   primacy	   of	   economic	   development	   strategies	   and	   close	   linkages	  
between	  investors	  and	  political	  elites	  determine	  top-­‐down	  land	  granting	  processes,	  which	  ignore	  the	  
specificity	   of	   agrarian	   contexts	   or	   even	   adapt	   them	   to	   their	   needs,	   with	   ‘available	   land’	   being	  
constructed	  through	  land	  laws	  and	  policies	  weakening	  the	  traditional	  tenure.	  
Our	   findings	   show	   that	   in-­‐depth	   field	   research	   is	   crucial	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   “fascination	   with	   big	  
numbers”	   (Oya,	   2013)	   and	   the	   “here	   and	   now”	   (Edelman	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   primacy	   of	   land	   grabbing	  
research.	   Focusing	   initially	   on	   large-­‐scale	   land	   acquisitions,	   our	   case	   studies	   reveal	   that	  
comparatively	   medium-­‐	   and	   small-­‐size	   ones,	   which	   represent	   substantial	   areas	   of	   land,	   have	  
accompanied	  the	  largest	  acquisitions.	  All	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  to	  appreciate	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
land	   loss	   for	   the	   populations	   who	   previously	   derived	   their	   livelihoods	   from	   those	   spaces	   and	  
resources.	  Similarly,	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  our	  project	  was	  the	  wave	  of	  LSLAs	  that	  occurred	  from	  the	  
mid-­‐2000s;	   field	   research	   has	   shown	   that	   earlier	   public	   policies	   had	   prepared	   for	   the	   radical	  
transformation	  of	  land	  tenure	  and	  land	  use	  whereby	  customary	  tenure	  and	  shifting	  cultivation	  were	  
fought	  by	  governments.	  In	  the	  current	  transition	  from	  family	  farming-­‐based	  livelihoods	  to	  economic	  
activities	   system	   in	   which	   off-­‐farm	   job	   has	   become	   crucial,	   large-­‐size	   landholdings	   do	   not	   create	  
enough	  job	  for	  native	  populations	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  resources	  they	  derived	  from	  farming	  
their	  land.	  New	  opportunities	  linked	  to	  the	  development	  of	  large-­‐scale	  landholdings,	  cash	  crops	  and	  
stronger	  urban-­‐rural	  interconnectedness	  are	  undeniable,	  but	  it	  benefits	  just	  a	  few.	  	  
Our	   research	   in	   Cambodia	   and	   Laos	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	  work	   of	  UN	  monitoring	   bodies	   show	   that	  
several	  human	  rights	  are	  violated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  LSLAs	  in	  Cambodia	  and	  Laos.	  We	  have	  found	  that	  
the	   rights	   that	   are	   most	   frequently	   violated	   in	   LSLA	   settings	   are	   the	   right	   to	   food,	   the	   rights	   of	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indigenous	  peoples	  to	  dispose	  of	  their	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources,	  the	  rights	  to	  housing	  and	  not	  to	  
be	  forcibly	  evicted,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  water.	  In	  turn,	  violations	  of	  these	  rights	  tend	  to	  trigger	  a	  wider	  
pool	   of	   infringements	   such	   as	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   education,	   healthcare,	   and	   violations	   of	   cultural	  
rights.	  We	  also	   found	  that	  procedural	   rights,	  such	  as	  the	  rights	  to	  participation,	  consultation,	  prior	  
free	   and	   informed	   consent,	   and	   access	   to	   effective	   remedies,	   including	   adequate	   relocation	   and	  
compensation,	   are	   also	   threatened	   in	   the	   context	   of	   LSLAs.	   National	   laws	   are	   generally	   good	   in	  
Cambodia	   and	   Laos,	   but	   they	   are	   poorly	   implemented.	   Administrative	  mechanisms	   to	   respond	   to	  
human	   rights	   violations	   are	   poor	   in	   Cambodia	   and	   almost	   non-­‐existent	   in	   Laos,	   and	   what	   does	  
emerge	  with	  great	  clarity	  is	  that	  individuals	  affected	  by	  LSLAs	  encounter	  many	  hurdles	  in	  accessing	  
justice	   in	   both	   countries.	   In	   this	   context,	   holding	   States	   accountable	   for	   human	   rights	   violations	  
stemming	   from	   LSLAs	   is	   a	   cause	   for	   concern,	   and	   international	   mechanisms	   offer	   an	   avenue	   for	  
seeking	  accountability.	  
The	  challenges	  of	  future	  research	  include	  the	  need	  to	  integrate	  the	  typologies	  and	  analyze	  how	  they	  
interact.	   It	  will	  also	  be	   important	   to	  perform	  extrapolations	  across	  Laos	  and	  Cambodia	   in	  order	   to	  
assess	  the	  reach	  and	  validity	  of	  our	  findings	  and	  to	  derive	  evidence	  for	  policy	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  
Among	   the	   research	   opportunities	   ahead,	   one	   is	   to	   follow-­‐up	   the	   current	   transformation	   of	  
livelihoods	   that	   we	   have	   highlighted,	   in	   particular	   to	   see	   (1)	   whether	   the	   smallholders	   who	   have	  
invested	   into	   rubber	   will	   manage	   to	   turn	   their	   investment	   into	   profit	   in	   an	   economic	   system	  
dominated	  by	  large-­‐size	  actors;	  (2)	  if	  more	  households	  will	  manage	  to	  invest	  into	  rubber,	  and	  (3)	  if	  
the	  mass	  of	  part-­‐time	  farmers	  and	  rural	  workers	  will	  be	  able	  to	  further	  resilience	  or	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  
definite	   withdrawal	   from	   farming	   and	   distress	  migration.	   It	   will	   also	   be	   important	   to	   deepen	   the	  
analysis	   of	   the	   links	   between	   democracy,	   development,	   and	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   in	   both	  
countries,	   to	  better	  understand	  how	  human	   rights	   can	  play	  a	  more	  efficient	   role	   in	  mitigating	   the	  
tensions	  related	  to	  LSLAs	  and	  protecting	  human	  rights	  of	  local	  populations.	  
Last,	  we	  would	   like	   to	   draw	   the	   attention	   to	   key	  opportunities	   for	   future	   research	  with	   regard	   to	  
more	  sustainable	  land	  investments.	  It	  needs	  to	  address	  the	  potentials	  of	  transforming	  and	  improving	  
the	   interfaces	   between	   i)	   agrarian	   contexts	   and	   their	   representation	   in	   land	   governance	   through	  
institutional	  innovations,	  empowerment,	  and	  information;	  ii)	  land	  governance	  and	  LSLAs	  through	  the	  
design	  of	  sustainability	  standards	  and	  the	  better	  implementation	  of	  voluntary	  guidelines	  and	  binding	  
laws	  and	   treaties,	  and	   iii)	   land	   investments	  and	  agrarian	  context	   through	  negotiation	  and	   learning	  
tool	  allowing	  to	  develop	  innovative	  farming	  practices	  such	  as	  out-­‐grower	  schemes	  and	  cooperatives.	  
The	  transformative	  potential	  of	  these	  interfaces	  will	  be	  decisive	  for	  the	  future	  of	  agrarian	  transitions	  
in	   Laos	   and	   Cambodia	   currently	   standing	   at	   crossroads	   between	   new	   forms	   of	   rural	   poverty	   and	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